Document Title:	Examining Radicalization's Risk and Protective Factors: A Case-Control Study of Violent Extremists, Non-Violent Criminal Extremists, Non-offending Extremists & Regular Violent Offenders
Author(s):	Steven Chermak, Ph.D., Joshua Freilich, PhD., Arun Ross, Ph.D., Noah Turner
Document Number:	309279
Date Received:	July 2024
Award Number:	2020-ZA-CX-0001

FINAL RESEARCH REPORT

FEDERAL AGENCY:	National Institute of Justice
FEDERAL AWARD NUMBER:	2020-ZA-CX-OOO1
PROJECT TITLE:	Examining Radicalization's Risk and Protective Factors: A Case-control Study of Violent Extremists, Non-violent criminal extremists, Non-offending Extremists & Regular Violent Offenders
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS:	Dr. Steven Chermak Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824 chermak@msu.edu, 517-316-6622 Dr. Joshua Freilich, John Jay College of Criminal Justice jfreilich@jjay.cuny.edu Dr. Arun Ross, Michigan State University rossarun@msu.edu
PROJECT MANAGER:	Noah Turner, Michigan State University/National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center (NCITE) Turne429@msu.edu
RECIPIENT ORGANIZATION:	Michigan State University 426 Auditorium Road, Room 2 East Lansing, MI 48824
PROJECT/GRANT PERIOD:	1/1/2021-12/31/2023
PROJECT AWARD AMOUNT:	$771,610

SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT

1. Major Goals and Objectives

Understanding the pathways that lead to politically and/or religiously motivated violence or terrorism remains a pressing concern. Despite extraordinary commitment and effort to better understand the threat of terrorism and respond more effectively to it, there is considerable empirical evidence that domestic terrorists continue to pose a significant danger to public safety. There is a great need for more innovative empirical investigations of the problem. Recent reports and analyses of the leading terrorism databases conclude that the terrorism threat remains significant and is a multifaceted cumbersome issue to address (Jackson, et al., 2019; McGinty, 2019; Powers, 2019; Rasvandal, 2019; Wray, 2018).

Government efforts to respond to the terrorism threat have been extraordinary. NIJ has, for instance, sponsored impressive studies to identify promising programs by empirically evaluating these efforts.   It is hard to believe but less than 10 years ago, theoretical work and pathways to radicalization was only in its infancy and empirical studies on the topic were rare (Borum, 2011a; 2011b). Aisha Javed Qureshi (2020) and Allison Smith (2018a; 2018b) reviewed NIJ's domestic radicalization portfolio and conclude that there have been significant advancements to understand better the risk factors and the processes leading to radicalization. Other assessments focused on methodological issues in terrorism and radicalization studies (Chermak, et al., 2012; Freilich & LaFree, 2016; Schuurman, 2020; Silke, 2008), and concluded that methodologies and data have improved significantly.

Despite these important empirical and methodological advances, key issues remain unaddressed. The post-9/11 investment in research infrastructure and support for creating and maintaining terrorist databases has resulted in increased quantitative terrorism studies that test

theory and use comparison groups. This growing interest in terrorism generally has led to the application of criminological theory to better understand domestic pathways to terrorism and radicalization (Freilich & LaFree, 2016; Freilich et al., 2014; 2015; Smith and Damphousse, 2009), identified risk and protective factors of interest (Smith, 2018a; b), and influenced the development and use of risk assessment tools (Clemmow 2020; Gill, 2015; Meloy & Gill, 2016; Sarma, 2017). These efforts have begun to aid efforts to prevent terrorism, but there remains a need to enhance the current understanding of key variables, (Borum, 2015; see also, Atran, et al., 2017; Monahan, 2012; Gill, 2015; Sarma, 2017), by exploring the influence of protective factors (Smith 2018b: 3) and considering differences using comparative analyses.

This project fills an important gap; it is the first-ever study to comparatively examine the presence/absence of risk and protective factors across three groups: (i) extremist individuals who committed ideologically motivated violent (fatal and non-fatal violent attacks) and nonviolent (financial) crimes, (ii) extremists who did not break the law and only engaged in legal extremist activities, and (iii) persons who committed non-ideological motivated homicides and other violent attacks. In addition, the project is methodologically unique in that although case-control is widely used to study public health and medical problems, no prior study has used this approach to compare violent and nonviolent criminal extremists to nonoffending extremists and regular violent offenders.

Thus, we accomplished four major goals/objectives in this project. First, although there has been a good amount of radicalization and risk assessment-related research on risk and protective factors, we expand this work with comparative analyses that have not been previously explored. Second, few studies compared violent or nonviolent criminal extremists to nonoffending extremists or other types of violent offenders like we examine here (Horgan &

Gill, 2016; Pyrooz et al., 2017). Third, terrorism studies still face significant methodological and statistical limitations (Borum, 2011a; b; Freilich & LaFree, 2015; Monahan, 2012; Smith 2018a; b). Our case-control approach will provide an empirically robust understanding of categorical differences across groups that have not yet been achieved. Fourth, the DHS, FBI, and the NCTC published a listing of observable behavioral mobilization signs that could indicate someone is planning to commit an act of extremist violence. Examples include seeking religious or political justification for an attack or attempting to recruit others like peers, and family members to commit extremist violence. Since our sample contains both violent and non-violent criminal extremists motivated by different ideologies, and both non-offending extremists and regular violent offenders, we also investigated the presence of these indicators before offending (Director of National Intelligence, 2021).

2. Research Questions

Our research questions focus on exploring differences in risk and protective factors across important dimensions. Specifically, we answer the following questions:

a. How does the presence of risk and protective variables vary when comparing violent ideological offenders to nonviolent criminal ideological offenders?

b. How does the presence of risk and protective variables vary when comparing ideological offenders to nonoffending extremists?

c. How does the presence of risk and protective variables vary when comparing ideological homicide offenders to regular homicide offenders?

d. How does the presence of risk and protective variables vary when comparing jihadist, far right, and far left extremists?

e. How does the presence of risk and protective variables vary when comparing jihadist, far right, and far left ideological offenders to jihadist, far right, and far left noncriminal extremists?

f. How do indicators of extremist mobilization vary by the violent/non-violent ideological extremists and across type of ideological motivation (jihadist, far right, far left)?

3. Research Design, Methods, Analytical and Data Analysis

3.1 Creating the Risk and Protective Factor Database (RPFD)

A number of databases are typically used to study terrorism and extremism in the United States, including the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), American Terrorist Study (ATS), Profiles of Individual Radicalization (PIRUS), and the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB). It has been argued that robust evidence only comes with replication using diverse data sources to produce differentiation (Losel, 2017; Silke, 2008). Here we used the ECDB to identify the violent and nonviolent offenders for the study, and then used a case control methodology to identify the nonoffending extremists and the regular violent offenders. We then updated the case source files for the ECDB cases, and systemically collected open-source documents on the nonoffending extremist and regular violent offender groups. We used the source file documents to code risk and protective factors. These data are included in the Risk and Protective Factor Database (RPFD) (See Appendix XX for the RPFD's codebook). We next discuss the data collection process.

3.2 Case Control Design: Generating the Cases and Controls

Case control is a methodology that is often used in the public health and biomedical fields to examine factors associated with the disease—the case control design samples on the dependent variable. The control samples are drawn from the population of offenders who are eligible for the event of interest but have not committed an ideologically motivated offense. Comparisons are made between case and control samples to identify differences in covariates. Sampling on the dependent variable is often more efficient than taking a large random sample to understand these rare events. Researchers argue that case-control studies are particularly well designed to study rare phenomena, as well as to study risk and protective factors (Sedgwick, 2014; Kleck & Jackson, 2016; Grella et al., 2013; Kellerman, 1993).

Through a case-control research design, we compare violent and nonviolent criminal extremists to non-offending extremists and non-extremist violent offenders identified through multiple data collection methodologies. The case controls were identified using open-source search methodologies. The case-control method is appropriate for this research as it compares similar individuals who live in similar geographic and temporal locations, allowing for an analysis of theoretically important variables, while controlling for macro-level variation such as differences in communities across time and place. Our research design compares radicalized/extremists who have been convicted of an ideologically motivated crime (the cases) to: 1). similar non-extremist offenders (homicides, attempted homicides, and assaults) from the same population that could have been radicalized, but were not, and 2)—those who were radicalized but did not offend—nonoffending extremists (the controls). Often, in case-control designs, the base population is limited to a specific temporal and geographic location, a method that appeals to a study where the event of interest, in this case, a crime committed by an extremist, has only occurred in a very small percentage of areas in the country. To ensure both

the cases and the controls are from the same population of interest, any limitations or restrictions placed on the researcher when identifying the cases must also be used when identifying the controls (Armenian, 2009).

Importantly, cases and controls are not matched, instead, controls are deemed part of the same base population and are randomly selected from the sampling frame (Schlesselman, 1982). For the criminal offenders, specifically, limiting eligible homicide offenders based on certain criteria is merely an attempt to identify the population of interest for the research. Although matching is common in case-control research, it can be difficult and increases the complexity of the research with minimal gain. Issues with matching include overmatching, matching on variables that might be of interest, and decreasing the sample size. When using matched data, pairs are analyzed together, reducing the size of the sample by half. In addition, matched cases and controls with the same responses are removed from the analysis, further lowering the sample size (Armenian, 2009). Therefore, we used only demographic information (gender and age) and geographic (county) and temporal (+/- three years) location of their offense to identify the controls.

For the first control group, non-extremist criminal offenders who met the demographic, geographic, and temporal parameters were identified using open-source methodologies. Violent crimes are generally newsworthy events and thus we set search parameters for county and time period. We then identified five control events where the perpetrator's age and gender were reported. We then randomly selected one of these events as a control. If, during this process, it was determined that the individual did not fit our inclusion criteria for a control (e.g., we found they were not connected to the offense or did not meet the demographic characteristics used to identify our control groups), we replaced them with the next person in the sampling frame. When

we were unable to find an adequate number of control cases, we extended the time period and/or the geographic region (adjacent counties) to identify additional possibilities. Importantly, the goal of our approach is not to match the cases and controls one for one, but to have the sample of the controls approximate our population of extremists.

For the second control group, non-offenders who have been radicalized, we similarly used open-source data methodologies to identify individuals with extremist beliefs who lived in the same locations and were active during the same periods as the extremist criminal offenders. These controls were significantly more time-consuming to identify and there were fewer control options generally available. However, we succeeded in identifying controls for most offending extremists. We used several different open sources to generate potential controls. For example, news media frequently cover protest events and marches. Thus, leaders and members of Klan groups, militia organizations, and neo-Nazi groups would be identified in these articles. Scholars and policy-focused groups often discuss the activities of groups of different ideologies and highlight active individuals in such groups. Moreover, we supplemented with social media searches to identify individuals who publicly aligned themselves with the extremist ideologies studied.

Importantly, we developed a coding scheme to demonstrate commitment to radical beliefs and justify our inclusion in this control pool. This coding scheme was also used for the criminal extremists in our database.

3.3. Data Collection Strategy

Our project's data collection strategy was divided into three phases. In the first phase, we refined the ECDB codebook to better capture risk and protective factors. Second, after the cases and controls were added to the RPFD, we followed established open-source data collection

protocols to collect documents on the cases and controls (Freilich et al., 2014; 2024). There is strong evidence that the current social media and traditional media landscape provide at least some information on most homicides. In the best-case scenarios, the data that can be collected is superior to that reported in the SHR (Parkin & Gruenewald, 2017). In addition, open-source data collection has been used in many peer-reviewed publications in high-profile and high-impact factor journals. For this study, highly focused search protocols provided a wealth of information related to risk and protective factors for the controls, provided new data on existing cases (e.g., the cases selected from the ECDB), and filled in missing values from data already collected. These searches provided data that allowed us to code attributes of both our cases and control groups including offenders or non-offenders, radicalized or not, and also allowed us to highlight the type of source data available for each case (e.g., open-source data that comes from social media, journalistic accounts, police records, court records, and public records databases). Third, we quantitatively analyzed these data.

3.3a. Phase 1: Development and Testing of Constructs

In September 2019, the PIs were invited to attend and present at the National Institute of Justice's Topical Meeting on Rare Incident Data Collection Models in San Antonio. This two-day meeting included select research teams employing open-source data collection strategies and highlighted opportunities and challenges. In addition, we received seed funding ($70,000) from our home institutions (MSU/John Jay) to explore and develop strategies to deal with such challenges. One challenge was developing the constructs. This preliminary work was beneficial to the current project for several reasons. First, we created a codebook to capture risk and protective factors at different levels of analysis. We pretested the constructs and invested significant time refining our operationalization of these variables (see codebook in Appendix).

Second, we developed a process to collect these data from extant source materials and devised an efficient thorough search protocol to minimize missing data.

We discovered that the ECDB already captures an impressive number of risk and protective factors at the individual, family, group, and community as well as many warning behaviors. As one can see from the codebook, a few examples of variables available included demographic, socioeconomic status, and specific individual characteristics (e.g., abuse and psychological concerns, family relationships, peer associations, employment history, criminal history, extremist history, and social life), Internet usage, and pro-social factors such as employment, drug and alcohol rehabilitation, military service, the development of long term emotional relationships, including marriage, friendships, and childbirth. We then extended this work to include other variables from the radicalization and risk and protective factor literature. This allowed us to (i) analyze these relationships and (ii) determine what can and cannot be collected from open sources.

3.3b. Phase 2: Sampling Plan, Data Collection, Coding, and Cleaning

Sampling Plan. The ECDB was created by identifying incidents and suspects through various open-source types, including existing databases, official government reports, watch-group reports, academic and scholarly work, the media, and other sources (Freilich et al., 2014). We have approximately 3,000 perpetrators available for analysis, and we randomly selected 499 (258 violent/241 nonviolent) of them.

Data Collection, Coding, and Cleaning. For each offender, we reviewed the open-source materials that were already uncovered on ECDB incidents to identify relevant information. We then created new search documents for the two control groups. We conducted systematic open-source searches using over 35 Internet-based search engines following the ECDB protocol. This

information was analyzed for each perpetrator concerning the presence of the key constructs. Second, one of the concerns about relying on open-source data is the threat caused by having missing data. Although there are various strategies to deal with missing data problems (e.g., imputation), it is vital to systematically access additional information from various sources including public data aggregators. For this project, we used open access to federal (PACER) and state/local (Judy Records) court records, as well as public record aggregators (True People Search) to fill in missing values.

3.3c. Phase 3: Analysis Plan

Once data collection was completed, we exported the data into a statistical software program for analysis. Below we present frequencies and prevalence rates for selected perpetrator attributes (e.g., age, gender, nationality, etc.), behavioral patterns (e.g., suspect role, group affiliation, etc.), and all constructs related to risk, protective, and mobilization indicators. We provide this information for the cases (criminal offending extremists) and the controls (nonoffending extremists; non-extremist offenders). In addition, we present these data for violent and nonviolent criminal extremists and by different ideological affiliations (far right, far left, and Islamic Extremists). We will present descriptive statistics for ideological violent and nonviolent, ideological and regular homicide, and attempted homicide offenders, by ideological type. These data were an important precursor to the multivariate statistical analysis.

In terms of multivariate modeling, many outcome measures related to our research questions were dichotomous and straightforward. We tested if each risk and protective factor is significantly more likely to be present in offenders who committed violent ideologically motivated attacks compared to the control groups.

4 | Expected Applicability of the Research

The study's results apply to law enforcement officials, other local leaders, and policymakers working to develop innovative solutions for mitigating the domestic pathways to terrorism. As strategies for countering violent extremism evolve, these results will be extraordinarily valuable for directing resources to areas and programs where they will be most effective and can be enhanced. We also expect the study to contribute significantly to the scientific literature, which currently lacks rigorous research designs on this topic and limited application of risk and protective factors. Insights into these factors should inform prevention strategies. There is great potential for refining risk assessments. The FBI, DHS and NCTC and other law enforcement officers and analysts will be especially interested in our empirical investigation of the behavioral indicators of future violent extremism and identification of other warning signs. Our goal is to provide law enforcement and intelligence communities with empirically informed comparative knowledge to determine the types of behaviors that are most likely to predict violent behaviors. Our comparative assessment by ideological type will also help in deciding whether different strategies need to be used for different types of offenders. Thus, the combination of data about perpetrators, compared to nonviolent, non-offending extremists and generalized homicide offenders, make this project unique and helps pinpoint investigative priorities.

5 | Participants and Other Collaborating Organizations

Other than the PIs, project managers, research assistants, and their respective universities, there are no other participants or collaborating organizations to report.

6 | Changes in Approach from Original Design and Reason for Change (if applicable)

Initially, the project was scheduled to end on December 31st, 2022, but we requested and were granted a one-year no-cost extension (NCE) until December 31st, 2023. We required the NCE due to extenuating circumstances that occurred. First, the project did not begin on January 1st, 2021, but was delayed due to the logistics of receiving an IRB review (that found the research to be non-human subjects), getting the privacy certificate signed, setting up accounts at both of our universities and related issues. Second, and importantly, this project was labor intensive and dependent upon students working as RAs. We needed RAs to locate all publicly available information on the adolescent enrolled student shooters, and those in our comparison group samples. We also used RAs to "clean" our searched cases and then code them. We needed to have a well-trained and consistent team (with limited turnover) in place. Unfortunately, due to Covid 19 and related issues, we had delays in recruiting and training RAs. We also had difficulties in maintaining the teams and had some RA turnover that delayed our progress. Ultimately though, we recruited and assembled a strong team and completed the project.

7 | Outcomes

7.1 | Activities/accomplishments

As noted, we developed a database that includes a significant number of risk and protective factors, as well as warning behaviors, that allow for comparisons between 1. offending extremists (violent v. nonviolent), 2. ideological offenders and nonoffenders; 3. ideologically motivated v. non-ideologically motivated violent offenders, 4. Jihadi v. far right v. far left; and 5. Offending v. nonoffending extremists by ideological type. This data will be available to scholars via ICPSR. We also created a codebook so that we could identify factors that distinguish the different groups

and address our research questions. In addition, we have begun presenting this work at national conferences and will begin moving papers to publication in 2024.

7.2 | Results and findings

Findings from our analysis are organized by our research objectives stated in Section 2. Our analysis is two-fold. We begin with a descriptive assessment of all the risk and protective factor variables included in the RPFD. We present data for over fifty risk and protective variables and thus organize the presentation of findings by six general categories. These categories are sociodemographic, familial/social factors, negative life events, psychological/personality, ideological factors, and criminal history. We pay particular attention to differences between the groups being compared and explore possible explanations for the results we observe. From this descriptive assessment, we selected specific variables to be included in multivariate models for each outcome of interest in line with our research objectives.

We used two criteria to select variables. First, we evaluate each variable's proportion of missing data since variables with a high amount of missing data make converging a multivariate model difficult. We only included variables with little or no missing data in the multivariate models. Second, variables were selected for the multivariate analysis based on their relevance, which is surmised through our descriptive assessment. Variables with high prevalences and/or greater differences between groups are deemed especially relevant and we include such variables in the multivariate models.

The type of multivariate models we estimate are dependent on the outcome of interest. If the outcome is a binary dependent variable, then we estimate a binary logistic regression model

for our multivariate assessment. If the outcome is categorical, however, we estimate a
multinomial logistic regression model to investigate differences across groups.

**RQ1: How do the presence of risk and protective variables vary when comparing violent
ideological offenders to nonviolent criminal ideological offenders?**

We begin by addressing our first research aim of discerning differences in risk and protective
factors between extremists who committed violent crimes and extremists who committed
nonviolent crimes.

