"To Protect and To Serve
…*and* To Listen"
Adding a new dimension to policing Los Angeles

A Report Issued to:

Mr. Rick Caruso, Chair, and Members,
Los Angeles Police Commission

And

Mr. William J. Bratton, Chief
Los Angeles Police Department

by:[1]

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[1] This report was authored by Professor Wellford W. Wilms in collaboration with his colleagues

Acknowledgements

I. Introduction

In 1994, researchers from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and the University of Southern California (USC) began an action research project within the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).[2] What seemed clear to us was that this large public agency suffered from a lack of systematic information that could help it navigate in increasingly unpredictable conditions. The conditions presented a unique opportunity to develop an action research project between the city's two premier universities and the Department.

The Research and its Purpose

Action research was developed by organizational psychologist Chris Argyris nearly 50 years ago to help organizations become more effective by establishing feedback loops to carry information from the environment or

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[2] Research principals are Wellford W. Wilms, professor, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, and School of Public Policy and Social Research, UCLA, Warren H. Schmidt, professor emeritus, School of Policy, Planning and Development, USC, and Alex J. Norman, professor emeritus, School of Public Policy and Social Research, UCLA. Other members of the team include professors Harold Levine and Yeow Meng Thum, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, Deone Zell, Department of Management, California State University, Northridge, and UCLA graduate students Joel Rabin, Dongbin Kim, Craig Honick and Dan Nakamura.

within the organization to decision makers (Argyris, 1978). In the case of the LAPD, this study was designed to create feedback loops up and down the chain of command. The purpose was to help Department leaders understand how the LAPD's structure and culture were aligned to support the implementation of reforms like community policing.

At the outset Chief Willie Williams established a 17-member Research Guidance Committee that included sworn and civilian employees from all levels of the Department to guide the study team and to help channel research findings back into the Department.[3] We established ground rules with the committee that nothing would be published during the course of the study so the findings could be used internally without interference.

But we also agreed that the results would be published at the end of the study to insure that Los Angeles policy leaders and citizens had access to the same information about changes that were taking place.

If, after this demonstration period, the LAPD leadership and the university researchers found sufficient value in the research, we would try to institutionalize the process.

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[3] Members of the original committee included (individuals' ranks are indicated as those held at the time) Deputy Chief Lawrence Fetters; Commander David Gascon, HRB; P III John Artes, West Valley Patrol Division; Mr. Al Beuerlein, Commanding Officer, Fiscal Support Bureau; Commander Michael Bostic, OHB Juvenile Group; Lt. Michael DeCoudre, HRB; Det. Jeff Foss, Southwest Detective Division; Dr. Debra Glaser, Director, BSS; Captain Larry Goebel, CO 77th Street Division; Mr. Steve Johnson, Chief Forensic Chemist, SID; Sgt. Dominic Licovoli, HRB; Commander Art Lopez, Employee Relations Administration; Ms. Annie Lowder, Chief Clerk, R&I; P III +1 Maria Marquez, 77th Street Division; Lt. Tom Mosell, Hollywood Vice; Sgt. Bill

We became known as the "Change Management Study Team" and our initial challenge was to become accepted and trusted so that we could have access to the inner-workings of the Department. Only with an "insider's" view could we identify and understand meaningful data that could be systematically gathered, analyzed and fed back to the Department.

We consciously decided against calling ourselves "consultants" because advice from outsiders is usually resented and rarely heeded. Rather, we defined ourselves as "mirrors" to the organization. Our role was to reflect data back to the Chief, command officers, supervisors and rank-and-file police officers with the aim of increasing their consciousness of changes that were taking place within the Department. We assumed that greater awareness and reliable information would naturally lead to more informed decisions. But we knew that if the project were to succeed, LAPD personnel would have to take responsibility for any decisions about changes if they were to endure.

We were surprised at and heartened by the Department's openness to the study and its officials' interest in the kind of information we provided. Members of the research team were given wide access--passes provided us entry to all LAPD facilities at any time, day or night, and a special directive from the Chief of Police enabled us to go on ride-alongs without supervision. During the years between 1994 and 1996 we went on more than 100 ride-

alongs, observed work in individual stations, and periodically interviewed executives and employees up and down the chain of command, while taking hundreds of pages of field notes.