Table 1a. Socio-demographic Factors

Variable	Violent Extremist (n=258)	Nonviolent Criminal Extremist (n=241)
Gender		
Female	16 (6.20%)	43 (17.84%)
Male	242 (93.80%)	198 (82.16%)
Age	30.36	40.08
Race/Ethnicity		
White, non-Hispanic	129 (50.00%)	126 (52.28%)
Black, non-Hispanic	62 (24.03%)	26 (10.79%)
Middle Eastern/North African	41 (15.89%)	33 (13.69%)
Other	24 (9.30%)	34 (14.11%)
Missing	2 (0.78%)	22 (9.13%)
Current Living		
Urban	106 (41.09%)	106 (43.98%)
Suburban	77 (29.84%)	74 (30.71%)
Rural	50 (19.38%)	40 (16.60%)
Missing	25 (9.69%)	21 (8.71%)
Foreign Born		
Foreign Born	60 (23.26%)	51 (21.16%)
U.S. – Born	189 (73.26%)	166 (68.88%)
Missing	9 (3.49%)	24 (9.96%)
Religiosity		
Secular	23 (8.91%)	10 (4.15%)
Somewhat Religious	36 (13.95%)	23 (9.54%)
Very Religious	91 (35.27%)	61 (25.31%)
Missing	108 (41.86%)	147 (61.00%)

Education		
Homeschool	3 (1.16%)	2 (0.83%)
Some School	41 (15.89%)	10 (4.15%)
High School Diploma/GED	49 (18.99%)	23 (9.54%)
Some college or vocational	67 (25.97%)	52 (21.58%)
College graduate	24 (9.30%)	61 (25.31%)
Missing	74 (28.68%)	93 (38.59%)
Employment History		
Never employed	23 (8.91%)	9 (3.73%)
Sporadically employed	113 (43.80%)	47 (19.50%)
Regularly employed	69 (26.74%)	127 (52.70%)
Missing	53 (20.54%)	58 (24.07%)
Socioeconomic Status		
Low	165 (63.95%)	75 (31.12%)
Middle	49 (18.99%)	60 (24.90%)
High	6 (2.33%)	70 (29.05%)
Missing	38 (14.73%)	36 (14.94%)
Home Ownership		
Rent	146 (56.59%)	44 (18.26%)
Own Home	30 (11.63%)	49 (20.33%)
Homeless	9 (3.49%)	6 (2.49%)
Missing	73 (28.29%)	142 (58.92%)
Military Experience		
No	218 (84.50%)	224 (92.95%)
Yes	40 (15.50%)	17 (7.05%)

Sociodemographic Factors

The sociodemographic profiles of violent extremists (hereafter, VEs) and nonviolent criminal

extremists (hereafter, NVCEs) are similar in many ways, but do diverge on key factors. Their

racial and ethnic composition is comparable, with a slightly higher percentage of Black offenders

amongst VEs (24% vs. 11%). Their area of living is similar, with a relatively equal percentage of

offenders distributed between urban, suburban, and rural settings. There is no substantive

difference in the percentage of VEs and NVCEs who are foreign-born, and they also demonstrate

similar levels of religiosity, albeit VEs are deemed "very religious" more frequently.

However, VEs are more often male (93% vs. 82%), and on average are nearly 10 years

younger than NVCEs. NVCEs are also more likely to have a college degree (25% vs 9%), with

most VEs having a high school diploma/GED (19%) or some college or vocational education (26%). Additionally, NVCEs are much more likely to have a stable employment history than VEs (53% vs. 27%), with VEs more often having erratic work histories (44%). These findings may explain why nearly 30% of NVCEs have high socioeconomic status (SES), compared to only 2% of VEs. This finding also adds some context to home ownership, as over half of VEs rent their home compared to only 20% of NVCEs. Finally, VEs were twice as likely to have served in the military(15% vs. 7%), a finding that will be expanded on in later sections.

Familial/Social Factors

Next, we turn to the familial and social factors. VEs are more likely to be single than NVCEs (42% v. 22%), with nearly 60% of NVCEs being married or partnered compared to about 41% of VEs. VEs are also slightly more likely to not have children than NVCEs (42% vs. 30%). These findings are reflected in evaluating the offenders' living arrangements, as a plurality of NVCEs lived with their spouse/children (35%), differing from VEs who were more equally distributed across living with spouse/children (17%), living with family (18%), living with non-family (18%), and living alone (14%).

VEs and NVCEs also differ in their relationship with parents and family members. While the high percentage of missing data on offender's parental history makes this variable difficult to interpret, we can discern VEs often have parents who are divorced (23%), deceased (7%), or who were never married (5%), with only about 21% having parents who are currently married. Additionally, compared to NVCEs, VEs were noticeably more likely to have either no contact (16% vs. 3%) or sporadic contact (27% vs. 10%) with their families. VEs were also more often

distant from their family members than NVCEs (36% vs. 11%), albeit this finding should also be interpreted with caution due to the high amount of missing data. Lastly, VEs were exposed to extremism as a child slightly more often than NVCEs (27% vs. 18%), but it was relatively rare for either group to have a family member with a criminal or extremist history.

In the realm of friendship, VEs were more likely than NVCEs to have deviant and/or violent peers (48% vs. 27%), as well as peers actively involved in criminal or delinquent activities (35% vs. 13%). VEs get along with their peers more often than not (42% vs. 7%), indicating friendships with peers engaged in deviant or criminal activities are frequently mutual. With that said, VEs were also more likely to have no friends compared to NVCEs (20% vs. 6%), indicating a duality of sorts in the social life of VEs where some have mostly deviant friends and others have no friends – only a small portion of VEs associate with peers who are nondeviant and nonviolent (12%).

Lastly, VEs and NVCEs were similar in their prosocial aspirations, as only 30% of VEs and 24% of NVCEs expressed a desire to achieve prosocial goals. However, VEs experienced platonic and romantic troubles much more frequently than NVCEs. Nearly half of VEs had problems making and maintaining friendships, compared to about a third of NVCEs. The contrast is even more stark with romance, as over half of VEs had difficulty making and maintaining romantic relationships compared to only 16% of NVCEs. These findings may help explain the disparities between VEs and NVCEs marital status and the types of friends they elect to associate with.

Table 1b. Familial/Social Factors

Variable	Violent Extremist (n=258)	Nonviolent Criminal Extremist (n=241)
Martial Status		
Single	109 (42.25%)	54 (22.41%)

Married/Partnered	107 (41.47%)	140 (58.09%)
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	33 (12.79%)	16 (6.64%)
Missing	9 (3.49%)	31 (12.86%)
Children		
0	106 (41.09%)	73 (30.29%)
1	38 (14.73%)	26 (10.79%)
2	36 (13.95%)	22 (9.13%)
3	9 (3.49%)	15 (6.22%)
Missing	69 (26.74%)	105 (43.57%)
Parental History		
Parents married	55 (21.32%)	34 (14.11%)
Parents divorced	59 (22.87%)	15 (6.22%)
Parents died	17 (6.59%)	8 (3.32%)
Never Married	12 (4.65%)	0 (0.00%)
Missing	115 (44.58%)	184 (76.35%)
Family Contact		
No contact	42 (16.28%)	8 (3.32%)
Sporadic Contact	69 (26.74%)	25 (10.37%)
Regular Contact	89 (34.50%)	102 (42.32%)
Missing	58 (22.48%)	106 (43.98%)
Childhood Exposure to Extremism		
No	189 (73.26%)	198 (82.16%)
Yes	69 (26.74%)	43 (17.84%)
Familial Criminal History		
No	218 (84.50%)	221 (91.70%)
Yes	36 (13.95%)	19 (7.88%)
Missing	4 (1.55%)	1 (0.41%)
Familial Extremist History		
No	205 (79.46%)	205 (85.06%)
Yes	48 (18.60%)	35 (14.52%)
Missing	5 (1.94%)	1 (0.41%)
Family Importance in Life		
Distant	92 (35.66%)	26 (10.79%)
Close	100 (38.76%)	85 (35.27%)
Missing	66 (25.58%)	130 (53.94%)
Prosocial Aspirations		
No	180 (69.77%)	183 (75.93%)
Yes	78 (30.23%)	58 (24.07%)
Romantic Troubles		
No	130 (50.39%)	166 (68.88%)
Yes	128 (49.61%)	75 (31.12%)
Platonic Troubles		
No	153 (59.30%)	203 (84.23%)
Yes	105 (50.70%)	38 (15.77%)
Living Arrangement		
Lived with spouse/children	44 (17.05%)	84 (34.85%)

Lived with family	47 (18.22%)	21 (8.71%)
Lived alone	35 (13.57%)	19 (7.88%)
Live with non-family	46 (17.83%)	12 (4.98%)
Incarcerated	5 (1.94%)	0 (0.00%)
No stable residence	25 (9.69%)	6 (2.49%)
Missing	56 (12.72%)	99 (41.08%)
Community Status		
Low status/prestige	111 (43.02%)	17 (7.05%)
High status/prestige	25 (9.69%)	29 (12.03%)
Missing	122 (47.29%)	195 (80.91%)
Type of Friends		
None	53 (20.54%)	16 (6.64%)
Deviant/Violent	125 (48.45%)	65 (26.97%)
Nonviolent/Nondeviant	31 (12.02%)	20 (8.30%)
Missing	49 (18.99%)	140 (58.09%)
Criminal/Delinquent Peers		
No	168 (65.12%)	210 (87.14%)
Yes	90 (34.88%)	31 (12.86%)
Get Along with Peers		
No	19 (7.36%)	6 (2.49%)
Yes	109 (42.25%)	50 (20.75%)
Missing	130 (50.39%)	185 (76.76%)

Negative Life Events

Experiential factors, particularly those that negatively impact one's life, may increase the risk of

an individual engaging in extremist crime and violence as a means to alleviate their negative

effect. Overall, both VEs and NVCEs frequently experience negative life transitions, but a higher

percentage of VEs experienced negative life transitions than NVCEs (84% vs. 63%). The most

common negative life events amongst VEs were medical health issues (29%), victimization such

as being bullied, experiencing discrimination or prejudice, or being the victim of a crime (33%),

social alienation from peers or family (39%), and drug use (30%). Although NVCE experiences

each type of negative life event less frequently, the three most common types experienced were

family problems (18%), recent relocation (14%), and social alienation from peers or family

(12%).

Table 1c. Negative Life Events

Variable	Violent Extremist (n=258)	Nonviolent Criminal Extremist (n=241)
Negative Transitions		
No	41 (15.89%)	88 (36.51%)
Yes	217 (84.11%)	153 (63.49%)
Loss of Job/Employment		
No	223 (86.43%)	226 (93.78%)
Yes	35 (13.57%)	15 (6.22%)
Recent Relocation		
No	204 (79.07%)	208 (86.31%)
Yes	54 (20.93%)	33 (13.69%)
Health Issue		
No	183 (70.93%)	216 (89.63%)
Yes	75 (29.07%)	25 (10.37%)
Victimization		
No	172 (66.67%)	209 (86.72%)
Yes	86 (33.33%)	32 (13.28%)
Family Problems		
No	195 (75.58%)	198 (82.16%)
Yes	63 (24.42%)	43 (17.84%)
Alienation		
No	157 (60.85%)	212 (87.97%)
Yes	101 (39.15%)	29 (12.03%)
Drug Use		
No	181 (70.16%)	222 (92.12%)
Yes	77 (29.84%)	19 (7.88%)
Alcohol Use		
No	228 (88.37%)	233 (96.68%)
Yes	30 (11.63%)	8 (3.32%)

Psychological/Personality Factors

Table 1d reveals stark differences between VEs and NVCEs on the psychological and
personality factors they demonstrate. VEs are much more likely to be mentally ill (40% vs. 12%)
or have had a serious mental health issue in the past, such as hospitalization or suicidal ideations,
than NVCEs (19% vs. 3%). VEs are also more likely to have demonstrated status-seeking
behaviors than NVCEs (52% vs. 34%), which are behaviors indicating a need for moral
superiority or to feel special, such as taking on leadership roles in extremist movements or
verbally expressing their value above others. Finally, VEs demonstrate impulsive behavior at a

higher percentage than NVCEs (37% vs. 12%), suggesting they may be drawn to riskier, more

exciting activities.

Table 1d. Psychological/Personality Factors

Variable	Violent Extremist (n=258)	Nonviolent Criminal Extremist (n=241)
Mental Illness		
No	155 (60.08%)	213 (88.38%)
Yes	103 (39.92%)	28 (11.62%)
Serious Mental Health Issue		
No	209 (81.01%)	234 (97.10%)
Yes	49 (18.99%)	7 (2.90%)
Status-Seeking Behaviors		
No	123 (47.67%)	158 (65.56%)
Yes	135 (52.33%)	83 (34.44%)
Impulsive Behaviors		
No	163 (63.18%)	212 (87.97%)
Yes	95 (36.82%)	29 (12.03%)

Ideological factors

VEs and NVCEs can be differentiated on a number of ideological factors. Identity-seeking

tendencies and a desire to belong are more prevalent amongst VEs than NVCEs (23% vs 5%;

55% vs. 36%, respectively). Both groups were similarly likely to engage in political activism

activities. Moreover, the majority of offenders in both groups held a perceived injustice or

grievance that underpinned their ideology. However, a perceived injustice or grievance was more

prevalent for VEs than NVCEs (80% vs. 53%). Likewise, VEs blamed their grievance on a

particular person or group more often than NVCEs (66% vs. 38%). Finally, in terms of group

affiliation, VEs were more likely to act alone (31%) and be a member of a formal group (24%),

whereas NVCEs were more often members of an informal group (40%) or acted with other

extremists without clear group boundaries (40%).

Table 1e. Ideological Factors

Variable	Violent Extremist (n=258)	Nonviolent Criminal Extremist (n=241)

Identity-Seeking		
No	200 (77.52%)	228 (94.61%)
Yes	58 (22.48%)	13 (5.39%)
Desire to Belong		
No	115 (44.57%)	155 (64.32%)
Yes	143 (55.43%)	86 (35.68%)
Political Activism		
No	149 (57.75%)	149 (61.83%)
Yes	109 (42.25%)	92 (38.17%)
Perceived Injustice/Grievance		
No	51 (19.77%)	114 (47.30%)
Yes	207 (80.23%)	127 (52.70%)
Blamed Other(s)		
No	88 (34.11%)	149 (61.83%)
Yes	170 (65.89%)	92 (38.17%)
Lone/Group Actor		
Acted Alone	80 (31.02%)	45 (18.67%)
Part of formal group	63 (24.42%)	35 (14.52%)
Part of informal group	39 (15.12%)	63 (26.14%)
Acting with others – no clear group boundaries	75 (29.07%)	97 (40.25%)
Missing	1 (0.39%)	1 (0.41%)

Criminal History

Our last set of factors captures individuals' criminal history. It is rare for both VEs and NVCEs to be a gang member. However, VEs are more likely to have previously been arrested (48% vs. 23%), or incarcerated in prison or jail (28% vs. 13%), and engaged in prior criminal behavior, whether they were arrested for it or not, than NVCEs (62% vs. 47%). These findings indicate a history of criminal activity is a more common characteristic for VEs than NVCEs.

Table 1f. Criminal History

Variable	**Violent Extremist (n=258)**	**Nonviolent Criminal Extremist (n=241)**
Gang Member		
No	238 (92.25%)	234 (97.10%)
Yes	20 (7.75%)	7 (2.90%)
Prior Arrest		
No	119 (46.12%)	171 (70.95%)
Yes	125 (48.45%)	56 (23.24%)

Missing	14 (5.43%)	14 (5.81%)
Prior Incarceration		
No	186 (72.09%)	210 (87.14%)
Yes	72 (27.91%)	31 (12.86%)
Prior Criminal Behavior		
No	98 (37.98%)	128 (53.11%)
Yes	160 (62.02%)	113 (46.89%)

Multivariate Analysis for Comparing Violent and Nonviolent Criminal Extremists

As noted, variables were selected for multivariate analysis based on (a) the proportion of missing data and (b) the relevance to differentiating VEs and NVCEs as discerned in our descriptive assessment. Moreover, modeling these relationships was challenging because of the sheer number of variables where we observed differences comparing the two groups. It is clear from the descriptive results that VEs are very different than NVCEs across the risk/protective categories we examined. Thus, the multivariate model helps us highlight those variables that are particularly salient overall and what variables are significant when controlling for other factors.

Table 1g displays the results of a binary logistic regression model, where the outcome of interest is whether the extremist offender engaged in violent crime (1) or nonviolent crime (0). The unstandardized regression coefficients (b), the standard errors (SE), and the odds ratios (OR) are reported for each variable of interest.

Table 1g. Binary Logistic Regression Comparing Violent and Nonviolent Criminal Extremists (n=499)

Variable	b (SE)	OR
Age	-.05 (.01)	.95***
Marital Status[a]		
Married/Partnered	-.42 (.28)	.66
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	.65 (.41)	1.91
Platonic Trouble	.47 (.28)	1.60
Criminal/Del. Peers	.63 (.29)	1.88*
Negative Transitions	.34 (.32)	1.41
Victimization	.25 (.31)	1.29
Alienation	.74 (.29)	2.09*

Mental Illness	.46 (.31)	1.58
Status-Seeking Behaviors	-.05 (.25)	.96
Impulsive Behaviors	.19 (.30)	1.22
Identity	.45 (.37)	1.56
Belonging	-.27 (.26)	.77
Injustice/Grievance	.24 (.29)	1.27
Blamed Other(s)	.82 (.25)	2.27***
Prior Incarceration	.63 (.34)	1.87
Prior Criminal Behavior	-.04 (.27)	.96
Pseudo R^2	.25	

***$p<.001$, **$p<.01$, *$p<.05$
[a] Reference category = (0) Single
Note: Dependent Variable: Violent Extremist = 1; Nonviolent Criminal Extremist = 0.
Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *OR* = Odds Ratio

The multivariate model reveals four variables that are the strongest correlates differentiating VE and NVCEs. First, younger offenders are significantly more likely to be involved in VE than NVCE (OR=.95; p<.001). Second, offenders who blame another person or collective for their grievance are significantly more likely to be VEs than NVCEs (OR=2.27; p<.001). It may be that establishing blame defines the pool of potential targets that a VE may victimize, providing a path for justifying the mobilization to violence. Third, having peers engaged in crime or delinquency is significantly related to engagement in violent extremism (OR=1.88; p<.05), suggesting exposure to such activities may lead to the acceptance of and engagement in violent behaviors to advance an ideological cause. Finally, individuals who have been alienated from social circles or family are significantly more likely to engage in VE as opposed to NVCE (OR=2.09; p<.05), punctuating the potential for negative life experiences to impact one's violent trajectory.

RQ2: How do the presence of risk and protective variables vary when comparing ideological offenders to nonoffending extremists?, and

RQ3: How do the presence of risk and protective variables vary when comparing ideological offenders to regular homicide offenders?

Comparing Ideological Offenders to Nonoffending Extremists and non-extremist Violent Offenders

This section leverages our case-control design to compare risk and protective factors between ideological offenders (IOs), which includes both VEs and NVCEs, to nonoffending extremists (hereafter, NOEs) and non-extremist violent offenders (hereafter, NEVOs).

Sociodemographic factors

Ideological Offenders vs. Nonoffending Extremists. In many ways, IOs and NOEs share similar sociodemographic factor profiles. IOs are only slightly younger than NOEs on average, and are similarly distributed in their race and ethnicity, with about half of both groups being white. The large majority of both groups are male, albeit IOs have a slightly have proportion of females. Additionally, IOs and NOEs both rarely had military experience, with military service being marginally more common for IOs (11% vs. 7%).

There are several notable differences between IOs and NOEs, however. Namely, IOs are less likely to live in urban areas (42% vs. 58%), less likely to be deemed "very religious" (30% vs. 43%)), less likely to have college degree (17% vs. 41%), less likely to be regularly employed (39% vs. 63%), be of lower SES (39% vs. 63%) and more likely to rent their home (38% vs. 14%). Clearly, the sociodemographic profile of a NOE indicates a more stable and prosocial lifestyle than IOs.

Table 2a Sociodemographic Factors

| Variable	Ideological Offender (n=499)	Nonoffending Extremist (n=232)	Non-extremist Violent Offender (n=240)

Gender			
Female	59 (11.82%)	10 (4.31%)	14 (5.83%)
Male	440 (88.18%)	222 (95.69%)	226 (94.17%)
Age	34.97	39.52	29.55
Race/Ethnicity			
White, non-Hispanic	255 (51.10%)	116 (50.00%)	107 (44.58%)
Black, non-Hispanic	88 (17.64%)	34 (14.66%)	84 (35.00%)
Middle Eastern/North African	74 (14.83%)	67 (28.88%)	3 (1.25%)
Other	58 (11.62%)	4 (1.72%)	21 (8.75%)
Missing	24 (4.81%)	11 (4.74%)	25 (10.42%)
Current Living			
Urban	212 (42.48%)	135 (58.19%)	135 (56.25%)
Suburban	151 (30.26%)	57 (24.57%)	60 (25.00%)
Rural	90 (18.04%)	24 (10.34%)	36 (15.00%)
Missing	46 (9.22%)	16 (6.90%)	9 (3.75%)
Foreign Born			
Foreign Born	111 (22.24%)	51 (21.98%)	8 (3.33%)
U.S. – Born	355 (71.14%)	162 (69.83%)	226 (94.17%)
Missing	33 (6.61%)	19 (8.19%)	6 (2.50%)
Religiosity			
Secular	33 (6.61%)	4 (1.72%)	20 (8.33%)
Somewhat Religious	59 (11.82%)	15 (6.47%)	9 (3.75%)
Very Religious	152 (30.46%)	99 (42.67%)	7 (2.92%)
Missing	255 (51.10%)	114 (49.14%)	204 (85.00%)
Education			
Homeschool	5 (1.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
Some School	51 (10.22%)	5 (2.16%)	21 (8.75%)
High School Diploma/GED	72 (14.43%)	16 (6.90%)	13 (5.42%)
Some college or vocational	119 (23.85%)	12 (5.17%)	15 (6.25%)
College graduate	85 (17.03%)	97 (41.81%)	2 (0.83%)
Missing	167 (33.47%)	102 (43.97%)	189 (78.75%)
Employment History			
Never employed	32 (6.41%)	1 (0.43%)	20 (8.33%)
Sporadically employed	160 (32.06%)	8 (3.45%)	35 (14.58%)
Regularly employed	196 (39.28%)	147 (63.36%)	37 (15.42%)
Missing	111 (22.24%)	76 (32.76%)	148 (61.67%)
Socioeconomic Status			
Low	240 (48.10%)	14 (6.03%)	79 (32.92%)
Middle	109 (21.84%)	75 (32.33%)	19 (7.92%)
High	76 (15.23%)	37 (15.95%)	3 (1.25%)
Missing	74 (14.83%)	106 (45.69%)	139 (57.92%)
Home Ownership			
Rent	190 (38.08%)	32 (13.79%)	100 (41.67%)
Own Home	79 (15.83%)	68 (29.31%)	19 (7.92%)
Homeless	15 (3.01%)	2 (0.86%)	15 (6.25%)
Missing	215 (43.09%)	130 (56.03%)	106 (44.17%)

Military Experience			
No	442 (88.58%)	215 (92.67%)	235 (97.92%)
Yes	57 (11.42%)	17 (7.33%)	5 (2.08%)

<u>Ideological Offenders vs. Non-extremist Violent Offenders.</u> The high amount of missing data on sociodemographic factors for NEVOs makes drawing comparisons difficult. However, some distinct differences between IOs and NEVOs can be ascertained. First, IOs were less likely to live in urban settings (42% vs. 56%), more likely to be foreign born (22% v. 3%), and more likely to be from lower SES (48% v. 32%). IOs were also slightly more likely to have been in the military than NEVOs (11% vs. 2%). In terms of similarities, both IOs and NEVOs most often rented a home as opposed to owning one.

We want to highlight the findings about employment history further. Researchers have found that violent extremists are less likely to have stable employment histories than nonviolent extremists (LaFree et al., 2018). Our results support these findings, as both NVCEs and NOEs are regularly employed more frequently than VEs. Further, as shown in Figure 1, the highest percentage of those who are sporadically employed are VEs, followed by NVCEs. Only a small portion of NOEs are sporadically employed or never employed, indicating the presence of stable employment may be a strong protective factor against committing extremist crime and violence.

<u>Figure 1. Employment History Across Cases and Controls</u>

Employment History Across Cases and Controls

Prior studies have linked current or prior military service to radical behaviors, suggesting those who have served may be more likely to adopt extreme belief systems (Haugstvedt & Koehler, 2021). At the least, those who serve receive formal training on handling weapons and other types of military equipment. However, our results (Figure 2) suggest that military experience is a rarity across each actor type. With that said, VEs still showed the highest percentage of individuals who had served in the military at 16%, more than twice the percentage as NCVEs or NOEs. While this finding is purely descriptive, it is worth highlighting the disparity in military experience across our four groups.

Figure 2. Military Experience Across Cases and Controls

Military Experience Across Cases and Controls
[Inner: Case Classification; Outer: Military Experience]

Familial/Social Factors

Ideological Offenders vs. Nonoffending Extremists. Though the high amount of missing data for these factors makes it difficult to interpret differences, our results indicate IOs were more likely than NOEs to be single (33% vs. 22%) and have no children (36% v. 11%). IOs also had no contact or sporadic contact with family more often than NOEs (10% vs. 3%, 19% vs. 1%, respectively), and were less likely to be close to family members (37% vs. 48%). IOs had a higher prevalence of exposure to extremism in childhood compared to the NOEs (22% v. 11%), and only slightly more likely to have family members with a criminal (11% vs. 5%) or extremist history (17% vs. 12%). A higher percentage of NOEs had prosocial aspirations (36% vs. 27%), whereas IOs had a higher prevalence of romantic (17% vs. 9%) and platonic troubles (29% vs. 2%).

In terms of peers, a similar percentage of IOs and NOEs had deviant and/or violent peers (38% vs. 44%), but a smaller percentage of IOs had nonviolent nondeviant peers than NOEs

(10% vs. 24%). It is important to note deviance here does not necessitate commission of crime/violence, and therefore peers involved in extremism who didn't engage in crime would be coded as deviant/violent friends but not a peer involved in criminal activity, which is captured in the *Criminal/Delinquent Peers* variable. In that variable, IOs more often had peers involved in criminal or delinquent activities (24% vs. 6%) and were less likely to get along with their peers than NOEs (32% vs. 54%).

Table 2b. Familial/Social Factors

Variable	Ideological Offender (n=499)	Nonoffending Extremist (n=232)	Non-extremist Violent Offender (n=240)
Martial Status			
Single	163 (32.67%)	51 (21.98%)	141 (58.75%)
Married/Partnered	247 (49.50%)	92 (39.66%)	62 (25.83%)
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	49 (9.82%)	12 (5.17%)	12 (5.00%)
Missing	40 (8.02%)	77 (33.19%)	25 (10.42%)
Children			
0	179 (35.87%)	26 (11.21%)	104 (43.33%)
1	64 (12.83%)	32 (13.79%)	29 (12.08%)
2	58 (11.62%)	33 (14.22%)	18 (7.50%)
3	24 (4.81%)	23 (9.91%)	0 (0.00%)
Missing	174 (34.87%)	118 (50.86%)	89 (37.08%)
Parental History			
Parents married	89 (17.84%)	47 (20.26%)	21 (8.75%)
Parents divorced	74 (14.83%)	9 (3.88%)	21 (8.75%)
Parents died	25 (5.01%)	10 (4.31%)	6 (2.50%)
Never Married	12 (2.40%)	1 (0.43%)	8 (3.33%)
Missing	299 (59.92%)	165 (72.12%)	184 (76.67%)
Family Contact			
No contact	50 (10.02%)	6 (2.59%)	26 (10.83%)
Sporadic Contact	94 (18.84%)	3 (1.29%)	7 (2.92%)
Regular Contact	191 (38.28%)	103 (44.40%)	77 (32.08%)
Missing	164 (32.87%)	120 (51.72%)	130 (54.17%)
Childhood Exposure to Extremism			
No	387 (77.56%)	206 (88.79%)	239 (99.58%)
Yes	112 (22.44%)	26 (11.21%)	1 (0.42%)
Familial Criminal History			
No	439 (87.98%)	218 (93.97%)	225 (93.75%)
Yes	55 (11.02%)	11 (4.74%)	14 (5.83%)
Missing	5 (1.00%)	3 (1.29%)	1 (0.42%)
Familial Extremist History			

No	410 (82.16%)	203 (87.50%)	240 (100.00%)
Yes	83 (16.63%)	29 (12.50%)	0 (0.00%)
Missing	6 (1.20%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
Family Importance in Life			
Distant	118 (23.65%)	5 (2.16%)	54 (22.50%)
Close	185 (37.07%)	112 (48.28%)	66 (27.50%)
Missing	196 (39.28%)	115 (49.57%)	120 (50.00%)
Prosocial Aspirations			
No	363 (72.75%)	148 (63.79%)	216 (90.00%)
Yes	136 (27.25%)	84 (36.21%)	24 (10.00%)
Romantic Troubles			
No	412 (82.57%)	212 (91.38%)	182 (75.83%)
Yes	87 (17.43%)	20 (8.62%)	58 (24.17%)
Platonic Troubles			
No	356 (71.34%)	226 (97.41%)	217 (90.42%)
Yes	143 (28.66%)	6 (2.59%)	23 (9.58%)
Living Arrangement			
Lived with spouse/children	128 (25.65%)	92 (39.66%)	33 (13.75%)
Lived with family	68 (13.63%)	11 (4.74%)	39 (16.25%)
Lived alone	54 (10.82%)	11 (4.74%)	14 (5.83%)
Live with non-family	58 (11.62%)	7 (3.02%)	18 (7.50%)
Incarcerated	5 (1.00%)	0 (0.00%)	3 (1.25%)
No stable residence	31 (6.21%)	1 (0.43%)	16 (6.67%)
Missing	155 (31.06%)	110 (47.41%)	117 (48.75%)
Community Status			
Low status/prestige	128 (25.65%)	32 (13.79%)	37 (15.42%)
High status/prestige	54 (10.82%)	67 (28.88%)	19 (7.92%)
Missing	317 (63.53%)	133 (57.33%)	184 (76.67%)
Type of Friends			
None	69 (13.83%)	3 (1.29%)	11 (4.58%)
Deviant/Violent	190 (38.08%)	101 (43.53%)	90 (37.50%)
Nonviolent/Nondeviant	51 (10.22%)	56 (24.14%)	28 (11.67%)
Missing	189 (37.88%)	72 (31.03%)	111 (46.25%)
Criminal/Delinquent Peers			
No	378 (75.75%)	219 (94.40%)	154 (64.17%)
Yes	121 (24.25%)	13 (5.60%)	86 (35.83%)
Get Along with Peers			
No	25 (5.01%)	16 (6.90%)	24 (10.00%)
Yes	159 (31.86%)	125 (53.88%)	78 (32.50%)
Missing	315 (63.13%)	91 (39.22%)	138 (57.50%)

<u>Ideological Offenders vs. Non-extremist Violent Offenders.</u> We see fewer differences

between IOs and NEVOs. IOs are married/partnered more often than NEVOs (49% vs. 26%), but

they are similar in number of children, family contact, family criminal history, family importance

in life, and romantic troubles. Unsurprisingly, IOs are more likely to be exposed to extremism in their childhood (22% vs. .4%), and more likely to have family members with an extremist history (17% vs. 0%). IOs also had more prosocial aspirations than NEVOs, but this may be an artifact of the information available in open sources on NEVOs' aspirations. Both IOs and NEVOs had a similar prevalence of deviant and/or violent friends, with NEVOs having a slightly higher percentage of peers involved in criminal or delinquent activities (36% vs. 24%).

Negative Life Events

Ideological Offenders vs. Nonoffending Extremists. IOs were notably more likely to experience a negative life transition (74%) compared to NOEs (40%). The most marked differences are in recent relocations (17% vs. 3%), health issues (20% vs. 2%), family problems (26% vs. 9%), and drug use (19% vs. 3%).

Table 2c. Negative Life Events

Variable	Ideological Offender (n=499)	Nonoffending Extremist (n=232)	Non-extremist Violent Offender (n=240)
Negative Transitions			
No	129 (25.85%)	140 (60.34%)	104 (43.33%)
Yes	370 (74.15%)	92 (39.66%)	136 (56.67%)
Loss of Job/Employment			
No	449 (89.98%)	217 (95.53%)	233 (97.08%)
Yes	50 (10.02%)	15 (6.47%)	7 (2.92%)
Recent Relocation			
No	412 (82.57%)	225 (96.98%)	229 (95.42%)
Yes	87 (17.43%)	7 (3.02%)	11 (4.58%)
Health Issue			
No	399 (79.96%)	227 (97.84%)	183 (76.25%)
Yes	100 (20.04%)	5 (2.16%)	57 (23.75%)
Victimization			
No	381 (76.35%)	170 (73.28%)	208 (86.67%)
Yes	118 (23.65%)	62 (26.72%)	32 (13.33%)
Family Problems			

No	393 (73.95%)	211 (90.95%)	195 (81.25%)
Yes	130 (26.05%)	21 (9.05%)	45 (18.75%)
Alienation			
No	369 (87.92%)	196 (84.48%)	211 (87.92%)
Yes	29 (12.08%)	36 (15.52%)	29 (12.08%)
Drug Use			
No	403 (80.76%)	226 (97.41%)	159 (66.25%)
Yes	96 (19.24%)	6 (2.59%)	81 (33.75%)
Alcohol Use			
No	461 (92.38%)	226 (97.41%)	221 (92.08%)
Yes	38 (7.62%)	6 (2.59%)	19 (7.92%)

Ideological Offenders vs. Non-extremist Violent Offenders. Similar to the comparison between IOs and NOEs, a higher percentage of IOs had negative life transitions than NEVOs, but the difference was not as pronounced (74% vs. 57%). The most prevalent events were recent relocations (17% vs. 5%), victimization (24% vs. 13%), and family problems (26% vs. 19%). Alternatively, a higher percentage of NEVOs used drugs than IOs, though they were equal on prevalence of alcohol abuse.

Psychological/Personality factors

Ideological Offenders vs. Nonoffending Extremists. IOs and NOEs differed on several psychological/personality factors. First, although likely it is an artifact of the variation in the types of information captured in open-source protocols for different IOs and NOEs (i.e., sources more likely to be exposed to and report mental health issues for IOs), IOs were much more likely to have mental illness (26% v. .4%) and serious previous mental health issue (11% v. .4%) than NOEs. Similarly, a higher percentage of IOs demonstrated impulsive behaviors (25% vs. 9%), indicating this population is more drawn to risky activities that are immediately gratifying.

However, NOEs were slightly more likely to demonstrate status-seeking behaviors (53% vs. 44%), suggesting NOEs may express a need for moral superiority more often than IOs.

Table 2d. Psychological/Personality Factors

Variable	Ideological Offender (n=499)	Nonoffending Extremist (n=232)	Non-extremist Violent Offender (n=240)
Mental Illness			
No	368 (73.75%)	231 (99.57%)	190 (79.17%)
Yes	131 (26.25%)	1 (0.43%)	50 (20.83%)
Serious Mental Health Issue			
No	443 (88.78%)	231 (99.57%)	218 (90.83%)
Yes	56 (11.22%)	1 (0.43%)	22 (9.17%)
Status-Seeking Behaviors			
No	281 (56.31%)	108 (46.55%)	233 (97.08%)
Yes	218 (43.69%)	124 (53.45%)	7 (2.92%)
Impulsive Behaviors			
No	375 (75.15%)	211 (90.95%)	147 (61.25%)
Yes	124 (24.85%)	21 (9.05%)	93 (38.75%)

Ideological Offenders vs. Non-extremist Violent Offenders. IOs and NEVOs were relatively similar in their percentage of individuals with a mental illness or a serious mental health issue, indicating a shared distinction from NOEs. However, IOs were much more likely to have committed status-seeking behaviors than NEVOs (44% vs. 3%), and a notably higher percentage of NEVOs demonstrated impulsive behaviors, suggesting the personality profiles of these two groups do diverge on certain factors.

Ideological factors

Ideological Offenders vs. Nonoffending Extremists. A number of interesting differences are revealed when comparing the ideological factors between IOs and NOEs. First, the frequency of identity-seeking tendencies is fairly equal between both groups. However, IOs express a desire to belong much more often than NOEs (46% vs 21%) . IOs are also more likely to perceive an injustice/grievance (66% vs. 47%), and place the blame for their grievance on a particular person

or collective (52% vs. 36%). NOEs, on the other hand, are involved in political activism much more often than IOs (40% vs. 86%), which reflects NOEs' use of nonviolent, legal actions to advance their ideology. NOEs also act in formal groups much more often than IOs (74% vs. 20%), as IOs mostly act alone (25%) or with others without clear group boundaries (34%), albeit they are more evenly distributed in their affiliations.

Table 2e. Ideological Factors

Variable	Ideological Offender (n=499)	Nonoffending Extremist (n=232)	Non-extremist Violent Offender (n=240)
Identity-Seeking			
No	428 (85.77%)	197 (84.91%)	236 (98.33%)
Yes	71 (14.23%)	35 (15.09%)	4 (1.67%)
Desire to Belong			
No	270 (54.11%)	182 (78.45%)	228 (95.00%)
Yes	229 (45.89%)	50 (21.55%)	12 (5.00%)
Political Activism			
No	298 (59.72%)	33 (14.22%)	240 (100.00%)
Yes	201 (40.28%)	199 (85.78%)	0 (0.00%)
Perceived Injustice/Grievance			
No	165 (33.07%)	123 (53.02%)	235 (97.92%)
Yes	334 (66.93%)	109 (46.98%)	5 (2.08%)
Blamed Other(s)			
No	237 (47.49%)	148 (63.79%)	212 (88.33%)
Yes	262 (52.51%)	84 (36.21%)	28 (11.67%)
Lone/Group Actor			
Acted Alone	125 (25.05%)	25 (10.78%)	153 (63.75%)
Part of formal group	98 (19.64%)	171 (73.71%)	9 (3.75%)
Part of informal group	102 (20.44%)	24 (10.34%)	13 (5.44%)
Acting with others – no clear group boundaries	172 (34.47%)	12 (5.17%)	64 (26.67%)
Missing	2 (0.40%)	0 (0.00%)	1 (0.42%)

<u>Ideological Offenders vs. Non-extremist Violent Offenders.</u> It is no surprise that IOs are much more ideological than NEVOs, as NEVOs are not driven by an ideological cause. Therefore, IOs have a higher prevalence of identity-seeking tendencies (14% vs. 1%), desire to belong (46% vs. 5%), involvement in political activism (40% vs. 0%), perceiving an injustice or grievance (67%

vs. 2%), and blaming others for their grievance (52% vs. 12%). NEVOs act alone most often (64%), or with others without group boundaries (27%).

Criminal History

Ideological Offenders vs. Nonoffending Extremists. Neither IOs nor NOEs had a high prevalence of gang membership, but IOs did appear to have a much more extensive criminal history than NOEs. IOs are more likely to have been arrested (36% vs. 16%), incarcerated (21% vs. 3%), and have demonstrated some prior criminal behavior (55% vs. 25%). It is important to note here that the criminal history inclusion criteria for NOE focused on crime seriousness of the event. Specifically, we would eliminate the NOE from the sampling pool if committed a crime that was more serious than a Class C misdemeanor. Most of the criminal activities of NOEs were tied to protest-related arrests where they were arrested but were not charged, or arrested and given a fine/short jail sentence.

Table 2f. Criminal History

Variable	Ideological Offender (n=499)	Nonoffending Extremist (n=232)	Non-extremist Violent Offender (n=240)
Gang Member			
No	472 (94.59%)	226 (97.41%)	214 (89.17%)
Yes	27 (5.41%)	6 (2.59%)	26 (10.83%)
Prior Arrest			
No	290 (58.12%)	192 (82.76%)	84 (35.00%)
Yes	181 (36.27%)	26 (15.52%)	151 (62.92%)
Missing	28 (5.61%)	4 (1.72%)	5 (2.08%)
Prior Incarceration			
No	396 (79.36%)	225 (96.98%)	170 (70.83%)
Yes	103 (20.64%)	7 (3.02%)	70 (29.17%)
Prior Criminal Behavior			
No	226 (45.29%)	175 (75.43%)	74 (30.83%)
Yes	273 (54.71%)	57 (24.57%)	166 (69.17%)

To explore the distinctions in criminal history further, Figure 3 illustrates how prior incarceration varies by actor type, and how prior criminal behavior maps onto previous incarceration experience. Prior incarceration was most prevalent in VEs, but of those who had not been incarcerated, nearly half had still engaged in some form of criminal behavior in their past. This trend is mirrored by NEVOs, with 56% of those who had not been previously incarcerated previously committed some type of crime that they may or may not have been arrested for. Moreover, although the overwhelming majority of NVCEs had not been previously incarcerated, nearly 40% of those who had not did engage in some criminal behavior in their past. NOEs, in keeping with their fairly minimal criminal past, had the lowest percentage of those who had been previously incarcerated, but also the lowest percentage of those who engaged in crime if they had not been incarcerated. Overall, the conventional wisdom that prior criminal behavior is a predictor of future criminal behavior appears to be applicable particularly for those who engage in violent crimes (i.e. VEs and NEVOs).

Figure 3. Prior Crime History Across Cases and Controls

Prior Crime History Across Cases and Controls
[Inner: Case Classification; Middle: Prior Prison; Outer: Prior Criminal Behavior]

Ideological Offenders vs. Non-extremist Violent Offenders. As opposed to the comparison between IOs and NOE, NEVOs actually have more extensive criminal histories than IOs. Specifically, NEVOs are slightly more likely to be gang members (11% vs. 5%) and to be incarcerated (29% vs. 20%), but much more likely to have previously been arrested (63% vs. 36%) and to have engaged in some criminal behavior (69% vs. 55%). It is clear that, while IOs frequently have a criminal history, it is often less extensive than that of a regular violent offender.