In 1996 we began working with captains at first four, then six, and later nine of the 18 geographic area stations (divisions). Together, we developed a survey instrument that tapped a variety of employee perceptions that the captains identified as important. The surveys were conducted three times over four years in half of the Department's 18 divisions. We also gathered data on the reactions of executives, managers and employees while we fed information back to chiefs, command officers, and employees for additional clues about how the organization worked. All of the quantitative and qualitative data were coded in electronic form for computerized analysis. See Figure 1 for a visual description of the project.

Figure 1
Project Timeline

1994-1996 Pilot Study	1996-2000 Surveys and Feedback	2000-2002 Analysis & Reports

II. This Report and its Organization

This report provides the most detailed picture available of rank-and-file police officers' and supervisors' reflections on external events, themselves as police officers, and work life in the LAPD between 1994 and 2000.[4] An earlier, abbreviated version of these findings was reported in late 2000. This report presents the study in its entirety -- a detailed description of the research methods, and the complete set of data analyzed as cross-tabulations with chi-square statistics for significance organized around an exploratory factor analysis. It also includes results of multivariate analyses used to find underlying associations between independent and dependent variables. We have integrated discussions of both the quantitative and qualitative data in an effort to bring them to bear on a series of key findings. The report concludes

with a summary of findings, conclusions, recommendations and a concluding note.

III. Background

Like other big cities, Los Angeles witnessed a dramatic drop in crime during the 1990s. Between 1990 and 1999, crime dropped by 50 percent (though homicides have surged 24.1 percent in the past two years).[5] But the period of falling crime rates was anything but tranquil for the Los Angeles Police Department.

Beginning with the Rodney King beating on March 3, 1991, and the subsequent acquittal of four involved officers on April 29, 1992 that led to a riot, the LAPD has remained at the center of a storm of controversy. Immediately after the King beating, LAPD Chief Daryl Gates appointed a panel of citizens to investigate the incident. Less than a week later, Mayor Tom Bradley announced the formation of his own pane (the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department) that absorbed the membership of Gates' citizen panel. The resulting commission of more than 100 staff members and counsel (that was composed mostly of lawyers) became known as the "Christopher Commission" because of the name of its chairman,

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[4] Although the research included civilians, results in this report pertain only to sworn officers.
[5] Crime and Arrest Weekly Statistics: Crimes Year to Date, Los Angeles Police Department, September 9, 2002; Los Angeles Times, August 14, 2000.

former Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The Commission examined four

key issues about the LAPD that included:

> The apparent failure to control or discipline officers with repeated
> complaints of excessive force
>
> Concerns about the LAPD's "culture" and officers' attitudes toward
> racial and other minorities
>
> The difficulties the public encounters in attempting to make
> complaints against LAPD officers
>
> The role of the LAPD leadership and civilian oversight authorities in
> addressing or contributing to these problems (Independent
> Commission, 1991, pp. vii-viii)

One hundred days later the Commission released its 228 page report

with 130 broad recommendations (Independent Commission, 1991). The

Commission explained:

> …the LAPD insists on aggressive detection of major crimes and a
> rapid, seven-minute response time for calls for service. Patrol
> officers are evaluated by statistical measures (for example, the
> number of calls handled and arrests made) and are rewarded for
> being "hard-nosed." This style of policing produces results, but it
> does so at the risk of creating a siege mentality that alienates the
> officer from the community (Independent Commission, 1991, p.
> xiv).

The report concluded that, among other things, the Department should

embrace community policing. Just weeks after the King beating, ten

metropolitan police chiefs lent support to community policing. Their

declaration said, "Our hope is for the Los Angeles tragedy to have a positive

outcome by accelerating change toward this new form of policing, in order to better serve our diverse communities" (Cannon, 1997, p. 143).