Multivariate Analysis for Comparing Ideological Offenders, Nonoffending Extremists, and Non-extremist Violent Offenders

Table 2g displays the results of a multinomial logistic regression model, where the outcome of interest is whether the offender was an ideological offender (0), nonoffending extremist (1), or non-extremist violent offender (2). The multinomial model works by using a designated group as the reference category, which in this model was IOs. As such, the results reflect direct comparisons between NOEs and IOs as well as NEVOs and IOs. The unstandardized regression coefficients (b), the standard errors (SE), and the relative risk ratios (RRR) are reported for each variable of interest.[1]

Table 2g. Multinomial Logistic Regression Comparing Extremist Offenders to Nonoffending Extremists and Non-extremist Violent Offenders

Variable	Nonoffending Extremists		Non-extremist Violent Offenders	
	b(SE)	RRR	b(SE)	RRR
Childhood Exposure to Extremism	-.53 (.34)	.59	-2.66 (1.64)	.07
Platonic Trouble	-1.84 (.52)	.16***	-.59 (.57)	.55
Criminal/Del. Peers	-.76 (.39)	.47	2.01 (.39)	7.50***
Negative Transitions	-.74 (.25)	.48**	-.89 (.29)	.41**
Drug Use	-.72 (.49)	.48	1.00 (.39)	2.73**
Mental Illness	-3.09 (1.00)	.05**	.52 (.40)	1.67
Status-Seeking Behaviors	.52 (.25)	1.68*	-2.09 (.69)	.12***
Impulsive Behaviors	-.04 (.36)	.96	1.57 (.39)	4.83***
Desire to Belong	-.59 (.29)	.55*	-1.48 (.55)	.23**
Injustice/Grievance	-.09 (.26)	.92	-5.12 (.92)	.01***
Blamed Other(s)	-.71 (.27)	.49**	-1.11 (.40)	.33**
Lone or Group Actor[a]				
Formal Group	1.77 (.34)	5.86***	-2.76 (.61)	.06***
Informal Group	-.50 (.39)	.61	-3.35 (.46)	.04***
Acting with others	-1.62 (.40)	.20***	-2.02 (.35)	.13***
Prior Criminal Behavior	-.75 (.44)	.47**	.95 (.30)	2.59***
Pseudo R²		.57		

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
[a]Reference category = (1) Acted Alone
Note: Dependent Variable: Ideological Offenders = 0 (reference category); Nonoffending extremist = 1; Non-extremist violent offender = 2.
Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *RRR* = Relative Risk Ratio

[1] Relative Risk Ratios are the multinomial equivalent of Odds Ratios in a binary logistic regression model.

Ideological Offenders vs. Nonoffending Extremists. The multinomial logistic regression model indicates several factors are strong differentiators of IOs and NOEs. First, NOEs are significantly less likely to have trouble making platonic friends than IOs (RRR=.16; p<.001). Additionally, NOEs are significantly less likely to experience negative life transitions (RRR=.48; p<.01), have a mental illness (RRR=.05; p<.01), express a desire to belong (RRR=.55; p<.05), blame a specific person or collective for their grievance than IOs (RRR=.49; p<.01), and have engaged in prior criminal behavior (RRR=.47; p<.01). Alternatively, NOEs are significantly more likely to demonstrate status-seeking behaviors (RRR=1.68; p<.05). NOEs are also more likely to be members of a formal group as opposed to a lone-actor (RRR=5.86; p<.001).

Ideological Offenders vs. Non-extremist Violent Offenders. There are clear differences when comparing NEVOs to IOs in the multivariate model. NEVOs are more likely than IOs to have criminal or delinquent peers (RRR=7.50; p<.001), use drugs (RRR=2.73; p<.01), demonstrate impulsive behaviors (RRR=4.83; p<.001), and had previously engage in criminal behavior (RRR=2.59; p<.001). However, NEVOs are less likely than IOs to have negative life transitions (RRR=.41; p<.01), demonstrate status-seeking tendencies (RRR=.12; p<.001), express a desire to belong (RRR=.23; p<.01), perceive an injustice or grievance (RRR=.01; p<.001), and blame others for their grievance (RRR=.33; p<.01). Additionally, NEVOs are significantly more likely to act alone than any other form of group affiliation.

RQ4: How do the presence of risk and protective variables vary when comparing jihadist, far right, and far left extremists?

This section explores differences in risk and protective factors between ideological categories. Specifically, we compare the factors experienced by jihadist, far-right, and far-left ideological offenders to examine how risk profiles may differ by ideological subscription.

Sociodemographic factors

Jihadist, far-right, and far-left IOs differ on a number of sociodemographic characteristics. While the majority of each group are male, there is a higher percentage of female offenders amongst far-left IOs (19%) than far-right (15%) or jihadist (6%). Additionally, while jihadist and far-left IOs are about the same age, far-right IOs are over 10 years older on average. There are also stark differences in the racial and ethnic composition of each ideological category. Jihadist IOs are the most evenly distributed, with most jihadist offenders being of Middle Eastern/North African descent (35%). Far-right IOs are overwhelmingly white (90%), and far-left offenders are most often black (40%) or white (36%).

Ideologues differ in their place of residence, with most jihadist (53%) and far-left (64%) IOs living in urban areas, whereas far-right IOs live in more suburban (35%) and rural (32%) areas. Jihadist offenders are born in a foreign country more often than far-right or far-left IOs (51% vs. .5% vs. 4%) and are much more likely to be deemed "very religious" (53% vs. 13% vs. 16%), than far-right or far-left IOs. The three ideological categories are somewhat different in their highest level of education, with slightly more jihadists having some college education (35% vs. 12% vs. 23%) or graduated college (20% vs. 16% vs. 13%) than far-right or far-left IOs. The three types of IOs have different employment histories, with jihadist and far-right IOs experiencing a sporadic work history more often than far-left IOs (39% vs. 30% vs. 18%). Interestingly, jihadist offenders were much more likely to be low SES than far-right or far-left offenders (60% vs. 42% vs. 32%), with far-right IOs being the most likely to be of high SES (26%). An equal proportion of jihadi (49%) and far-left (49%) offenders rented their homes, whereas far-right offenders were similarly likely to rent (24%) or own their homes (25%).

Table 3a. Sociodemographic

Variable	Jihadist (n=210)	Far-right (n=212)	Far-left (n=77)
Gender			
Female	13 (6.19%)	31 (14.62%)	15 (19.48%)
Male	197 (93.81%)	181 (85.38%)	62 (80.52%)
Age	29.88	41.95	29.44
Race/Ethnicity			
White, non-Hispanic	36 (17.14%)	191 (90.09%)	28 (36.36%)
Black, non-Hispanic	50 (23.81%)	7 (3.30%)	31 (40.26%)
Middle Eastern/North African	74 (35.24%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
Other	47 (22.38%)	8 (3.77%)	3 (3.90%)
Missing	3 (1.43%)	6 (2.83%)	15 (19.48%)
Current Living			
Urban	111 (52.86%)	52 (24.53%)	49 (63.64%)
Suburban	60 (28.57%)	75 (35.38%)	16 (20.78%)
Rural	16 (7.62%)	67 (31.60%)	7 (9.09%)
Missing	23 (10.95%)	18 (8.49%)	5 (6.49%)
Foreign Born			
Foreign Born	107 (50.95%)	1 (0.47%)	3 (3.90%)
U.S. – Born	87 (41.43%)	198 (93.40%)	70 (90.91%)
Missing	16 (7.62%)	13 (6.13%)	4 (5.19%)
Religiosity			
Secular	18 (8.57%)	4 (1.89%)	11 (14.29%)
Somewhat Religious	42 (20.00%)	13 (6.13%)	4 (5.19%)
Very Religious	112 (53.33%)	28 (13.21%)	12 (15.58%)
Missing	38 (18.10%)	167 (78.77%)	50 (64.94%)
Education			
Homeschool	3 (1.43%)	2 (0.94%)	0 (0.00%)
Some School	28 (13.33%)	18 (8.49%)	5 (6.49%)
High School Diploma/GED	28 (13.33%)	40 (18.87%)	4 (5.19%)
Some college or vocational	75 (35.71%)	26 (12.26%)	18 (23.38%)
College graduate	42 (20.00%)	33 (15.57%)	10 (12.99%)
Missing	34 (16.19%)	93 (43.87%)	40 (51.95%)
Employment History			
Never employed	20 (9.52%)	10 (4.72%)	2 (2.60%)
Sporadically employed	82 (39.05%)	64 (30.19%)	14 (18.18%)
Regularly employed	90 (42.86%)	79 (37.26%)	27 (35.06%)
Missing	18 (8.57%)	59 (27.83%)	34 (44.16%)
Socioeconomic Status			
Low	127 (60.48%)	88 (41.51%)	25 (32.47%)
Middle	55 (26.19%)	42 (19.81%)	12 (15.58%)
High	17 (8.10%)	56 (26.42%)	3 (3.90%)
Missing	11 (5.24%)	26 (12.26%)	37 (48.05%)
Home Ownership			
Rent	102 (48.57%)	50 (23.58%)	38 (49.35%)

Own Home	20 (9.52%)	53 (25.00%)	6 (7.79%)
Homeless	3 (1.43%)	6 (2.83%)	6 (7.79%)
Missing	85 (40.48%)	103 (48.58%)	27 (35.06%)
Military Experience			
No	189 (90.00%)	187 (88.21%)	66 (85.71%)
Yes	21 (10.00%)	25 (11.79%)	11 (14.29%)

Familial/Social factors

In terms of family and social variables, jihadist (36%) and far-left (43%) offenders are single slightly more often than far-right offenders (25%). Far-left offenders are much more likely to have no children (71%) compared to jihadists (36%) and far-right (23%) IOs. Though information on offenders' parental situation is more often missing than not, our results suggest jihadists' parents are married more often than far-right or far-left IOs (24% vs. 11% vs. 1%).

Jihadists have sporadic contact with their families more frequently than far-right or far-left IOs (28% vs. 11% vs. 14%) but are also slightly more likely to have regular contact (43% vs. 36% vs. 31%) – a function of there being fewer missing data on jihadist familial situations than far-right and far-left IOs. These findings map onto offenders' living situations, as jihadist IOs mostly live with spouse/children (26%) or other family members (20%). Childhood exposure to extremism was much more prevalent amongst jihadist IOs (40%) than far-right (11%) or far-left (5%) IOs, although the three categories were comparable in the rareness of having family members with a criminal or extremist history. Jihadist and far-left IOs were similarly close to their families (42% and 43%, respectively), but far-right IOs were close to their families slightly less often (30%).

Prosocial aspirations were more common amongst far-left offenders and these ideologues were also the least likely to experience platonic or romantic troubles. Compared to jihadists (46%) and far-rightists (41%), only 26% of far-left IOs had problems making or maintaining

romantic relationships. Jihadists were much more likely than both groups to have problems

forming platonic friendships (41% vs. 23% vs. 10%), but it is important to remember they were

more often in close contact with their family members. In terms of the friendships they do hold,

jihadists associate with deviant/violent friends less often that far-right or far-left IOs (30% vs.

42% vs. 49%) but had the highest prevalence of peers involved in criminal or delinquent

activities (27% vs. 24% vs. 16%), suggesting that the deviant peers jihadist IOs do have are

frequently involved in criminal activities.

Table 3b. Familial/Social Factors

Variable	Jihadist (n=210)	Far-right (n=212)	Far-left (n=77)
Martial Status			
Single	76 (36.19%)	54 (25.47%)	33 (42.86%)
Married/Partnered	110 (52.38%)	106 (50.00%)	31 (40.26%)
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	15 (7.62%)	26 (12.26%)	7 (9.09%)
Missing	8 (3.81%)	26 (12.26%)	6 (7.79%)
Children			
0	76 (36.19%)	48 (22.64%)	55 (71.43%)
1	29 (13.81%)	33 (15.57%)	2 (2.60%)
2	29 (13.81%)	18 (8.49%)	11 (14.29%)
3	13 (6.19%)	9 (4.25%)	2 (2.60%)
Missing	63 (30.00%)	104 (49.06%)	7 (9.09%)
Parental History			
Parents married	51 (24.29%)	23 (10.85%)	15 (1.30%)
Parents divorced	31 (14.76%)	27 (12.74%)	15 (20.78%)
Parents died	11 (5.24%)	7 (3.30%)	7 (9.09%)
Never Married	8 (3.81%)	1 (0.47%)	3 (3.90%)
Missing	109 (51.90%)	154 (72.64%)	36 (46.75%)
Family Contact			
No contact	22 (10.48%)	20 (9.43%)	8 (10.39%)
Sporadic Contact	59 (28.10%)	24 (11.32%)	11 (14.29%)
Regular Contact	91 (43.33%)	76 (35.85%)	24 (31.17%)
Missing	38 (18.10%)	92 (43.40%)	34 (44.16)
Childhood Exposure to Extremism			
No	125 (59.52%)	189 (89.15%)	73 (94.81%)
Yes	85 (40.48%)	23 (10.85%)	4 (5.19%)
Familial Criminal History			
No	187 (89.05%)	184 (86.79%)	68 (88.31%)
Yes	22 (10.48%)	25 (11.79%)	8 (10.39%)
Missing	1 (0.48%)	3 (1.42%)	1 (1.30%)

Familial Extremist History			
No	175 (83.33%)	165 (77.83%)	70 (90.91%)
Yes	32 (15.24%)	44 (20.75%)	7 (9.09%)
Missing	3 (1.43%)	3 (1.42%)	0 (0.00%)
Family Importance in Life			
Distant	60 (28.57$)	39 (18.40%)	19 (24.68%)
Close	89 (42.38%)	63 (29.72%)	33 (42.86%)
Missing	61 (29.05%)	110 (51.89%)	25 (32.47%)
Prosocial Aspirations			
No	153 (72.86%)	164 (77.36%)	46 (59.74%)
Yes	57 (27.14%)	48 (22.64%)	31 (40.26%)
Romantic Troubles			
No	114 (54.29%)	125 (58.96%)	57 (74.03%)
Yes	96 (45.71%)	87 (41.04%)	20 (25.97%)
Platonic Troubles			
No	124 (59.05%)	163 (76.89%)	69 (89.61%)
Yes	86 (40.95%)	49 (23.11%)	8 (10.39%)
Living Arrangement			
Lived with spouse/children	55 (26.19%)	64 (30.19%)	9 (11.69%)
Lived with family	44 (20.95%)	14 (6.60%)	10 (12.99%)
Lived alone	18 (8.57%)	22 (10.38%)	14 (18.18%)
Live with non-family	26 (12.38%)	21 (9.91%)	11 (14.29%)
Incarcerated	3 (1.43%)	2 (0.94%)	0 (0.00%)
No stable residence	9 (4.29%)	11 (5.19%)	11 (14.29%)
Missing	55 (26.19%)	78 (36.79%)	22 (28.57%)
Community Status			
Low status/prestige	42 (20.00%)	67 (31.60%)	19 (24.68%)
High status/prestige	21 (10.00%)	19 (8.96%)	14 (18.18%)
Missing	147 (70.00%)	126 (59.43%)	44 (57.14%)
Type of Friends			
None	42 (20.00%)	12 (5.66%)	15 (19.48%)
Deviant/Violent	62 (29.52%)	90 (42.45%)	38 (49.35%)
Nonviolent/Nondeviant	26 (12.38%)	14 (6.60%)	11 (14.29%)
Missing	80 (38.10%)	96 (45.28%)	13 (16.88%)
Criminal/Delinquent Peers			
No	153 (72.86%)	160 (75.47%)	65 (84.42%)
Yes	57 (27.14%)	52 (24.53%)	12 (15.58%)
Get Along with Peers			
No	10 (4.76%)	11 (5.19%)	4 (5.19%)
Yes	91 (43.33%)	43 (20.28%)	25 (32.47%)
Missing	109 (51.90%)	158 (74.53%)	48 (62.34%)

Negative Life Events

It was common amongst all three ideological categories to experience a negative life transition, albeit jihadist (84%) and far-right (74%) experienced them at a higher percentage than far-left IOs (49%). The most common life events for jihadists were recent relocations (29%), prior victimization (33%), and alienation from a social circle or family (31%). Comparatively, far-right IOs experienced family problems (21%), social alienation (24%), and drug use (22%) most often, although these proportions were not noticeably different compared to jihadists and far left. Far-left IOs had the highest percentage of offenders who experienced a health issue (28%) as well as loss of job/employment (14%). They were similarly likely to have been victimized (26%) as jihadistsexperienced family problems (22%), alienation (18%), and used drugs (17%) at rates comparable to both jihadist and far-right IOs.

Table 3c. Negative Life Events

Variable	Jihadist (n=210)	Far-right (n=212)	Far-left (n=77)
Negative Transitions			
No	34 (16.19%)	56 (26.42%)	39 (50.65%)
Yes	176 (83.81%)	156 (73.58%)	38 (49.35%)
Loss of Job/Employment			
No	191 (90.95%)	192 (90.57%)	66 (85.71%)
Yes	19 (9.05%)	20 (9.43%)	11 (14.29%)
Recent Relocation			
No	150 (71.43%)	198 (93.40%)	64 (83.12%)
Yes	60 (28.57%)	14 (6.60%)	13 (16.88%)
Health Issue			
No	166 (79.05%)	178 (83.96%)	55 (71.43%)
Yes	44 (20.95%)	34 (16.04%)	22 (28.57%)
Victimization			
No	140 (66.67%)	184 (86.79%)	57 (74.03%)
Yes	70 (33.33%)	28 (13.21%)	20 (25.97%)
Family Problems			
No	165 (78.57%)	168 (79.25%)	60 (77.92%)
Yes	45 (21.43%)	44 (20.75%)	17 (22.08%)
Alienation			
No	144 (68.57%)	162 (76.42%)	63 (81.82%)
Yes	66 (31.43%)	50 (23.58%)	14 (18.18%)
Drug Use			
No	173 (82.38%)	166 (78.30%)	64 (83.12%)

Yes	37 (17.62%)	46 (21.70%)	13 (16.88%)
Alcohol Use			
No	194 (92.38%)	191 (90.09%)	76 (98.70%)
Yes	16 (7.62%)	21 (9.91%)	1 (1.30%)

Psychological/Personality factors

The percentage of offenders who had a mental illness or who had previously had a serious mental health issue was relatively similar across all three ideological categories. Jihadist offenders and far-right offenders, however, were much more likely to have demonstrated status-seeking behaviors that indicated a need for moral superiority and to dominate others than far-left IOs (52% vs. 44% vs. 20%). Examples of these behaviors may include deeming oneself a "soldier of god" or a "holy warrior," expressions that signify a level of status attainable by few. Alternatively, far-left IOs demonstrated impulsive behaviors slightly more frequently than jihadists (29% vs 35%) and much more often than far-right IOs (17% vs. 35%).

Table 3d. Psychological/Personality Factors

Variable	Jihadist (n=210)	Far-right (n=212)	Far-left (n=77)
Mental Illness			
No	150 (71.43%)	164 (77.36%)	54 (70.13%)
Yes	60 (28.57%)	48 (22.64%)	23 (29.87%)
Serious Mental Health Issue			
No	181 (86.19%)	197 (92.92%)	65 (84.42%)
Yes	29 (13.81%)	15 (7.08%)	12 (15.58%)
Status-Seeking Behaviors			
No	101 (48.10%)	118 (55.66%)	62 (80.52%)
Yes	109 (51.90%)	94 (44.34%)	15 (19.48%)
Impulsive Behaviors			
No	148 (70.48%)	177 (83.49%)	50 (64.94%)
Yes	62 (29.52%)	35 (16.51%)	27 (35.06%)

Ideological factors

In their ideological characteristics, jihadists were the most likely to be seeking identity (23% vs. 9% vs. 4%) and express a desire to belong (72% vs. 32% vs. 13%) than far-right or far-left IOs. Fifty-two percent of far-left IOs were involved in political activism, compared to forty-two percent of jihadists and thirty-four percent of far rightists-- results that indicate far-left extremists may have frequently attempted nonviolent and noncriminal avenues of advancing their ideology before engaging in ideological crime and violence. All three categories were similarly likely to perceive an injustice or grievance, but jihadist and far-left offenders were more likely to place the blame for their grievance on a particular person or group of people.

In terms of group affiliation, nearly half of jihadists acted with others without clear group boundaries (49%), with 24% of jihadist IOs acting alone and 21% acting as a member of a formal group. Far-left IOs acted as members of an informal group (44%) or alone (36%) most often, with very few far-left offenders being members of a formalized group (3%). Unlike the other two groups, far-right IOs were fairly evenly distributed across all four categories of group affiliation, suggesting there is not a particular mode of affiliation that characterizes these offenders.

Table 3e. Ideological Factors

Variable	Jihadist (n=210)	Far-right (n=212)	Far-left (n=77)
Identity-Seeking			
No	161 (76.67%)	193 (91.04%)	74 (96.10%)
Yes	49 (23.33%)	19 (8.96%)	2 (3.90%)
Desire to Belong			
No	59 (28.10%)	144 (67.92%)	67 (87.01%)
Yes	151 (71.90%)	68 (32.08%)	10 (12.99%)
Political Activism			
No	121 (57.62%)	140 (66.04%)	37 (48.05%)
Yes	89 (42.38%)	72 (33.96%)	40 (51.95%)
Perceived Injustice/Grievance			
No	56 (26.67%)	82 (38.68%)	27 (35.06%)
Yes	154 (73.33%)	130 (61.32%)	50 (64.94%)

Blamed Other(s)			
No	92 (43.81%)	115 (54.25%)	30 (38.96%)
Yes	118 (56.19%)	97 (45.75%)	47 (61.04%)
Lone/Group Actor			
Acted Alone	51 (24.29%)	46 (21.70%)	28 (36.36%)
Part of formal group	45 (21.43%)	51 (24.06%)	2 (2.60%)
Part of informal group	12 (5.71%)	56 (26.42%)	34 (44.16%)
Acting with others – no clear group boundaries	102 (48.57%)	58 (27.36%)	12 (15.58%)
Missing	0 (0.00%)	1 (0.47%)	1 (1.30%)

Criminal History

In keeping with the trends from previous sections, very few IOs, regardless of ideology, were members of a gang. Across the three ideologies, their criminal histories are comparable, although jihadist IOs are the least likely to have previously been arrested (28% vs. 42% vs. 42%) and least likely to have engaged in prior criminal behavior (44% vs. 59% vs. 71%). A slightly higher percentage of far-right offenders (24%) were previously incarcerated than jihadist (19%) and far-left (16%) IOs. Overall, these results indicate a criminal history is common amongst offenders from all three ideological categories.

Table 3f. Criminal History

Variable	Jihadist (n=210)	Far-right (n=212)	Far-left (n=77)
Gang Member			
No	205 (97.62%)	197 (92.92%)	70 (90.91%)
Yes	5 (2.38%)	15 (7.08%)	7 (0.09%)
Prior Arrest			
No	144 (68.57%)	104 (49.06%)	42 (54.55%)
Yes	59 (28.10%)	90 (42.45%)	32 (41.56%)
Missing	7 (3.33%)	18 (8.49%)	3 (3.90%)
Prior Incarceration			
No	171 (81.43%)	160 (75.47%)	65 (84.42%)
Yes	39 (18.57%)	52 (24.53%)	12 (15.58%)
Prior Criminal Behavior			
No	117 (55.71%)	87 (41.04%)	22 (28.57%)
Yes	93 (44.29%)	125 (58.96%)	55 (71.43%)

Multivariate Analysis for Comparing Jihadist, Far-Right, and Far-Left Ideological Offenders

As opposed to the previous section, where the purpose of the analysis was to ascertain differences between IOs and the two control groups, this section is focused on identifying differences between all three ideological categories. As such, we estimated three binary logistic regression models to compare each ideological category to one another as opposed to a multinomial model, which would only draw comparisons between the reference category and the two defined categories.

Table 3g. Binary Logistic Regression Models Comparing Jihadi, Far-right, and Far-Left Extremist Offenders

	Model 1 Far-Right Vs. Jihadist		Model 2 Far-Right Vs. Far-Left		Model 3 Jihadist Vs. Far-Left	
Variable	**b (SE)**	**OR**	**b (SE)**	**OR**	**b (SE)**	**OR**
Childhood Exposure to Extremism	1.77 (.32)	5.89***	-.94 (.63)	.39	-3.18 (.73)	.04***
Platonic Trouble	.52 (.29)	1.68	-1.02 (.51)	.36*	-1.82 (.62)	.16**
Negative Transitions	.14 (.29)	1.15	-1.48 (.36)	.23***	-1.68 (.53)	.19**
Victimization	.66 (.33)	1.93*	2.01 (.47)	7.49***	.75 (.52)	2.11
Status-Seeking Behaviors	-.17 (.25)	.85	-.95 (.38)	.39*	-.87 (.52)	.42
Identity-Seeking	.48 (.38)	1.62	-.10 (.76)	.93	-.90 (.88)	.41
Desire to Belong	1.60 (.25)	4.93***	-1.35 (.43)	.26**	-3.41 (.52)	.03***
Injustice/Grievance	.29 (.27)	1.30	.84 (.39)	2.32*	.42 (.49)	1.52
Prior Criminal Behavior	-1.28 (.25)	.28***	.72 (.38)	2.06*	2.10 (.49)	8.12***
Pseudo R^2	.26		.21		.55	

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
Note: Dependent Variable: **Model 1**: Far-right = 0; Jihadist = 1; **Model 2**: Far-right = 0; Far-left = 1; **Model 3**: Jihadist = 0; Far-left = 1.
Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *OR* = Odds Ratio

Table 3g presents the results of Models 1-3, with the outcome of interest specified for each model. Model 1 compares far-right and jihadist IOs, with four variables demonstrating a significant relationship in differentiating the two groups. First, jihadists were significantly more

likely to be exposed to extremism as a child than far-right IOs (OR=5.89; p<.001). Jihadists were also significantly more likely to experience prior victimization (OR=1.93; p<.05) and to express a desire to belong to something than far-right IOs (OR=4.93; p<.001). However, jihadists were significantly less likely to have engaged in prior criminal behavior than far-right IOs (OR=.28; p<.001).

Model 2 compares far-right and far-left IOs. Far-left IOs were significantly more likely to have a victimization experience (OR=7.49; p<.001), perceive an injustice or grievance (OR=2.32; p<.05), and have previously engaged in criminal behavior (OR=2.06; p<.05) than far-right IOs. Far-left offenders were significantly less likely than far-right offenders to have trouble forming platonic relationships (OR=.36; p<.05), experience a negative life transition (OR=.23; p<.001), demonstrate status-seeking behaviors (OR=.39; p<.05), and express a desire to belong (OR=.26; P<.01).

Finally, Model 3 compares jihadist and far-left IOs. Similar to the comparison between jihadists and far-right IOs, far-left offenders were significantly less likely to be exposed to extremism as a child than jihadists (OR=.04; p<.001). Far-leftists were also significantly less likely than jihadist IOs to have trouble making and maintaining platonic relationships (OR=.16; p<.01), experience a negative life transition (OR=.19; p<.01), and to express a desire for belonging (OR=.03; p<.001). Far-left offenders, in turn, were significantly more likely to have engaged in prior criminal behavior than jihadist IOs (OR=8.12; p<.001).

RQ5: How do the presence of risk and protective variables vary when comparing jihadist, far right, and far left ideological offenders to jihadist, far right, and far left noncriminal extremists?

In this section we break down the ideological categories further by comparing ideological offenders to nonoffending extremists within each ideological category. The purpose of this delineation is to understand how offending extremists differ from nonoffending extremists within a specific ideological group and explore whether those differences are consistent between ideologies.

Table 4a. Sociodemographic

Variable	Jihadist		Far-right		Far-left	
	Offender (n=207)	**Nonoffender (n=96)**	**Offender (n=212)**	**Nonoffender (n=102)**	**Offender (n=77)**	**Nonoffender (n=34)**
Gender						
Female	13 (6.19%)	2 (2.08%)	31 (14.62%)	4 (3.92%)	15 (19.48%)	4 (11.76%)
Male	197 (93.81%)	94 (97.92%)	181 (85.38%)	98 (96.08%)	62 (80.52%)	30 (88.24%)
Age	29.88	43.38	41.95	37.19	29.44	36.29
Race/Ethnicity						
White, non-Hispanic	36 (17.14%)	5 (5.21%)	191 (90.09%)	94 (92.16%)	28 (36.36%)	17 (50.00%)
Black, non-Hispanic	50 (23.81%)	19 (19.79%)	7 (3.30%)	1 (0.98%)	31 (40.26%)	14 (41.18%)
Middle Eastern/North African	74 (35.24%)	67 (69.79%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
Other	47 (22.38%)	2 (2.08%)	8 (3.77%)	0 (0.00%)	3 (3.90%)	2 (5.88%)
Missing	3 (1.43%)	3 (3.13%)	6 (2.83%)	7 (6.86%)	15 (19.48%)	1 (2.94%)
Current Living						
Urban	111 (52.86%)	70 (72.92%)	52 (24.53%)	41 (40.20%)	49 (63.64%)	24 (70.59%)
Suburban	60 (28.57%)	24 (25.00%)	75 (35.38%)	25 (24.51%)	16 (20.78%)	8 (23.53%)
Rural	16 (7.62%)	0 (0.00%)	67 (31.60%)	23 (22.55%)	7 (9.09%)	1 (2.94%)
Missing	23 (10.95%)	2 (2.08%)	18 (8.49%)	13 (12.75%)	5 (6.94%)	1 (2.94%)
Foreign Born						
Foreign Born	107 (50.95%)	49 (51.04%)	1 (0.47%)	1 (0.98%)	3 (3.90%)	1 (2.94%)
U.S. – Born	87 (41.43%)	33 (34.38%)	198 (93.40%)	98 (96.08%)	70 (90.91%)	31 (91.19%)
Missing	16 (7.62%)	14 (14.58%)	13 (6.13%)	3 (2.94%)	4 (5.19%)	2 (5.88%)
Religiosity						
Secular	16 (8.57%)	0 (0.00%)	4 (1.89%)	3 (2.94%)	11 (14.29%)	1 (2.94%)
Somewhat Religious	42 (20.00%)	4 (4.17%)	13 (6.13%)	11 (10.78%)	4 (5.19%)	0 (0.00%)
Very Religious	112 (53.33%)	69 (71.88%)	28 (13.21%)	20 (19.61%)	12 (15.58%)	10 (29.41%)
Missing	38 (18.10%)	23 (23.96%)	167 (78.77%)	68 (66.67%)	50 (64.94%)	23 (67.65%)
Education						
Homeschool	3 (1.43%)	0 (0.00%)	2 (0.94%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
Some School	28 (13.33%)	1 (1.04%)	18 (8.49%)	4 (3.92%)	5 (6.49%)	0 (0.00%)
High School Diploma/GED	28 (13.33%)	4 (4.17%)	40 (18.87%)	7 (6.86%)	4 (5.19%)	5 (14.71%)
Some college or vocational	75 (35.71%)	5 (5.21%)	26 (12.26%)	7 (6.86%)	18 (23.38%)	0 (0.00%)

College graduate	42 (20.00%)	61 (63.54%)	33 (15.57%)	18 (17.65%)	10 (12.99%)	18 (52.94%)
Missing	34 (16.19%)	25 (26.04%)	93 (43.87%)	66 (64.71%)	40 (51.95%)	11 (32.35%)
Employment History						
Never employed	20 (9.52%)	0 (0.00%)	10 (4.72%)	1 (0.98%)	2 (2.60%)	0 (0.00%)
Sporadically employed	82 (39.05%)	0 (0.00%)	64 (30.19%)	8 (7.84%)	14 (16.18%)	0 (0.00%)
Regularly employed	90 (42.86%)	81 (84.38%)	79 (37.26%)	41 (40.20%)	27 (35.06%)	25 (73.53%)
Missing	18 (8.57%)	15 (15.63%)	59 (27.83%)	52 (50.98%)	34 (44.16%)	9 (26.47%)
Socioeconomic Status						
Low	127 (60.48%)	2 (2.08%)	88 (41.51%)	9 (8.82%)	25 (32.47%)	3 (8.82%)
Middle	55 (26.19%)	35 (36.46%)	42 (19.81%)	24 (23.53%)	12 (15.58%)	16 (47.06%)
High	17 (8.10%)	26 (27.08%)	56 (26.42%)	6 (5.88%)	3 (3.90%)	5 (14.71%)
Missing	11 (5.24%)	33 (34.38%)	26 (12.26%)	63 (61.76%)	37 (48.05%)	10 (29.41%)
Home Ownership						
Rent	102 (48.57%)	11 (11.46%)	50 (23.58%)	15 (14.71%)	38 (49.35%)	6 (17.65%)
Own Home	20 (9.52%)	39 (40.63%)	53 (25.00%)	15 (14.71%)	6 (7.79%)	14 (41.18%)
Homeless	3 (1.43%)	0 (0.00%)	6 (2.83%)	2 (1.96%)	6 (7.79%)	0 (0.00%)
Missing	85 (40.48%)	46 (47.92%)	103 (48.58%)	70 (68.63%)	27 (35.06%)	14 (41.18%)
Military Experience						
No	189 (90.00%)	95 (98.96%)	187 (88.21%)	90 (88.24%)	66 (85.71%)	30 (88.24%)
Yes	21 (10.00%)	1 (1.04%)	25 (11.79%)	12 (11.76%)	11 (14.29%)	4 (11.76%)

Sociodemographic factors

<u>Jihadist.</u> The large majority of jihadist offenders and nonoffenders are male. However, jihadist nonoffenders are over 13 years older on average than offenders. The racial and ethnic composition of the two groups is notably different as well. Twice as many jihadist nonoffenders are Middle Eastern/North African (70%) compared to just 35% of jihadist offenders, who are more often black (24% vs. 20%), white (17% vs. 5%), or another race (22% vs. 2%). Jihadist nonoffenders are more likely than offenders to live in urban areas (53% vs. 73%), and are deemed "very religious" much more often than jihadist offenders (53% vs. 72%).

In terms of education and employment, the differences between the two groups are stark. Jihadist nonoffenders are much more likely to be college educated (20% vs. 63%), and more likely to be regularly employed (43% vs. 84%). In fact, for those who had an employment history known, no jihadist nonoffender had a sporadic or nonexistent work history. These trends continue into SES, where over 60% of violent extremists are classified as low SES, compared to just 2% of nonoffenders who frequently fall into the middle (36%) and high (27%) SES categories. Jihadist offenders are also more likely than nonoffenders to rent their home (49% vs 11%), whereas over 40% of jihadist nonoffenders own their home. Finally, though the occurrence is generally small for both groups, only 1 jihadist nonoffender (1%) had military experience, compared to 10% of jihadist offenders.

Far-Right. In contrast to jihadists, far-right offenders and nonoffenders were much similar in their sociodemographic profiles. While there was a slightly higher percentage of females amongst far-right offenders, they are alike in age, racial/ethnic composition, religiosity, education level, employment history, home ownership, and military experience. The groups

diverge slightly in current living situation, with offenders residing in urban areas less often than nonoffenders (24% vs. 40%). Additionally, though interpretation is limited by the high amount of missing data, far-right offenders are considered low SES more often than nonoffenders (42% vs. 9%).

Far-left. Far-left offenders and nonoffenders shared many sociodemographic characteristics, but differed on many as well. On average, far-left offenders were about 7 years younger than nonoffenders. The two groups were similar in their racial composition, areas of living, religiosity, and military experience. But, there were clear differences in education and employment history. Far-left offenders were college educated much less often than nonoffenders (13% vs. 53%) and were less likely to be regularly employed than nonoffenders (35% vs. 74%). A higher percentage of far-left offenders were low SES compared to nonoffenders (32% vs. 9%), with a plurality of nonoffenders falling into middle class (47%). Offenders also rented their home more often than nonoffenders (49% vs. 18%).

Familial/Social factors

<u>**Jihadists.**</u> In terms of marital status, a higher percentage of jihadist offenders were single (36% vs. 10%) and had no children (26% vs. 7%) than nonoffenders. This may explain why nearly half of the jihadist nonoffenders lived with a spouse and/or children, compared to 26% of jihadist offenders. Offenders also had only sporadic contact with their family more often than nonoffenders (28% vs. 1%), with nonoffenders being in regular contact more frequently than jihadist offenders (43% vs. 55%). This also tracks with family importance, as more jihadist offenders were distant from their family than nonoffenders (29% vs. 2%), as nonoffenders most

often had close ties to their family (56%). These groups also diverge on familial influences, as over 40% of jihadist offenders had exposure to extremism as a child, compared to just about 14% of nonoffenders. However, neither group had a high prevalence of criminal or extremist family members.

Jihadist offenders express prosocial aspirations less frequently than jihadist nonoffenders (27% vs. 47%). These individuals also experience problems making and maintaining platonic and romantic relationships that were not shared by their nonoffending counterparts. Nearly 46% of jihadist offenders had problems forming romantic connections, with 41% having trouble making platonic friendships, compared to just 4% and 1% of nonoffenders, respectively.

In terms of peers, jihadist offenders were more likely to have no friends (20% vs. 1%), but less likely to have deviant/violent peers than nonoffenders (29% vs. 51%). This finding is likely due to nonoffenders associating with other extremists, who were deemed deviant because of their association with extremist movements. Adding to this point, jihadist offenders associated with criminal and/or delinquent peers much more often (27% vs. 3%), suggesting that the deviant peers nonoffenders associate with are rarely involved in criminal activity. Interestingly, nonoffenders are also more likely than offenders to get along with the peers whom they do associate with (43% vs. 73%).

Table 4b. Familial/Social Factors

Variable	Jihadist		Far-right		Far-left	
	Offender (n=207)	**Nonoffender (n=96)**	**Offender (n=212)**	**Nonoffender (n=102)**	**Offender (n=77)**	**Nonoffender (n=34)**
Marital Status						
Single	76 (36.19%)	10 (10.42%)	54 (25.47%)	29 (28.43%)	33 (42.86%)	12 (35.29%)
Married/Partnered	110 (52.38%)	47 (48.96%)	106 (50.00%)	35 (34.31%)	31 (40.26%)	10 (29.41%)
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	16 (7.62%)	3 (3.13%)	26 (12.26%)	6 (5.88%)	7 (9.09%)	3 (8.82%)
Missing	8 (3.81%)	36 (37.50%)	26 (12.26%)	32 (31.37%)	6 (7.79%)	9 (26.47%)
Children						
0	76 (26.19%)	7 (7.29%)	48 (22.64%)	19 (18.63%)	55 (71.43%)	0 (0.00%)
1	29 (13.81%)	12 (12.50%)	33 (15.57%)	15 (14.71%)	2 (2.60%)	5 (14.71%)
2	29 (13.81%)	19 (19.79%)	18 (8.49%)	9 (8.82%)	11 (14.29%)	5 (14.71%)
3	13 (6.19%)	11 (11.46%)	9 (4.25%)	9 (8.82%)	2 (2.60%)	3 (8.82%)
Missing	63 (30.00%)	47 (48.96%)	104 (49.06%)	50 (49.02%)	7 (9.09%)	21 (61.76%)
Parental History						
Parents married	51 (24.29%)	25 (26.04%)	23 (10.85%)	16 (15.69%)	15 (19.48%)	6 (17.65%)
Parents divorced	31 (14.76%)	4 (4.17%)	27 (12.74%)	3 (2.94%)	16 (20.78%)	2 (5.88%)
Parents died	11 (5.24%)	4 (4.17%)	7 (3.30%)	4 (3.92%)	7 (9.09%)	0 (0.00%)
Never Married	8 (3.81%)	0 (0.00%)	1 (0.47%)	1 (0.98%)	3 (3.90%)	2 (5.88%)
Missing	109 (51.90%)	63 (65.63%)	154 (72.64%)	78 (76.47%)	36 (46.75%)	24 (70.59%)
Family Contact						
No contact	22 (10.48%)	3 (3.13%)	20 (9.43%)	0 (0.00%)	8 (10.39%)	3 (8.82%)
Sporadic Contact	59 (28.10%)	1 (1.04%)	24 (11.32%)	1 (0.98%)	11 (14.29%)	1 (2.94%)
Regular Contact	91 (43.33%)	53 (55.21%)	76 (35.85%)	38 (37.25%)	24 (31.17%)	12 (35.29%)
Missing	38 (18.10%)	39 (40.63%)	92 (43.40%)	63 (61.76%)	34 (44.16%)	18 (52.94%)
Childhood Exposure to Extremism						
No	125 (59.52%)	83 (86.46%)	189 (89.15%)	92 (90.20%)	73 (94.81%)	31 (91.18%)
Yes	85 (40.48%)	13 (13.54%)	23 (10.85%)	10 (9.80%)	4 (5.19%)	3 (8.82%)
Familial Criminal History						
No	187 (89.05%)	90 (93.75%)	184 (86.79%)	96 (94.12%)	68 (88.31%)	32 (94.12%)
Yes	22 (10.48%)	4 (4.17%)	25 (11.79%)	5 (4.90%)	8 (10.39%)	2 (5.88%)
Missing	1 (0.48%)	2 (2.08%)	3 (1.42%)	1 (0.98%)	1 (1.30%)	0 (0.00%)