Many of the principles of community policing had been pioneered by the LAPD under Edward Davis who became Chief in 1969. Davis had read Robert Ardrey's book, Territorial Imperative, and he was convinced that if officers took ownership of a specific territory they would defend it, and public safety would be improved (Cannon, 1997). This idea led to the development of the LAPD's Basic Car Plan that assigned specific patrol cars and officers to specific communities. Under Davis, community relations programs with grassroots leadership were developed in each of the LAPD's geographic areas. In 1975, the Department developed Team Policing in which teams of officers provided all police services to specific communities. But in the mid-1970s (before the impact of Proposition 13 had been felt) the Mayor cut the LAPD's budget, removing the community relations officers and destroying relationships that had been built between the Department and the community. Bradley feared that the growing community power base provided by these steps to reconnect the LAPD with citizens could be used by a chief for political advantage.

Daryl Gates, who had been director of operations, became Chief in 1978. As director of operations, budget reductions had forced Gates to specialize many functions. As Chief, he developed specialized operations like CRASH and Narcotics so that the Department could respond to escalating demands for

service within tight budget constraints. And the LAPD developed a reputation for using paramilitary methods such as Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) that gained national visibility in the 1974 shootout with the Symbionese Liberation Army. As Chief, Gates nurtured these specialized operations including the mobile force of elite officers (Metropolitan Division) (Gates, 1993). These events would influence the Christopher Commission's conclusion that the LAPD would be unable to forge close ties with the community until it changed its underlying beliefs about police work.

From 1991 onward, the LAPD was in constant turmoil. In 1992, a change to the City Charter limited the Chief of Police to one five-year term with the possibility of one additional term. In 1992, Daryl Gates, who had led the Department for 14 years, resigned under pressure. He had been popular with rank-and-file officers. Gates was "a cop's chief" and he supported his officers, frequently criticizing the powerful Los Angeles Times and the City's political leaders in public.

Willie L. Williams, Jr., the first outsider to head the Department since the late 1940s, replaced Gates and became the LAPD's 51st Chief on June 30, 1992. Williams was brought to Los Angeles from Philadelphia to implement community policing as the Christopher Commission had recommended. He had been credited with successfully implementing community policing in Philadelphia, and his outgoing personal style was seen by many as an asset in

bringing members of the Los Angeles community closer to the LAPD. The new Chief began by revitalizing and expanding the Basic Car Plan from 122 to 168 cars, establishing community police advisory boards across the city, and developing a strategic plan called <u>Commitment to Action</u>.

In 1993, Richard Riordan was inaugurated as Mayor. A year earlier, as a cornerstone of his "Project Safety LA" campaign, and his desire to attract business to Los Angeles, Riordan had pledged to greatly expand the police department. The buildup began in 1993 and was accelerated in 1995 when the City received a large grant from the U.S. Department of Justice COPS Office to hire and train 3,000 police officers to augment the buildup. In 1994, the O.J. Simpson murder trial began. Revelations about slipshod handling of evidence, the Department's substandard scientific lab, and self-serving and racist comments by Detective Mark Fuhrman, again cast a dark shadow upon the LAPD.

Plans moved forward, though in a turbulent and increasingly fractious political environment. In the early years of his administration, Williams was one of Los Angeles' most popular officials and he attracted considerable support for the idea of community policing from elected officials and community leaders. However, Los Angeles' political environment was highly charged, and the new Chief also drew criticism for implementing these reforms too slowly.

A round of interviews we conducted with LAPD command officers in early 1995 revealed that pressures from the changing environment were having a profound impact on the Department, especially at the top management level. The Department was struggling to shake off negative publicity following the Rodney King beating and the subsequent riots of 1992. It was also trying to respond to sweeping recommendations from the Christopher Commission and to pressures from the Mayor, City Council, and Police Commission for increased accountability. In 1996 the Department's first Inspector General was hired, the result of a recommendation of the Christopher Commission. Finally, a new Chief hired from outside the Department with an untested management style and visible personal problems, who was now vulnerable to being removed from office because of Proposition F, demoralized these high level managers who began to take a "wait and see" attitude.

Also significant was the widespread perception that the Department was drifting. Though many top managers told us they tried to support Williams, they also complained that they were receiving no real direction. Despite a large investment of time and effort to create a strategic plan, Commitment to Action was generally ignored at the upper levels of the Department. Most managers claimed that it was too ambitious to be useful, and with 37 unranked goals, it lacked focus.