Familial Extremist History						
No	175 (83.33%)	86 (89.58%)	165 (77.83%)	86 (84.31%)	70 (90.91%)	31 (91.18%)
Yes	32 (15.24%)	10 (10.42%)	44 (20.75%)	16 (15.69%)	7 (9.09%)	3 (8.82%)
Missing	3 (1.43%)	0 (0.00%)	3 (1.42%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
Family Importance in Life						
Distant	60 (28.57%)	2 (2.08%)	39 (18.40%)	3 (2.94%)	19 (24.68%)	0 (0.00%)
Close	89 (42.38%)	54 (56.25%)	63 (29.72%)	40 (39.22%)	33 (42.86%)	18 (52.94%)
Missing	61 (29.05%)	40 (41.67%)	110 (51.89%)	59 (57.84%)	25 (32.47%)	16 (47.06%)
Prosocial Aspirations						
No	153 (72.86%)	51 (53.13%)	164 (77.36%)	81 (79.41%)	46 (59.74%)	16 (47.06%)
Yes	57 (27.14%)	45 (46.88%)	48 (22.64%)	21 (20.59%)	31 (40.26%)	18 (52.94%)
Romantic Troubles						
No	114 (54.29%)	92 (95.83%)	125 (58.96%)	90 (88.24%)	57 (74.03%)	30 (88.24%)
Yes	96 (45.71%)	4 (4.17%)	87 (41.04%)	12 (11.76%)	20 (25.97%)	4 (11.76%)
Platonic Troubles						
No	124 (59.05%)	95 (98.96%)	163 (76.89%)	97 (95.10%)	69 (89.61%)	34 (100%)
Yes	86 (40.95%)	1 (1.04%)	49 (23.11%)	5 (4.90%)	8 (10.39%)	0 (0.00%)
Living Arrangement						
Lived with spouse/children	55 (26.19%)	48 (50.00%)	64 (30.19%)	32 (31.37%)	9 (11.69%)	12 (35.29%)
Lived with family	44 (20.95%)	1 (1.04%)	14 (6.60%)	9 (8.82%)	10 (12.99%)	1 (2.94%)
Lived alone	18 (8.57%)	3 (3.13%)	22 (10.38%)	3 (2.94%)	14 (18.18%)	5 (14.71%)
Live with non-family	26 (12.38%)	3 (3.13%)	21 (9.91%)	4 (3.92%)	11 (14.29%)	0 (0.00%)
Incarcerated	3 (1.43%)	0 (0.00%)	2 (0.94%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
No stable residence	9 (4.29%)	0 (0.00%)	11 (5.19%)	1 (0.98%)	11 (14.29%)	0 (0.00%)
Missing	55 (26.19%)	41 (42.71%)	78 (36.79%)	53 (51.96%)	22 (28.57%)	16 (47.06%)
Community Status						
Low status/prestige	42 (20.00%)	11 (11.46%)	67 (31.60%)	13 (12.75%)	19 (24.68%)	8 (23.53%)
High status/prestige	21 (10.00%)	49 (51.04%)	19 (8.96%)	4 (3.92%)	14 (18.18%)	14 (41.18%)
Missing	147 (70.00%)	36 (37.50%)	126 (59.43%)	85 (83.33%)	44 (57.14%)	12 (35.29%)
Type of Friends						
None	42 (20.00%)	1 (1.04%)	12 (5.66%)	2 (1.96%)	15 (19.48%)	0 (0.00%)
Deviant/Violent	62 (29.52%)	49 (51.04%)	90 (42.45%)	37 (36.27%)	38 (49.35%)	15 (44.12%)
Nonviolent/Nondeviant	26 (12.38%)	26 (27.08%)	14 (6.60%)	12 (11.76%)	11 (14.29%)	18 (52.94%)

Missing	80 (38.10%)	20 (20.83%)	96 (45.28%)	51 (50.00%)	13 (16.88%)	1 (2.94%)
Criminal/Delinquent Peers						
No	153 (72.86%)	93 (96.88%)	160 (75.47%)	94 (92.16%)	65 (84.42%)	32 (94.12%)
Yes	57 (27.14%)	3 (3.13%)	52 (24.53%)	8 (7.84%)	12 (15.58%)	2 (5.88%)
Get Along with Peers						
No	10 (4.76%)	5 (5.21%)	11 (5.19%)	10 (9.80%)	4 (5.19%)	1 (2.94%)
Yes	91 (43.33%)	70 (72.92%)	43 (20.28%)	25 (24.51%)	25 (32.47%)	30 (88.24%)
Missing	109 (51.90%)	21 (21.88%)	158 (74.53%)	67 (65.69%)	48 (62.34%)	3 (8.82%)

Far-Right. Much like their sociodemographic profiles, far-right offenders and nonoffenders are relatively comparable in their familial and social factors. There are no substantial differences in marital status, children, parental history, family contact, familial criminal or extremist history, prosocial aspirations, or living situation between far-right offenders and nonoffenders. Far-right offenders were more likely to experience romantic troubles (41% vs. 12%) and have platonic troubles (23% vs. 5%) than nonoffenders. The two groups were similarly associated with deviant/violent friends, but far-right offenders had criminal or delinquent peers more often than nonoffenders (25% vs. 8%).

Far-Left. Like far-rightists, far-left offenders and nonoffenders had more in common than not. They were similar in terms of their marital status, parents marital status, family contact, exposure to extremism as a child, familial criminal and extremist history, and living arrangements. Their points of divergence include having children, as most far-left offenders have no children. Far-left offenders were also less likely to be close with their family (43% vs. 53%) and have prosocial aspirations (40% vs. 53%) than nonoffenders. Additionally, far-left offenders were more likely to have romantic troubles (26% vs. 12%) and platonic troubles (10% vs. 0%). In terms of peers, far-left offenders were less likely to have nonviolent/nondeviant peers (14% vs. 53%), and slightly more likely to have peers involved in criminal activity (16% vs. 6%) than nonoffenders. Offenders were also less likely than nonoffenders (32% vs. 88%) to get along with their peers.

Negative Life Events

Jihadists. Jihadist offenders experienced negative life transitions much more frequently than nonoffenders (84% vs. 52%). The most prominent differences between the two groups include

events like recent relocations (29% vs. 3%), health issues (21% vs. 0%), family problems (21% vs. 8%), social alienation (31% vs. 15%), and drug use (18% vs. 1%). Interestingly, nonoffenders had prior victimization experiences more frequently than jihadist offenders (33% vs. 42%).

Far-Right. Mirroring the contrast amongst jihadists, far-right offenders were three times more likely to experience negative life transitions than nonoffenders (74% vs. 25%). Specifically, far-right offenders experience health issues (16% vs. 3%), family problems (21% vs. 10%), social alienation (24% vs. 16%), and drug use (22% vs. 5%) more frequently than nonoffenders.

Far-Left. Overall, far-left offenders and nonoffenders are much more similar than jihadists and far-rightists in their negative life events as about half of both groups have gone through a negative life transition. However, far-left offenders are more likely to be recently relocated (17% vs. 0%), have a medical health issue (29% vs. 6%), experience family problems (22% vs. 9%), and use drugs (17% vs. 0%) than nonoffenders.

Table 4c. Negative Life Events

	Jihadist		Far-right		Far-left	
	Offender	**Nonoffender**	**Offender**	**Nonoffender**	**Offender**	**Nonoffender**
Variable	**(n=207)**	**(n=96)**	**(n=212)**	**(n=102)**	**(n=77)**	**(n=34)**
Negative Transitions						
No	34 (16.19%)	46 (47.92%)	56 (26.42%)	77 (75.49%)	39 (50.65%)	17 (50.00%)
Yes	176 (83.81%)	50 (52.08%)	156 (73.58%)	25 (24.51%)	38 (49.35%)	17 (50.00%)
Loss of Job/Employment						
No	191 (90.95%)	92 (95.83%)	192 (90.57%)	93 (91.18%)	66 (85.71%)	32 (94.12%)
Yes	19 (9.05%)	4 (4.17%)	20 (9.43%)	9 (8.82%)	11 (14.29%)	2 (5.88%)
Recent Relocation						
No	150 (71.43%)	93 (96.88%)	198 (93.40%)	98 (96.08%)	64 (83.12%)	34 (100%)
Yes	60 (28.57%)	3 (3.13%)	14 (6.60%)	4 (3.92%)	13 (16.88%)	0 (0.00%)
Health Issue						
No	166 (79.05%)	96 (100.00%)	178 (83.96%)	99 (97.06%)	55 (71.43%)	32 (94.12%)
Yes	44 (20.95%)	0 (0.00%)	34 (16.04%)	3 (2.94%)	22 (28.57%)	2 (5.88%)
Victimization						
No	140 (66.67%)	56 (58.33%)	184 (86.79%)	91 (89.22%)	57 (74.03%)	23 (67.65%)
Yes	70 (33.33%)	40 (41.67%)	28 (13.21%)	11 (10.78%)	20 (25.97%)	11 (32.35%)
Family Problems						
No	165 (78.57%)	88 (91.67%)	168 (79.25%)	92 (90.20%)	60 (77.92%)	31 (91.19%)
Yes	45 (21.43%)	8 (8.33%)	44 (20.75%)	10 (9.80%)	17 (22.08%)	3 (8.82%)
Alienation						
No	144 (68.57%)	82 (85.42%)	162 (76.42%)	86 (84.31%)	63 (81.82%)	28 (82.35%)
Yes	66 (31.43%)	14 (14.58%)	50 (23.58%)	16 (15.69%)	14 (18.18%)	6 (17.65%)
Drug Use						
No	173 (82.38%)	95 (98.96%)	166 (78.30%)	97 (95.10%)	64 (83.12%)	34 (100%)
Yes	37 (17.62%)	1 (1.04%)	46 (21.70%)	5 (4.90%)	13 (16.88%)	0 (0.00%)
Alcohol Use						
No	194 (92.38%)	96 (100.00%)	191 (90.09%)	97 (95.10%)	76 (98.70%)	33 (97.06%)
Yes	16 (7.62%)	0 (0.00%)	21 (9.91%)	5 (4.90%)	1 (1.30%)	1 (2.94%)

Psychological/Personality factors

Jihadist. Jihadist offenders were much more likely to have a mental illness (29% vs. 0%) and to have had serious past mental health issues (14% vs. 1%) than jihadist nonoffenders. However, the majority of both groups demonstrated status-seeking behaviors, with nonoffenders having a higher percentage (64%) of individuals who expressed a need for moral superiority over others than jihadist offenders (53%). Jihadist offenders were on the other hand more impulsive, showing impulsive behaviors in about 30% of cases compared to just 3% of nonoffenders.

Far-Right. Echoing jihadists, far-right offenders were more likely than nonoffenders to have a mental illness (22% vs. 1%) or to have had a serious mental health issue in their past (7% vs. 0%). Unlike jihadists, far-right offenders and nonoffenders displayed a comparable prevalence of status-seeking tendencies and impulsive behaviors.

Far-Left. Like jihadists and far-rightists, a much higher percentage of far-left offenders experience a mental illness (30% vs. 0%) and had previously dealt with a serious mental health issue (16% vs. 0%). Mirroring jihadists, far-left offenders were much less likely to have displayed status-seeking behaviors than nonoffenders (19% vs. 44%), but were much more likely to demonstrate impulsive behaviors (35% vs. 9%).

Ideological factors

Jihadist. Jihadist offenders and nonoffenders were alike in their frequency of identity-seeking tendencies, but diverge in their desire to belong as offenders (72%) were much more likely to crave belonging than nonoffenders (22%). Consistent with the findings in earlier sections, nonoffenders were more commonly involved in political activism (42% vs. 83%), a testament to

their use of nonviolent and noncriminal means to advance an ideological cause. Jihadist offenders were more likely to both perceive an injustice or grievance (73% vs. 48%) and blame their grievance on a particular other (56% vs. 31%) than nonoffending extremists. Most often, jihadist offenders acted with others without clear group boundaries (49%) while nonoffenders acted as part of a formal group (77%).

Far-Right. In keeping with earlier sections, far-right offenders and nonoffenders are fairly comparable on the basis of ideological factors. The main differences between the two are that nonoffenders are more frequently involved in political activism than offenders (34% vs. 84%), and far-right offenders are more likely to perceive an injustice or grievance than nonoffenders (61% vs. 46%). Interestingly, though, offenders blame their grievance on a specific other marginally more than nonoffenders (46% vs. 41%). Far-right offenders may act as any one of the modes of group affiliation, but far-right nonoffenders are almost exclusively affiliated with a formal group (78%).

Table 4d. Psychological/Personality Factors

	Jihadist		Far-right		Far-left	
	Offender	**Nonoffender**	**Offender**	**Nonoffender**	**Offender**	**Nonoffender**
Variable	**(n=207)**	**(n=96)**	**(n=212)**	**(n=102)**	**(n=77)**	**(n=34)**
Mental Illness						
No	150 (71.43%)	96 (100.00%)	164 (77.36%)	101 (99.02%)	54 (70.13%)	34 (100%)
Yes	60 (28.57%)	0 (0.00%)	48 (22.64%)	1 (0.98%)	23 (29.87%)	0 (0.00%)
Serious Mental Health Issue						
No	181 (86.19%)	95 (98.96%)	197 (92.92%)	102 (100.00%)	65 (84.42%)	34 (100%)
Yes	29 (13.81%)	1 (1.04%)	15 (7.08%)	0 (0.00%)	12 (15.58%)	0 (0.00%)
Status-Seeking Behaviors						
No	101 (48.10%)	35 (36.46%)	118 (55.66%)	54 (52.94%)	62 (80.52%)	19 (55.88%)
Yes	109 (51.90%)	61 (63.54%)	94 (44.34%)	48 (47.06%)	15 (19.48%)	15 (44.12%)
Impulsive Behaviors						
No	148 (70.48%)	93 (96.88%)	177 (83.49%)	87 (85.29%)	50 (64.94%)	31 (91.18%)
Yes	62 (29.52%)	3 (3.13%)	35 (16.51%)	15 (14.71%)	27 (35.06%)	3 (8.82%)

Table 4e. Ideological Factors

	Jihadist		Far-right		Far-left	
	Offender	**Nonoffender**	**Offender**	**Nonoffender**	**Offender**	**Nonoffender**
Variable	**(n=207)**	**(n=96)**	**(n=212)**	**(n=102)**	**(n=77)**	**(n=34)**
Identity-Seeking						
No	161 (76.67%)	74 (77.08%)	193 (91.04%)	94 (92.16%)	74 (96.10%)	29 (85.29%)
Yes	49 (23.33%)	22 (22.92%)	19 (8.96%)	8 (7.84%)	3 (3.90%)	5 (14.71%)
Desire to Belong						
No	59 (28.10%)	75 (78.13%)	144 (67.92%)	76 (74.51%)	67 (87.01%)	31 (91.18%)
Yes	151 (71.90%)	21 (21.88%)	68 (32.08%)	26 (25.49%)	10 (12.99%)	3 (8.82%)
Political Activism						
No	121 (57.62%)	16 (16.67%)	140 (66.04%)	16 (15.69%)	37 (48.05%)	1 (2.94%)
Yes	89 (42.38%)	80 (83.33%)	72 (33.96%)	86 (84.31%)	40 (51.95%)	33 (97.06%)
Perceived Injustice/Grievance						

No	56 (26.67%)	50 (52.08%)	82 (38.68%)	55 (53.92%)	27 (35.06%)	18 (52.94%)
Yes	154 (73.33%)	46 (47.92%)	130 (61.32%)	47 (46.08%)	50 (64.94%)	16 (47.06%)
Blamed Target						
No	92 (43.81%)	66 (68.75%)	115 (54.25%)	60 (58.82%)	30 (38.96%)	22 (64.71%)
Yes	118 (56.19%)	30 (31.25%)	97 (45.75%)	42 (41.18%)	47 (61.04%)	12 (35.29%)
Lone/Group Actor						
Acted Alone	51 (24.29%)	16 (16.67%)	46 (21.70%)	5 (4.90%)	28 (36.36%)	4 (11.76%)
Part of formal group	45 (21.43%)	74 (77.08%)	51 (24.06%)	80 (78.43%)	2 (2.60%)	17 (50.00%)
Part of informal group	12 (5.71%)	3 (3.13%)	56 (26.42%)	10 (9.80%)	34 (44.16%)	11 (32.35%)
Acting with others – no clear group boundaries	102 (48.57%)	3 (3.13%)	58 (27.36%)	7 (6.86%)	12 (15.58%)	2 (5.88%)
Missing	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	1 (0.47%)	0 (0.00%)	1 (1.30%)	0 (0.00%)

Far-Left. In contrast to jihadists, far-left offenders are less likely than nonoffenders to have identity-seeking tendencies (4% vs. 15%). However, mirroring the other two ideologies, far-left offenders are much less involved in political activism than nonoffenders (52% vs. 97%). Like jihadists, far-left offenders are more likely to both perceive an injustice or grievance (65% vs. 47%) and blame others for their grievance (61% vs. 35%) than nonoffenders. Far-left nonoffenders mostly operate as members of a formal (50%) or informal group (32%).

Criminal History

Jihadists. Unsurprisingly, jihadist offenders have more extensive criminal histories than nonoffenders. While gang membership is low for both groups, jihadist offenders are more likely to have been arrested (28% vs. 10%), previously incarcerated (19% vs. 4), and to have committed prior criminal behavior (44% vs. 23%) than jihadist nonoffenders.

Far-Right. Similarly, far-right offenders were more criminally involved than nonoffenders. Gang membership remains a rarity, but far-right offenders were more often arrested (42% vs. 14%), incarcerated (24% vs. 2%), and previously engaged in criminal behavior (59% vs. 24%) than far-right nonoffenders.

Far-Left. The trends for jihadists and far-right offenders and nonoffenders translate into the far-left category as well. There is somewhat of a difference in gang membership between the two groups, with 9% of far-left offenders being members of a gang compared to 0 nonoffenders. Additionally, the difference in previous arrests is less prevalent, as over 35% of far-left nonoffenders were previously arrested compared to 42% of far-left offenders. In turn, far-left

offenders were more likely to have been previously incarcerated (16% vs. 3%) and to have

previously engaged in criminal behavior (71% vs. 32%).

Table 4f. Criminal History

Variable	Jihadist		Far-right		Far-left	
	Offender (n=207)	**Nonoffender (n=96)**	**Offender (n=212)**	**Nonoffender (n=102)**	**Offender (n=77)**	**Nonoffender (n=34)**
Gang Member						
No	205 (97.62%)	95 (98.96%)	197 (92.92%)	97 (95.10%)	70 (90.91%)	34 (100.00%)
Yes	5 (2.38%)	1 (1.04%)	15 (7.08%)	5 (4.90%)	7 (9.09%)	0 (0.00%)
Prior Arrest						
No	144 (68.57%)	82 (85.42%)	104 (49.06%)	88 (86.27%)	42 (54.55%)	22 (64.71%)
Yes	59 (28.10%)	10 (10.42%)	90 (42.45%)	14 (13.73%)	32 (41.56%)	12 (35.29%)
Missing	7 (3.33%)	4 (4.17%)	18 (8.49%)	0 (0.00%)	3 (3.90%)	0 (0.00%)
Prior Incarceration						
No	171 (81.43%)	92 (95.83%)	160 (75.47%)	100 (98.04%)	65 (84.42%)	33 (97.06%)
Yes	39 (18.57%)	4 (4.17%)	52 (24.53%)	2 (1.96%)	12 (15.58%)	1 (2.94%)
Prior Criminal Behavior						
No	117 (55.71%)	74 (77.08%)	87 (41.04%)	78 (76.47%)	22 (28.57%)	23 (67.65%)
Yes	93 (44.29%)	22 (22.92%)	125 (58.96%)	24 (23.53%)	55 (71.43%)	11 (32.35%)

Multivariate Analysis Comparing Offenders and Nonoffenders by Ideological Category

For the multivariate analysis, we estimate binary logistic regression models to compare ideological offenders and nonoffenders within each ideological category. However, we did not estimate a multivariate model for the sample of far-left offenders and nonoffenders due to the small sample size of that category. The small sample size, coupled with the uneven split of the dependent variable (n=77 offenders; n=34 nonoffenders), posed problems to model convergence and eliminated our ability to include key variables of interest. Thus, we only ran multivariate models for jihadist and far-right ideologues, where such problems were not as prevalent.

Table 4g. Binary Logistic Regression Models Comparing Jihadist Offenders and Nonoffenders (n=300)[2]

Variable	b (SE)	OR
Race/Ethnicity[a]		
Black, non-hispanic	.31 (.89)	1.35
Middle Eastern/Northern African	1.01 (.79)	2.76
Other	-3.36 (1.24)	.03**
Childhood Exposure to Extremism	-1.65 (.57)	.19**
Prosocial Aspiration	1.21 (.48)	3.35*
Romance Trouble	-2.17 (.70)	.11**
Platonic Trouble	-3.57 (1.47)	.03*
Criminal/Del. Peers	-1.60 (.73)	.20*
Negative Transition	.00 (.52)	1.00
Impulsive Behaviors	-1.30 (.95)	.27
Desire to Belong	-1.43 (.46)	.24**
Political Activism	2.27 (.47)	9.65***
Injustice/Grievance	-.85 (.49)	.43*
Pseudo R^2	.63	

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
[a]Reference Category = (1) White
Note: Dependent Variable: Jihadist Ideological Offender = 0; Jihadist Nonoffender = 1
Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *OR* = Odds Ratio

---

[2] Note that we attempted to include *Prior Criminal Behavior* in this model but opted to exclude that variable over concerns of multicollinearity.

Table 4g displays the results of the binary logistic regression model comparing jihadist offenders (=0) to jihadist nonoffenders (=1). Clearly, a number of factors are salient in differentiating jihadist offenders from nonoffenders. First, in their racial and ethnic identity, jihadist nonoffenders were significantly less likely than offenders to be of an "other" racial category, which includes Hispanic, Asian, Native American, or biracial identity (OR=.03; p<.01). Jihadist nonoffenders were also less likely to be exposed to extremism as a child (OR=.19; p<.01), have problems forming romantic relationships (OR=.11; p<.01) and platonic relationships (OR=.03; p<.05), have criminal or delinquent peers (OR=.20; p<.05), express a desire for belonging (OR=.24; p<.01), and perceive an injustice or grievance (OR=.43; p<.05). In contrast jihadist nonoffenders were more likely than offenders to have prosocial aspirations (OR=3.35; p<.05) and be engaged in political activism (OR=9.65; p<.001).

Table 4h. Binary Logistic Regression Models Comparing Far-Right Offenders and Nonoffenders (n=314)

Variable	b(SE)	OR
Romance Trouble	-.66 (.43)	.52
Platonic Trouble	-.17 (.61)	.85
Criminal/Del. Peers	-.01 (.60)	.99
Negative Transition	-1.55 (.37)	.21***
Mental Illness	-2.24 (.84)	.11**
Desire to Belong	.67 (.45)	1.95
Political Activism	2.70 (.41)	14.87***
Injustice/Grievance	-.66 (.37)	.52
Prior Criminal Behavior	-.83 (.31)	.43*
Pseudo R^2	.40	

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
Note: Dependent Variable: Far-right Ideological Offender = 0; Far-right Nonoffender = 1
Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *OR* = Odds Ratio

In terms of far-right offenders and nonoffenders, the multivariate model in Table 4h indicates several factors differentiate the two groups. First, far-right nonoffenders are significantly less likely to experience a negative life transition than far-right offenders (OR=.21; p<.001).

Nonoffenders are also less likely to have a mental illness (OR=.11; p<.01), and less likely to have previously engaged in criminal behavior (OR=.43; p<.05). Alternatively, far-right nonoffenders are significantly more likely to engage in political activism than offenders, which is consistent with the descriptive assessment above (OR=14.87; p<.001).

RQ6: How do indicators of extremist mobilization vary by the violent/non-violent ideological extremists and across type of ideological motivation (jihadist, far right, far left)?

We provide descriptives for variables related to the mobilization of others or warning behaviors. In Table 5a, we provide results for extremists who committed violent and nonviolent crimes. There were no substantive differences comparing the two groups for over one-half of the variables. VEs were however much more likely than NVCEs to prepare a statement related to their crimes (24% vs 8%), communicate their intention to engage in extremist crime and violence to others (36% vs. 19), glorify violence (50% vs. 20%), communicate with other extremists (55% vs. 43%), advocate for violence (69% v 35%), have angry outbursts (24% vs. 5%), be involved in extremist online spaces (37% vs. 25%), have both formal (29% vs. 17%) and informal (22% vs. 12%) training, have a hierarchical mindset (48% vs. 30%), sympathize with an extremist cause (76% vs. 65%), isolated self from others (31% vs. 6%), and dehumanize others (41% vs. 13%). On the other hand, VEs were much less likely than NCVEs to supply resources to other extremists (5% vs. 20%), received third party monies to fund their activities (11% vs. 17%), have suspicious financial transactions (5% vs. 20%), and to reject democratic values and laws (36% vs. 48%). The higher prevalence for the former three factors are consistent with the types of activities that NVCEs often engage in, including material support, tax fraud, or other financial crimes.

Table 5a. Mobilization Indicators

Variable	Violent Extremist (n=258)	Nonviolent Criminal Extremist (n=241)
Hostility Towards Nation		
No	188 (72.87%)	181 (75.10%)
Yes	70 (27.13%)	60 (24.90%)
Prepared Statement		
No	197 (76.36%)	223 (92.53%)
Yes	61 (23.64%)	18 (7.47%)
Mobilized Others		
No	162 (62.79%)	157 (65.15%)
Yes	96 (37.21%)	84 (34.85%)
Sought Travel Help		
No	222 (86.05%)	223 (92.53%)
Yes	26 (13.95%)	18 (7.47%)
Communicating Intent		
No	165 (63.95%)	194 (80.50%)
Yes	93 (36.05%)	47 (19.50%)
Travel Preparations		
No	203 (78.68%)	188 (78.01%)
Yes	55 (21.32%)	53 (21.99%)
Supplying Resources		
No	245 (94.96%)	193 (80.08%)
Yes	13 (5.04%)	48 (19.92%)
Received Third Party Money		
No	229 (88.76%)	200 (82.99%)
Yes	29 (11.24%)	41 (17.01%)
Glorify Violence		
No	128 (49.61%)	193 (80.08%)
Yes	130 (50.39%)	48 (19.92%)
Radicalize Others		
No	187 (72.48%)	180 (74.69%)
Yes	71 (27.52%)	61 (25.31%)
Communicate With Extremists		
No	117 (45.35%)	137 (56.85%)
Yes	141 (54.65%)	104 (43.15%)
Contact Infamous Extremists		
No	207 (80.23%)	202 (82.82%)
Yes	51 (19.77%)	39 (16.18%)
Advocated Violence		
No	79 (30.62%)	156 (64.73%)
Yes	179 (69.38%)	85 (35.27%)
Angry Outbursts		
No	195 (75.58%)	229 (95.02%)
Yes	63 (24.42%)	12 (4.98%)

Produced Media		
No	199 (77.13%)	194 (80.50%)
Yes	59 (22.87%)	47 (19.50%)
Concealment Behaviors		
No	245 (94.96%)	219 (90.87%)
Yes	13 (5.04%)	22 (9.13%)
Manipulate Social Media		
No	247 (95.74%)	222 (92.12%)
Yes	11 (4.26%)	19 (7.88%)
Online Involvement		
No	162 (62.79%)	180 (74.69%)
Yes	96 (37.21%)	61 (25.31%)
Online Preparations		
No	214 (82.95%)	190 (78.84%)
Yes	44 (17.05%)	51 (21.16%)
Formal Training		
No	182 (70.54%)	199 (82.57%)
Yes	76 (29.46%)	42 (17.43%)
Informal Training		
No	200 (77.52%)	211 (87.55%)
Yes	58 (22.48%)	30 (12.45%)
Hierarchical Mindset		
No	133 (51.55%)	168 (69.71%)
Yes	125 (48.45%)	73 (30.29%)
Suspicious Transactions		
No	244 (94.57%)	193 (80.08%)
Yes	14 (5.43%)	48 (19.92%)
Disposal Of Assets		
No	251 (97.29%)	238 (98.76%)
Yes	7 (2.71%)	3 (1.24%)
Unusual Goodbyes		
No	243 (94.19%)	239 (99.17%)
Yes	15 (5.81%)	2 (0.83%)
Sympathize With Cause		
No	62 (24.03%)	84 (34.85%)
Yes	196 (75.97%)	157 (65.15%)
Promote Extreme Narratives		
No	136 (52.71%)	140 (58.09%)
Yes	122 (47.29%)	101 (41.91%)
Isolated Self		
No	179 (69.38%)	226 (93.78%)
Yes	79 (30.62%)	15 (6.22%)
Adopted Multiple Ideologies		
No	242 (93.80%)	235 (97.51%)
Yes	16 (6.20%)	6 (2.49%)
Reject Democratic Values		

No	164 (63.57%)	125 (51.87%)
Yes	94 (36.43%)	116 (48.13%)
Dehumanize Others		
No	153 (59.30%)	210 (87.14%)
Yes	105 (40.70%)	31 (12.86%)
Praising Past Attacks		
No	207 (80.23%)	200 (82.99%)
Yes	51 (19.77%)	41 (17.01%)
Condemning Others		
No	231 (89.53%)	226 (93.78%)
Yes	27 (10.47%)	15 (6.22%)
Lying To Authorities		
No	208 (80.62%)	190 (78.84%)
Yes	50 (19.38%)	51 (21.16%)

Multivariate Analysis

We estimated a binary logistic regression model with the mobilization indicators that were substantively different between VEs and NVCEs. Displayed in Table 5b, several factors are strong predictors of violent extremism at the multivariate level. VEs are significantly more likely to express an acceptance or glorification of violence (OR=3.56; p<.001), have a history of angry outbursts (OR=2.91; p<.01), have formal weapons or equipment training (OR=2.00; p<.01), isolate themselves from friends and family (OR=3.95; p<.001), and dehumanize others (OR=2.95; p<.001). Alternatively, VEs are significantly less likely to supply resources to extremist causes (OR=.18; p<.001), engage in suspicious financial transactions (OR=.33; p<.01), and reject conventional democratic values and norms (OR=.33; p<.001).

Table 5b. Binary Logistic Regression Comparing Mobilization Indicators Between Violent and Nonviolent Criminal Extremists (n=499)

Variable	b(SE)	OR
Communicating Intent	.18 (.28)	1.20
Glorify Violence	1.27 (.27)	3.56***
Communicate	.37 (.25)	1.45
Supplying Resources	-1.72 (.40)	.18***
Third Party Monies	-.27 (.35)	.76
Angry Outbursts	1.07 (.39)	2.91**
Online Involvement	-.50 (.30)	.61

Formal Training	.69 (.26)	2.00**
Suspicious Transactions	-1.09 (.36)	.33**
Hierarchical Mindset	.38 (.25)	1.47
Isolated Self	1.37 (.40)	3.95***
Reject Democracy	-1.10 (.24)	.33***
Dehumanize Others	1.01 (.30)	2.75***
Pseudo R^2	.28	

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
Note: Dependent Variable: Violent Extremist = 1; Nonviolent Criminal Extremist = 0.
Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *OR* = Odds Ratio

Comparing Mobilization Indicators Across Ideological Categories

Table 5b displays the frequencies of our mobilization indicators across the three ideological categories. Although there are some similarities in the presence of warning behaviors comparing across ideology (e.g. mobilization of others, having angry outbursts, disposing of assets, issuing unusual goodbyes, adopting multiple ideologies, and condemning others), there were some stark differences for many of the warning behavior variables. For example, jihadists were more likely to show hostility towards the nation (37% vs. 22% vs. 8%), prepare a statement (28% vs. 5% vs. 9%), seek travel help (25% vs. 0% vs. 1%), prepare to travel (46% vs. .5% vs. 13%), supply resources to extremist movements (27% vs. 1% vs. 1%), accept or glorify violence as a means to achieve ideological goals (60% vs. 15% vs. 25%), communicate with other extremists (64% vs. 46% vs. 16%), advocate for violence (78% vs. 40% vs. 21%), be involved in extremist online spaces (49% vs. 14% vs. 31%), use online spaces to prepare for their attack (30% vs. 7% vs. 18%), have both formal (32% vs. 18% vs. 14%) and informal training (32% vs. 6% vs. 12%), sympathize with an extremist cause (85% vs. 68% vs. 40%), isolate themselves from others (28% vs. 10% vs. 18%), and praise past attacks (33% vs. 5% vs. 9%). Both jihadist and far-right IOs were more likely than far-left IOs to promote extremist narratives (50% vs. 44% vs. 32%), have a hierarchical mindset (42% vs. 40% vs. 5%), and dehumanize others (31% vs. 28% vs.

14%). Far-right IOs in particular were more likely to reject traditional democratic values and laws (35% vs. 62% vs. 5%). Finally, jihadists and far-left IOs communicated their intentions to engage in extremism more often than far-right offenders (37% vs. 17% vs. 32%).

Table 5c. Mobilization Indicators

Variable	Jihadist (n=210)	Far-right (n=212)	Far-Left (n=77)
Hostility Towards Nation			
No	133 (63.33%)	165 (77.83%)	71 (92.21%)
Yes	77 (36.67%)	47 (22.17%)	6 (7.79%)
Prepared Statement			
No	150 (71.43%)	200 (94.34%)	70 (90.91%)
Yes	60 (28.57%)	12 (5.66%)	7 (9.09%)
Mobilized Others			
No	126 (60.00%)	130 (61.32%)	63 (81.82%)
Yes	84 (40.00%)	82 (38.68%)	14 (18.18%)
Sought Travel Help			
No	157 (74.76%)	212 (100.00%)	76 (98.70%)
Yes	53 (25.24%)	0 (0.00%)	1 (1.30%)
Communicating Intent			
No	132 (62.86%)	185 (82.55%)	52 (67.53%)
Yes	78 (37.14%)	37 (17.45%)	25 (32.47%)
Travel Preparations			
No	113 (53.81%)	211 (99.53%)	67 (87.01%)
Yes	97 (46.19%)	1 (0.47%)	10 (12.99%)
Supplying Resources			
No	153 (72.86%)	209 (98.58%)	76 (98.70%)
Yes	57 (27.14%)	3 (1.42%)	1 (1.30%)
Received Third Party Money			
No	168 (80.00%)	185 (87.26%)	76 (98.70%)
Yes	42 (20.00%)	27 (12.74%)	1 (1.30%)
Glorify Violence			
No	83 (39.52%)	180 (84.91%)	58 (75.32%)
Yes	127 (60.48%)	32 (15.09%)	19 (24.68%)
Radicalize Others			
No	143 (68.10%)	157 (74.06%)	67 (87.01%)
Yes	67 (31.90%)	55 (25.94%)	10 (12.99%)
Communicate With Extremists			
No	75 (35.71%)	114 (53.77%)	65 (84.42%)
Yes	135 (64.29%)	98 (46.23%)	12 (15.58%)
Contact Infamous Extremists			
No	156 (74.29%)	186 (87.74%)	67 (87.01%)

Yes	54 (25.71%)	26 (12.26%)	10 (12.99%)
Advocated Violence			
No	46 (21.90%)	128 (60.38%)	61 (79.22%)
Yes	164 (78.10%)	84 (39.62%)	16 (20.78%)
Angry Outbursts			
No	184 (87.62%)	179 (84.43%)	61 (79.22%)
Yes	26 (12.38%)	33 (15.57%)	16 (20.78%)
Produced Media			
No	160 (76.19%)	176 (83.02%)	57 (74.03%)
Yes	50 (23.81%)	36 (16.98%)	20 (25.97%)
Concealment Behaviors			
No	191 (90.95%)	210 (99.06%)	63 (81.82%)
Yes	19 (9.05%)	2 (0.94%)	14 (18.18%)
Manipulate Social Media			
No	190 (90.48%)	212 (100.00%)	67 (87.01%)
Yes	20 (9.52%)	0 (0.00%)	10 (12.99%)
Online Involvement			
No	107 (50.95%)	182 (85.85%)	53 (68.83%)
Yes	103 (49.05%)	30 (14.15%)	24 (31.17%)
Online Preparations			
No	145 (69.05%)	196 (92.45%)	63 (81.82%)
Yes	65 (30.95%)	16 (7.55%)	14 (18.18%)
Formal Training			
No	142 (67.62%)	173 (81.60%)	66 (85.71%)
Yes	68 (32.38%)	39 (18.40%)	11 (14.29%)
Informal Training			
No	143 (68.10%)	200 (94.34%)	68 (88.31%)
Yes	67 (31.90%)	12 (5.66%)	9 (11.69%)
Hierarchical Mindset			
No	122 (58.10%)	106 (50.00%)	73 (94.81%)
Yes	88 (41.90%)	106 (40.00%)	4 (5.19%)
Suspicious Transactions			
No	174 (82.86%)	188 (88.68%)	75 (97.40%)
Yes	36 (17.14%)	24 (11.32%)	2 (2.60%)
Disposal Of Assets			
No	204 (97.14%)	210 (99.06%)	75 (97.40%)
Yes	6 (2.86%)	2 (0.94%)	2 (2.60%)
Unusual Goodbyes			
No	200 (95.24%)	206 (97.17%)	76 (98.70%)
Yes	10 (4.76%)	6 (2.83%)	1 (1.30%)
Sympathize With Cause			
No	32 (15.24%)	68 (32.08%)	46 (59.74%)
Yes	178 (84.76%)	144 (67.92%)	31 (40.26%)
Promote Extreme Narratives			
No	105 (50.00%)	119 (56.13%)	52 (67.53%)
Yes	105 (50.00%)	93 (43.87%)	25 (32.47%)

Isolated Self			
No	152 (72.38%)	190 (89.62%)	63 (81.82%)
Yes	58 (27.62%)	22 (10.38%)	14 (18.18%)
Adopted Multiple Ideologies			
No	198 (94.29%)	204 (96.26%)	75 (97.40%)
Yes	12 (5.71%)	8 (3.77%)	2 (2.60%)
Reject Democratic Values			
No	136 (64.76%)	80 (37.74%)	73 (94.81%)
Yes	74 (35.24%)	132 (62.26%)	4 (5.19%)
Dehumanize Others			
No	145 (69.05%)	152 (71.70%)	66 (85.71%)
Yes	65 (30.95%)	60 (28.30%)	11 (14.29%)
Praising Past Attacks			
No	140 (66.67%)	201 (94.81%)	66 (85.71%)
Yes	70 (33.33%)	11 (5.19%)	11 (9.91%)
Condemning Others			
No	186 (88.57%)	198 (93.40%)	73 (94.81%)
Yes	24 (11.43%)	14 (6.60%)	4 (5.19%)
Lying To Authorities			
No	170 (80.95%)	156 (73.58%)	72 (93.51%)
Yes	40 (19.05%)	56 (26.42%)	5 (6.49%)

Multivariate Analysis

For the multivariate models, we take the same approach as demonstrated in earlier sections and estimate three separate models to compare each ideological category to one another. Because the sample sizes for each of these models are slightly smaller, we were more deliberate on the variable selection and only use variables with the most pronounced differences between ideologies. Additionally, we did not include variables that reported a frequency of 0 or 1 in any of the models, as variables with such low frequencies produced unreliable coefficients with large standard errors.

Table 5d displays the results of each model. Model 1 compared mobilization indicators between far-right and jihadist IOs. Jihadist IOs were significantly more likely than far-right IOs to glorify violence (OR=5.63; p<.001), go through some form of informal training (OR=6.22; p<.001), be involved in extremist online spaces (OR=3.31; p<.001), and praise past extremist

attacks (OR=6.60; p<.001). On the other hand, jihadist IOs were significantly less likely to have

a hierarchical mindset (OR=.25; p<.001) and reject democratic values than far-right IOs.

Table 5d. Binary Logistic Regression Models Comparing Mobilization Indicators Jihadist, Far-right, and Far-Left Extremist Offenders

	Model 1 (n=422) Far-Right Vs. Jihadist		Model 2 (n=289) Far-Right Vs. Far-Left		Model 3 (n=287) Jihadist Vs. Far-Left	
Variable	**b(SE)**	**OR**	**b(SE)**	**OR**	**b(SE)**	**OR**
Hostility	.72 (.38)	2.05	3.02 (1.51)	20.59*	-.66 (.62)	.52
Prepared Statement	.87 (.54)	2.38	.46 (1.04)	1.60	-.52 (.49)	.59
Glorify Violence	1.73 (.35)	5.63***	2.69 (1.36)	14.58*	-.37 (.45)	.69
Communicate With Extremists	.37 (.30)	1.44	-.79 (.46)	.45	-2.19 (.38)	.11***
Informal Training	1.83 (.41)	6.22***	3.79 (1.10)	44.36***	-.89 (.50)	.41
Online Involvement	1.20 (.37)	3.31***	2.87 (.58)	17.70***	-.23 (.47)	.79
Hierarchical Mindset	-1.39 (.31)	.25***	-5.47 (1.35)	.00***	-2.07 (.78)	.13**
Sympathize With Cause	.55 (.33)	1.73	-.89 (.46)	.41	-1.39 (.41)	.25***
Reject Democracy	-2.39 (.35)	.09***	-7.16 (1.84)	.00***	-.90 (.74)	.41
Praising Past Attacks	1.89 (.57)	6.60***	1.00 (1.14)	2.74	-.31 (.52)	1.37
Pseudo R^2	.43		.60		.40	

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
Note: Dependent Variable: **Model 1**: Far-right = 0; Jihadist = 1; **Model 2**: Far-right = 0; Far-left = 1; **Model 3**: Jihadist = 0; Far-left = 1.
Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *OR* = Odds Ratio

Model 2 compares far-right and far-left IOs. Far-left offenders were significantly more

likely than far-right offenders to express hostility towards the nation (OR=20.59; p<.05), glorify

violence (OR=14.58; p<.05), have had some informal training (OR=44.36; p<.001), and be

involved in extremist online spaces (OR=17.70; p<.001). With that said, far-left offender were

significantly less likely to have a hierarchical mindset (OR=.00; p<.001) and reject democratic

values (OR=.00; p<.001) than far-right IOs.