But despite widespread agreement that the strategic plan was without focus, many captains described how they used the plan's very lack of focus to advance their own area goals that could easily be aligned with some of the plan's 37 unranked priorities. This was an early and serendipitous finding that revealed the central role the captains play in the management of officers under their command – an issue we take up in greater detail later in this report.

But hope for renewal at the LAPD under Willie Williams was short lived. Despite his public popularity, Williams lost whatever support he had enjoyed from within his own command staff, as well as from the rank-and-file. A widely publicized account revealed he was given free rooms in a Las Vegas casino, a gift that he publicly denied. His denial only confirmed what many LAPD officers already believed -- that "east coast" police were inherently corrupt. Frustrated with the slow pace of change, in 1995 the Los Angeles Police Commission took over the reform agenda (though it continued to hold Williams accountable) and in 1997, refused to re-appoint him to a second five-year term.

During a three-month period while the Los Angeles Police Commission searched for a new chief, Bayan Lewis, a former Assistant Chief and veteran LAPD executive, took over. In August 1997, the Los Angeles Police Commission appointed Bernard Parks as the City's 53rd Chief of Police. Parks immediately launched a blizzard of new initiatives adding to the existing workload with which the Department was already having difficulty coping. For instance, in

addition to recommendations from the Christopher Commission that were still being implemented, nine other reports had recommended 660 other ideas that Parks and his command staff were examining and implementing.

Parks removed the rank of Assistant Chief and took the patrol function away from the Captain I (then called the "patrol captain") and gave it to the Captain III who commanded each area. He also introduced FASTRAC (Focus, Accountability, Strategy, Teamwork, Response and Coordination), a method modeled on New York's "Compstat" to systematically focus attention on patterns of crime as a basis for action, the "Ideal Basic Car" plan, the "Ideal Area", and he implemented a new complaint system. Parks also tightened up on discipline, and issued a flurry of administrative orders on subjects ranging from the Department reorganization to community policing, personnel investigations, Basic Car realignment, domestic violence and others.

His decision in 1998 to send 168 senior lead officers back to the field angered a large number of vocal Los Angeles residents because these senior lead officers had become points of contact with the Department for many residents, they had become the symbols of community policing.[6] Removing the senior lead officers was a blow to many of the Department's staunch advocates of community policing, and many residents regarded it as a huge step backward. But Parks said publicly that he believed that responsibility for

community policing had to be spread throughout the Department's ranks and not limited to the senior leads. Despite Parks' public comments about community policing, it was common knowledge within the Department that Parks was not an advocate. His lack of enthusiasm may also have been influenced by the fact that community policing had been the signature initiative of his predecessor, Willie Williams. Accordingly, Parks removed community-policing responsibilities from the senior lead officers and reassigned them to the field. As the pressure grew to reinstate the senior lead officers, the Los Angeles Police Commission in 2000 told Parks to reinstate them. But the public perception was that Parks was moving too slowly. Finally, in March 2001, Riordan ordered Parks to reinstate the senior lead officers announcing, "Community police officers are the bedrock that unites our neighborhoods with the officers who are sworn to protect them," Riordan said. "I am proud to announce today that...community policing is back." (Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2001).

In 1997 the Department was once more in the public eye, now in a positive way for the professional and heroic way it handled the North Hollywood shootout where two heavily armored bank robbers with fully automatic assault weapons were killed by LAPD officers. Later in 1998 the Department again

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[6] Under Davis, the senior lead officers were the embodiment of community policing, working in the field, working cars and training rookie police officers.

gained public approval for its handling of a shooting at a Jewish community center.

But, in late 1998, the Rampart scandal, ironically discovered and investigated by the Department, drew it into a bruising public debate over increased civilian oversight reversing any forward motion the Department may have regained. In early 1998, the Department's internal control systems had triggered an inquiry into cocaine that was missing from the Property Division in Parker Center. A management audit determined that the cocaine had in fact been stolen. An LAPD task force identified officer Rafael Perez, who was assigned to Rampart Area anti-gang unit (CRASH), as the suspect and he was arrested.[7] It soon became evident that other suspects were closely associated as friends or working partners. Events surrounding the investigations produced a momentous public debate that once again placed the Los Angeles Police Department under intense scrutiny.

In 2001, after months of negotiation, the city entered into a consent decree with the U.S. Department of Justice. The Department said that it had discovered evidence of a "pattern or practice" of civil rights violations and required the LAPD to make changes in its systems of management and supervision, including use-of-force investigations, collecting racial data on

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[7] "CRASH" is an acronym for Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums.

those who are apprehended, and improving the way in which complaints are taken. It also contains requirements for a system to track problem officers.

In 2001 Richard Riordan left office. Later, in mid-2001, James Hahn, who was elected mayor with strong support from the Los Angeles Police Protective League, took office. Hahn appointed a four new members to the Los Angeles Police Commission and was clear in his support for a compressed work schedule (a campaign promise he had made to the union in return for its support) and community policing.

The Mayor drew important political support from Los Angeles' African American community where Parks also had considerable influence and early in Hahn's term, it appeared that he supported Parks as Chief of Police. But Parks seemed to go out of his way to antagonize the Police Protective League whose leaders supported the Mayor. Continuing a pattern of adversarial labor relations, Parks, in 1998, publicly characterized the League's board of directors as "nine tired old men" who were out of touch with their members. "They're dated and stuck in a time warp," Parks charged (Los Angeles Times, August 12, 1998). The union, in turn had likened Parks in its monthly publication to Saddam Hussein and the Ayatollah Khomeini.

To some, the fracas appeared to be just union politics. And Parks and his supporters characterized it that way, obscuring the seriousness of issues brought forth by the union – that the disciplinary system needed overhauling,

working conditions had deteriorated, and that morale among the rank and file had plummeted. These were the same issues that our preliminary study had reported to Parks first in 1998 and later made public in 2000. In late 2001, the Mayor brought the Chief and union together to try to patch up relationships, but Hahn sidestepped the issues that the union had raised. A few weeks later the union charged that, according to a union poll, 93 percent of its officers voted "no confidence" in the Chief of Police (Los Angeles Times, January 18, 2002). The following week the mayor issued a letter to the union chastising it for waging a political campaign against the Chief.

Parks continued to come under fire from the union, and later from the federal monitor who was overseeing the consent decree, for dragging his feet on steps to reform the Department. In its May 15, 2002 report, the federal monitor charged that the LAPD had failed to make the agree-upon changes and worse, that efforts were being made within the Department to undermine its authority (Los Angeles Times, May 15, 2002).

In early February 2002, in a surprise move, Hahn announced his opposition to Parks' reappointment for a second five-year term. The Mayor said that Parks had not done enough to fight crime, reform the LAPD, boost officer morale or implement community policing. In early April, 2002 the Los Angeles Police Commission voted four to one against rehiring Parks and opened a national search for a new Chief of Police. On May 8, 2002 retired Deputy Chief

Martin Pomeroy was appointed as Interim Chief and after a national search, former New York Police Commissioner, William J. Bratton was sworn in on October 25, 2002 as Los Angeles' 54th Police Chief.

We now turn to the study itself.

IV. Research Design and Methods

Site Selection

Los Angeles is a sprawling metropolis with more than 3.65 million inhabitants who live within its 467 square miles and on its 6,472 miles of streets. At the hub of the city is the downtown district that comprises a financial district, jewelry, garment and flower marts, food processing and distribution plants, light industry and a prominent Chinatown and Little Tokyo. This downtown area is surrounded by myriad residential sectors that are woven together by a network of freeways. There are also a number of secondary, but prominent, financial centers along the connecting freeways and boulevards such as Century City, Westwood, Van Nuys, and Woodland Hills. The city has a major international airport, the largest international port on the West Coast, and miles of beaches. The Santa Monica mountain range splits the city into north and south, creating a significant valley to the north of the downtown area where nearly half of the city's population resides. While Los Angeles is one of the most diverse cities in the nation, because of its size, a rapidly growing and poor immigrant population, and the extended freeway system, enables groups of people to live distant from one another in largely segregated areas.