Finally, Model 3 compares jihadist and far-left IOs. The differences between these two

groups are less profound that the previous comparisons, but there are still several mobilization

indicators that characterize jihadist and far-left IOs. Specifically, far-left IOs were significantly

less likely to communicate with other extremists (OR=.11; p<.001), have a hierarchical mindset (OR=.13; p<.01), and sympathize with an extremist cause (OR=.25; p<.001) than jihadist IOs.

Comparing Ideological Offenders to Nonoffending Extremists and Non-extremist Violent Offenders

The final warning behavior table (5c) compares IOs to NOEs and NEVOs. It is not surprising that most of these variables were only consistently present when coding materials on the IOs, as these mobilization indicators are situated as precursors to extremist crime and violence. This conceptualization is validated by the exceptionally low frequency of these indicators among the NEVO sample, as the most prevalent indicator for these offenders is a history of angry outbursts (27%), which they do demonstrate at a higher percentage than IOs (15%) or NOEs (5%). Comparing IOs to NOEs, however, reveal some more interesting differences. IOs are more likely than NOEs to express hostility towards the nation (26% vs. 13%), make preparations to travel for an extremist cause (22% vs. 1%), glorify (36% vs. 27%) and advocate for violence (53% vs. 25%), have a hierarchical mindset (40% vs. 23%), sympathize with extremist causes (71% vs. 26%), promote extremist narratives (45% vs. 24%), isolate oneself (19% vs. 1%), reject democratic values and norms (42% vs. 10%), and dehumanize others (27% vs. 12%). In contrast, a higher percentage of NOEs attempted to radicalize others (26% vs. 60%) and mobilize others to extremist action (38% vs. 63%). Additionally, NOEs were more likely than IOs to communicate with other extremists (49% vs. 77%), produce extremist media (21% vs. 50%), and be involved in online extremist spaces (31% vs. 50%). So, in many ways the warning behaviors that are thought to precede extremist crime and violence may be more relevant to characterizing those extremists who act within the parameters of the law.

Table 5d. Mobilization Indicators

Variable	Extremist Offenders (n=499)	Nonoffending Extremists (n=232)	Regular Non-extremist Violent Offenders (n=240)
Hostility Towards Nation			
No	369 (73.95%)	201 (86.64%)	240 (100.00%)
Yes	130 (26.05%)	31 (13.36%)	0 (0.00%)
Prepared Statement			
No	420 (84.17%)	232 (100.00%)	239 (99.58%)
Yes	79 (15.83%)	0 (0.00%)	1 (0.42%)
Mobilized Others			
No	319 (63.93%)	86 (37.07%)	237 (98.75%)
Yes	180 (36.07%)	146 (62.93%)	3 (1.25%)
Sought Travel Help			
No	445 (89.18%)	231 (99.57%)	239 (99.58%)
Yes	54 (10.82%)	1 (0.43%)	1 (0.42%)
Communicating Intent			
No	359 (71.94%)	189 (81.47%)	237 (98.75%)
Yes	140 (28.06%)	43 (18.53%)	3 (1.25%)
Travel Preparations			
No	391 (78.36%)	228 (98.28%)	240 (100.00%)
Yes	108 (21.64%)	4 (1.72%)	0 (0.00%)
Supplying Resources			
No	438 (87.78%)	226 (97.41%)	240 (100.00%)
Yes	61 (12.22%)	6 (2.59%)	0 (0.00%)
Received Third Party Money			
No	429 (85.97%)	229 (98.71%)	240 (100.00%)
Yes	70 (14.03%)	3 (1.29%)	0 (0.00%)
Glorify Violence			
No	321 (64.33%)	169 (72.84%)	237 (98.75%)
Yes	178 (35.67%)	63 (27.16%)	3 (1.25%)
Radicalize Others			
No	367 (73.55%)	92 (39.66%)	238 (99.17%)
Yes	132 (26.45%)	140 (60.34%)	2 (0.83%)
Communicate With Extremists			
No	254 (50.90%)	54 (23.28%)	237 (98.75%)
Yes	245 (49.10%)	178 (76.72%)	3 (1.25%)
Contact Infamous Extremists			
No	409 (81.96%)	182 (78.45%)	240 (100.00%)
Yes	90 (18.04%)	50 (21.55%)	0 (0.00%)
Advocated Violence			
No	235 (47.09%)	173 (74.57%)	231 (96.25%)
Yes	264 (52.91%)	59 (25.43%)	9 (3.75%)
Angry Outbursts			
No	424 (84.97%)	220 (94.83%)	175 (72.92%)
Yes	75 (15.03%)	12 (5.17%)	65 (27.08%)

Produced Media			
No	393 (78.76%)	117 (50.43%)	238 (99.17%)
Yes	106 (21.24%)	115 (49.57%)	2 (0.83%)
Concealment Behaviors			
No	464 (92.99%)	231 (99.57%)	239 (99.58%)
Yes	35 (7.01%)	1 (0.43%)	1 (0.42%)
Manipulate Social Media			
No	469 (93.99%)	228 (98.28%)	238 (99.17%)
Yes	30 (6.01%)	4 (1.72%)	2 (0.83%)
Online Involvement			
No	342 (68.54%)	116 (50.00%)	233 (97.08%)
Yes	157 (31.46%)	116 (50.00%)	7 (2.92%)
Online Preparations			
No	404 (80.96%)	231 (99.57%)	236 (98.33%)
Yes	95 (19.04%)	1 (0.43%)	4 (1.67%)
Formal Training			
No	381 (76.35%)	218 (93.97%)	236 (98.33%)
Yes	118 (23.65%)	14 (6.03%)	4 (1.67%)
Informal Training			
No	411 (82.36%)	216 (93.10%)	238 (99.17%)
Yes	88 (17.64%)	16 (6.90%)	2 (0.83%)
Hierarchical Mindset			
No	301 (60.32%)	179 (77.16%)	238 (9917%)
Yes	198 (39.68%)	53 (22.84%)	2 (0.83%)
Suspicious Transactions			
No	437 (87.58%)	231 (99.57%)	239 (99.58%)
Yes	62 (12.42%)	1 (0.43%)	1 (0.42%)
Disposal Of Assets			
No	489 (98.00%)	231 (99.57%)	240 (100.00%)
Yes	10 (2.00%)	1 (0.43%)	0 (0.00%)
Unusual Goodbyes			
No	482 (96.59%)	232 (100.00%)	237 (98.75%)
Yes	17 (3.41%)	0 (0.00%)	3 (1.25%)
Sympathize With Cause			
No	146 (29.26%)	171 (73.71%)	239 (99.58%)
Yes	353 (70.74%)	61 (26.29%)	1 (0.42%)
Promote Extreme Narratives			
No	276 (55.31%)	176 (75.86%)	240 (100.00%)
Yes	223 (44.69%)	56 (24.14%)	0 (0.00%)
Isolated Self			
No	405 (81.16%)	229 (98.71%)	235 (97.92%)
Yes	94 (18.84%)	3 (1.29%)	5 (2.08%)
Adopted Multiple Ideologies			
No	477 (95.59%)	227 (97.84%)	240 (100.00%)
Yes	22 (4.41%)	5 (2.14%)	0 (0.00%)
Reject Democratic Values			

No	289 (57.92%)	209 (90.09%)	240 (100.00%)
Yes	210 (42.08%)	23 (9.91%)	0 (0.00%)
Dehumanize Others			
No	363 (72.75%)	204 (87.93%)	237 (98.75%)
Yes	136 (27.25%)	28 (12.07%)	3 (1.25%)
Praising Past Attacks			
No	407 (81.56%)	207 (89.22%)	240 (100.00%)
Yes	92 (18.44%)	25 (10.78%)	0 (0.00%)
Condemning Others			
No	457 (91.58%)	226 (97.41%)	240 (100.00%)
Yes	42 (8.42%)	6 (2.59%)	0 (0.00%)
Lying To Authorities			
No	398 (79.76%)	222 (95.69%)	205 (85.42%)
Yes	101 (20.24%)	10 (4.31%)	35 (14.58%)

Multivariate Analysis

For the multivariate analysis, we estimate a multinomial logistic regression model to compare the mobilization indicators of IOs to that of NOEs and NEVOs. Consistent with the descriptive analysis, NOEs were significantly more likely to mobilize (RRR=1.94; p<.05) and radicalize others (RRR=3.33; p<.001) than IOs. They were also more likely to communicate with other extremists (RRR=4.02; p<.001) and produce extremist media (RRR=5.45; p<.001) than their IO counterparts. NOEs were, however, less likely to have formal training (RRR=.35; p<.01), sympathize with an extremist cause (RRR=.07; p<.001), and reject conventional democratic values (RRR=.18; p<.001) than IOs.

Table 5f. Multinomial Logistic Regression Comparing Mobilization Indicators between Extremist Offenders, Nonoffending Extremists, and Non-extremist Violent Offenders (n=971)

	Nonoffending Extremists		Non-extremist Violent Offenders	
Variable	**b(SE)**	**RRR**	**b(SE)**	**RRR**
Mobilized Others	.66 (.32)	1.94*	-1.53 (.83)	.22
Glorify Violence	.18 (.29)	1.19	-2.17 (.84)	.11*
Radicalize Others	1.20 (.33)	3.33***	-.34 (1.20)	.71
Communicate with Extremists	1.39 (.25)	4.02***	-3.10 (.78)	.05***
Angry Outbursts	-.82 (.45)	.44	2.28 (.49)	9.81***

	b (SE)	RRR	b (SE)	RRR
Produced Media	1.69 (.30)	5.45***	-.40 (.90)	.67
Online Involvement	.00 (.28)	1.00	-2.00 (.51)	.14**
Formal Training	-1.06 (.35)	.35**	-2.65 (.77)	.07***
Hierarchical Mindset	-.47 (.30)	.63	-3.32 (1.59)	.04*
Sympathize With Cause	-2.65 (.30)	.07***	-4.20 (1.04)	.01***
Promote Extreme Narratives	.28 (.27)	1.33	16.26 (.51)	.00***
Reject Democratic Values	-1.69 (.33)	.18***	18.20 (.31)	.00***
Dehumanize Others	-.65 (.36)	.52	-2.48 (1.75)	.08
Pseudo R^2			.58	

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05
Note: Dependent Variable: Ideological Offenders = 0 (reference category); Nonoffending extremist = 1; Non-extremist violent offender = 2.
Key: *b* = Unstandardized Coefficients; *SE* = Robust Standard Error; *RRR* = Relative Risk Ratio

Unsurprisingly, the comparison between IOs and NEVOs reveals that IOs are significantly more likely to demonstrate nearly every mobilization indicator included in the model, with the exception of radicalizing others, producing extremist media, and dehumanizing others. However, consistent with the findings above, NEVOs are significantly more likely to have a history of angry outbursts than IOs (RRR=9.81; p<.001), which speaks volumes to the divergence between IOs and NEVOs on this behavioral characteristic. Nonetheless, it is evident that these indicators of mobilization are much more accurate precursors to extremist crime and violence, or even nonoffending extremism for that matter than regular violence offending.

7.3 | Limitations

This study adds depth to our understanding of how extremists who commit both violent and non-crimes are different from extremists who do not break the law and non-extremists who commit serious crimes. Despite the contributions to the study, there are several limitations to note.

First, it is a significant challenge to study terrorism and other acts of targeted violence because they are rare events. Scholars have been able to address this challenge by developing open-source data collection methodologies. The body of research using such approaches is quite impressive, although there would be some value in standardizing methodological expectations when using open-source data. One of the important standards is to be transparent about the quality and type of data used. As noted, we were unable to test some variables because of the high percentage of cases with missing data for some variables. There is also some debate about whether to code outcomes as missing or count the absence of evidence as a "no." For example, it was important for our analysis that we were certain that non-offending extremists really never broke the law previously. However, it is not likely that sources would report a negative like this. We were, however, confident in the absence of evidence here (and for other variables) because our search protocol was exhaustive (i.e., we did not limit the number of documents retrieved about a subject—we just collected all publicly available information), it was likely that a source would report this information if it was affirmative, and we also targeted search for information using data aggregators to find this information.

Second, a related challenge to using open-source information is the variation in the number and types of documents available for different types of cases. One would expect to have fewer documents about nonviolent extremists compared to violent extremists because the latter are much more likely to be covered by multiple news outlets and garner deeper attention about the nature of the events. Similarly, one would expect violent homicides committed by extremists to be more consistently newsworthy than non-extremist homicides. It was also interesting how the source documents varied when comparing offending to non-offending extremists. The source documents for offending extremists would get extensively covered in the news media and would often

highlight characteristics of the offender. The source documents for non-offending extremists, however, would be covered in the news but less frequently, but they would engage the media directly by posting on social media, writing articles for media outlets, and being identified by scholars and watchdog organizations as an individual actively involved in an extremist movement. Again, we attempted to limit the impact of such variations by collecting all documents about a case and also by collecting methodological data related to the type of source documents used for data about a case.

Third, the identification of the case controls was challenging for some cases. For example, if a violent homicide occurred by an extremist in a rural area, then having multiple homicides to match was unlikely. Thus, he would have to extend the geographic area in order to identify enough potential matches. The data presented confirm this as we saw some geographic differences across some of the categories because we would have to find cases in a larger geographic unit. Similarly, nonoffending extremists were less likely to be consistently mentioned in source documents for certain locations, so identifying matches was quite a challenge. We sometimes spent several hours on a case identifying potential matches, ensuring they met inclusion criteria, and confirming ideological commitment. If five potential matches were not available, we randomly selected the control case from only the cases that were able to be identified.

8 | Artifacts

8.1 | List of products (e.g., publications, conference papers, technologies, websites, databases), including locations of these products on the Internet or in other archives or databases

We have produced open-source search protocols to collect all publicly available information on offending extremists, nonoffending extremists, and non extremist violent offenders. We have

created a codebook that captures risk and protective factors, warning behaviors, ideological commitment, and reliability scores for the cases.

8.2 | Data sets generated (broad descriptions will suffice)

We have a fully coded database of violent extremists, nonviolent extremists, nonoffending extremists, and non-extremist violent offenders (n=971). The database includes risk and protective factors as well as warning related behaviors.

8. 3 | Dissemination activities

We have only disseminated the results so far at the *American Society of Criminology* meetings in 2023. As the project is now complete, we will start to move materials to publication by crafting research briefs that can be disseminated through practitioner-focused organizations and media outlets. We will look to present some of the key findings on warning behaviors to law enforcement conferences (e.g., IACP) and to fusion centers. We will look to publish the findings in peer-reviewed journals and doctoral students will use these data for PhD dissertation projects

References

Armenian, H. K. (2009). *The case-control method: design and applications* (Vol. 38). Oxford University Press.

Atran, S., Axelrod, R., Davis, R., & Fischhoff, B. (2017). Challenges in researching terrorism from the field. *Science*, *355*(6323), 352-354.

Borum, R. (2011a). Radicalization into violent extremism I: A review of social science theories. *Journal of Strategic Studies, 4*(4): 7-36.

Borum, R. (2011b). Radicalization into violent extremism II: A review of conceptual models and empirical research. *Journal of Strategic Security*, *4*(4): 37-62.

Borum, R. (2015). Assessing risk for terrorism involvement. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2 (2): 63-87.

Chermak, S.M., J.D. Freilich, W. Parkin & J.P. Lynch. (2012). American terrorism and extremist crime data sources and selectivity bias: An investigation focusing on homicide events committed by far-right extremists. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 28(1): 191-218

Clemmow, C. (2020). *Risk factors and indicators for engagement in violent extremism.* Security and Crime Science PhD Dissertation. University College London.

Clemmow, C., Schumann, S., Salman, N. L., & Gill, P. (2020). The base rate study: Developing base rates for risk factors and indicators for engagement in violent extremism. *Journal of forensic sciences*, *65*(3), 865-881.

Director of National Intelligence. 2021. Homegrown Violent Extremism and Mobilization Indicators. Downloaded from WWW: https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/news_documents/Mobilization_Indicators_Booklet_2021.pdf

Freilich, J.D., S.M. Chermak, R. Belli, J. Gruenewald & W.S. Parkin. (2014). Introducing the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB). *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26(2): 372-384

Freilich, J.D., S.M. Chermak & J. Gruenewald. (2015). The future of terrorism research: A review essay. *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice* 39(4): 353-369

Freilich, J.D. & G. LaFree. (2016). Measurement issues in the study of terrorism: Introducing the special issue. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 39(7-8): 569-579

Freilich, J. D., Chermak, S. M., Arietti, R. A., & Turner, N. D. (2024). Terrorism, Political Extremism, and Crime and Criminal Justice. *Annual Review of Criminology*, *7*.

Gill, P. (2015). *Lone actor terrorists: A behavioural analysis*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Gill, P., Horgan, J., & Deckert, P. (2013). Bombing alone: Tracing the motivations and antecedent behaviors of lone actor terrorists. *Journal of Forensic Sciences, 59,* 425– 435

Grella, C., K. Lovinger, & W. Weine. (2013). Relationships among trauma, exposure, familitial, and Ptsd. Women and Criminal Justice, 23:63-79.

Haugstvedt, H., & Koehler, D. (2021). Armed and Explosive? An Explorative Statistical Analysis of Extremist Radicalization Cases with Military Background. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1-15.

Horgan, J., & P. Gill. (2016). Across the universe: A comparative analysis of violent behavior and radicalization across three offender types with implications for criminal justice training and education. Washington Dc: National Institute of Justice

Jackson, B., A. Rhoades, J.R. Remer, N. Lander, K. Costello, Sina Beaghley, (2019). Practical Terrorism Prevention. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Javed Qureshi, Aisha. 2020. Understanding Domestic Radicalization and Terrorism: A National Issue withi a Global Context. National Institute of Justice: National Institute of Justice Journal. https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/understanding-domestic-radicalization-and-terrorism
Kleck, G. & D. Jackson, (2016). What kind of Joblessness Affects Crime? Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 32: 489-513.

LaFree, G., Jensen, M. A., James, P. A., & Safer-Lichtenstein, A. (2018). Correlates of violent political extremism in the United States. *Criminology, 56*(2), 233-268.

Losel, F. (2017). Evidence comes by replication, but needs differentiation: The reproducibility issue in science and its relevance for criminology. Doi: 10.1007/s11292.

McGinty, J. (2019). Are far-right extremist crime rising? Wall Street Journal, April 5.

Meloy, J. R., & Gill, P. (2016). The lone-actor terrorist and the TRAP-18. *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*, *3*(1), 37.

Monahan, J. (2012). The individual risk assessment of terrorism. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law*, *18*(2), 167.

Parkin, W. S., & Gruenewald, J. (2017). Open-source data and the study of homicide. *Journal of interpersonal violence*, *32*(18), 2693-2723.

Powers, A. (2019). How sovereign citizens helps swindle $1 billion from the government they disawowel? , March 29.

Pyrooz, D.C., G. LaFree, S. Decker, & P.A. James. (2017). Cut form the same cloth? Comparing gangs and violent political extremists. *Justice Quarterly*, 1-32.

Ravndal, J.A. (2019). Right-wing terrorism and violence may actually have declined. Washington Post, April 2.

Sarma, K. M. (2017). Risk assessment and the prevention of radicalization from nonviolence into terrorism. *American Psychologist*, *72*(3), 278.

Schlesselman, J. J. (1982). *Case-control studies: design, conduct, analysis* (Vol. 2). Oxford University Press.

Schuurman, B. (2020). Research on terrorism, 2007–2016. A review of 744 data, methods, and authorship. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 32(5), 745 1011–1026

Sedgwick, Philip. (2014). Case-control Studies: Advantages and Disadvantages" British Medical Journal, 348.

Silke, A. (2008). Research on terrorism: A Review of the Impact of 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism, in *Terrorism informatics: Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security*, edited by Hsinchun Chen, Edna Reid, Joshua Sinai, Andrew Silke, and Boaz Ganor (Hartford, CT: Springer, 2008), 27-50.

Smith, A. (2018a). Risk factors and indicators associated with radicalization to terrorism in the United States: What research supported by the National Institute of Justice tells us. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice.

Smith, A. (2018b). How radicalization to terrorism occurs in the United States: What research sponsored by the National Institute of Justice tells us. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice.

Smith, B.L., K.R. Damphousse, & P. Roberts. (2006). "Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents: The Identification of Behavioral, Geographic, and Temporal Patterns of Preparatory Conduct." Final Report for NIJ Award #2003-DT-CX-0003. National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC..

Wray, C. (2018). Quoted in Desert News, at: https://www.deseretnews.com/article/900029802/fbi-director-says-homegrown-extremists-are-primary-terrorist-threat-to-us.html