For deployment purposes, the LAPD divides the city into four geographic operations or "bureaus" — Central, South, West, and Valley. The bureaus are divided into 18 geographical areas or divisions, each with its own station and area captain. There is significant variation between the 18 areas in terms of their geographic size and topography, their populations (density, ethnicity and income), the mix of commercial and residential establishments, the type and volume of crime and the type and volume of calls that are dispatched.

At the outset of the study in March 1994, we interviewed members of the LAPD command staff, bureaus, specialized divisions and areas to select four divisions that would best represent the diversity of the total. The original sample included four areas - West Valley, Hollywood, 77th Street, and Central, one from each of the four bureaus, that represented a range of geographic sizes, populations, and types and volumes of crime. In 1995 the study was expanded to include two additional areas, Hollenbeck and West Los Angeles. In 1996 the sample was again expanded to include three additional areas - Pacific, Rampart and Southeast. A description of each of the nine areas can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1
Selected Characteristics by Division[8]
(2001)

	Square miles	Population	Part I crimes (Percent of total)	Homicides	Emergency Calls for Service
77th	12	185,520	6.4	83	18,103
Central	5	42,516	4.3	17	7,371
Hollenbeck	15	207,710	3.8	38	9,159
Hollywood	19	204,844	5.7	15	11,610
Pacific	24	212,576	5.7	18	8,269
Rampart	8	282,144	6.4	53	15,034
Southeast	10	135,274	4.8	68	13,412
West LA	64	228,034	4.1	12	8,010
West Valley	52	313,066	6.7	14	12,216
City of LA	467	3,865,000	100	591	208,370

The sample of nine divisions provides a cross-section of life in Los Angeles and it, like the original sample, includes representation from each of the four bureaus (Central Bureau: Central, Rampart and Hollenbeck; South Bureau: 77th and Southeast; West Bureau: Hollywood, West LA and Pacific; and Valley Bureau: West Valley). Size of divisions range from 64 square miles (West Los Angeles) and more than 300,000 inhabitants (West Valley) to five square miles and 42,516 residents (Central); Part 1 crimes and homicides represent extreme highs and lows of the city, as are emergency calls for service.

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[8] Los Angeles Police Department, Statistical Digest 2001, Information Technology Division, Management Report Unit.

Research Methods

Instrumentation

In July 1996 we held a series of meetings with captains from each of six divisions to brainstorm items that could be included in a survey instrument to measure employee perceptions on a number of dimensions of police work. Captains contributed items that they felt were important in managing their divisions and our earlier qualitative fieldwork enabled us to help refine the list of issues. The issues formed the basis for writing items for a questionnaire that was pilot tested with a cross-section of officers and civilian employees at the Police Academy, revised, and pilot tested again.[9] Each year the questionnaire has been modified slightly to delete the few questions that failed to produce useful information and to add a few new questions on additional issues. The final result was a 95-item questionnaire, scored on a five-point Likert scale that is organized around the following issues (See Appendix 1 for a copy of the instrument):

> Police Work and the Working Environment (32 items)
> Supervisors and Managers (20 items)
> Hiring, Evaluation and Disciplinary Systems (18 items)
> Community Policing and the Department's Relationship to the
> Community (25 items)

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[9] The original draft questionnaire contained items in random order. During the pilot test a number of officers noticed items that resembled others elsewhere in the questionnaire but that were included to tap different perceptions. They became immediately suspicious that we were trying to "trick" them. As a solution we decided to divide the questionnaire into discrete sections.

We had originally hoped to be able to identify respondents with a unique ID code (known only to the researchers that would be destroyed at the conclusion of the study) so that we could track individual officers' perceptions over time. But we learned that officers' mistrust of management would seriously jeopardize their cooperation. In fact, we were advised to limit the number of demographic characteristics because officers told us they would not complete a questionnaire from which they thought they could be identified.

The questionnaire included 13 questions about respondents' backgrounds, including area of assignment, rank, length of time with the assignment and with the department, age, ethnic background, gender, and education level. Five open-ended questions tapped respondents' perceptions of what gives them the greatest job satisfaction, obstacles to doing their jobs, things they would like to change in their areas or divisions and the Department, as well as any additional comments.[10]

The Surveys and Employee Samples

The initial survey was conducted over a seven-week period that extended from mid-November, 1996 to early-January, 1997 (the survey had to be delayed three weeks in one area because of an officer shooting that pushed the survey schedule beyond the Christmas Holidays). Members of the research

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[10] Prompted by the Rampart scandal, the 1999-2000 questionnaire includes four scenarios designed to determine misconduct that officers consider serious and that they or their colleagues would report to a supervisor.

team administered the questionnaire at roll calls on different days of the week in each of six areas.

Table 2
1996–1997 Response Rates

All Six Areas	Total	Absent			Total Available for Duty Today	Useable Question-naires	Response Rate
		Court	Sick	Vacation /Days off			
Sworn	1,931	112	92	470	1,257	1,131	90%

We collected useable questionnaires from 1,131 sworn personnel with a total of 3,480 responses to the open-ended questions. We achieved a 90 percent response rate of sworn employees available for duty on the day of the survey.

The second survey was conducted over a six-week period that extended from January through February 1998. This survey was conducted as a modified "turnkey" operation to shift some of the administrative burden to the Department as part of a strategy to begin to institutionalize the process. Each captain identified a "point person" at each area to coordinate the administration of the questionnaire, under the guidance of members of the research team. It was administered at each roll call and throughout the other parts of the station to make sure we had representative samples of detectives and other support and area personnel.

Table 3
1998 Response Rates

All Nine Areas	Total	Absent			Total Available for Duty Today	Useable Question-naires	Response Rate
		Court	Sick	Vacation /Days off			
Sworn	2,907	125	96	546	2,063	1,720	83%

We collected useable questionnaire from 1,720 sworn personnel with a total of 7,652 responses to the open-ended questions. The second survey achieved a response rate of 83 percent of employees available for duty.

The third survey was conducted over an eight-week period from November 1999 to late January 2000. The survey was delayed somewhat because of the Rampart scandal that broke just as we were about to administer the questionnaire. Because of officers' sensitivity, the survey was stopped in the Rampart Area in December 1999. It served as a signal to the research team that the terms had to be renegotiated with the Police Protective League. After agreements were reached in early January 2000, the survey was resumed and completed in the remaining areas. This survey was conducted as a complete "turnkey" operation to shift the entire administrative burden to the Department to test whether or not the process could be successfully institutionalized. As in the second survey, a "point person" took responsibility for administration of the questionnaire (according to our written specifications

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at roll calls and at the desks of support personnel) in exactly the same way the second survey had been conducted. Completed questionnaires were returned to a box marked "UCLA Researchers" that was sealed and picked up when they survey was complete.

Table 4
1999-2000 Response Rates

All Nine Areas	Total	Absent			Total Available for Duty Today	Useable Question-naires	Response Rate
		Court	Sick	Vacation /Days off			
Sworn	2,924	97	226	532	1,969	1,625	82%

This final survey produced useable questionnaires from 1,625 sworn officers for an overall response rate of 82 percent

Tables 5 and 6 show selected characteristics of the sample for each of the three survey periods. Table 5 gives a gender breakdown by survey year and compares the results with Los Angeles Police Department data. As can be seen from the array the array, our data closely match the distribution of the Department's.

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                        Table 5
            Gender by Survey Year and Department


              1996-1997        1998        1999-2000
            Survey   Dept.  Survey  Dept.  Survey   Dept.

Male          85%     83%    83%     82%    82%     82%
            (931)   (7434) (1327) (7998) (1261)  (7633)


Female        15%     17%    17%     18%    18%     18%
            (171)   (1524)  (280)  (1734)  (279)  (1737)
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Similarly, Table 6 shows an ethnic breakdown that indicates a close correspondence between the two data sets even though the Los Angeles Police Department does not the use an "other" category.

Table 6
Ethnicity by Survey Year and Department

	1996–1997		1998		1999–2000	
	Survey	Dept.	Survey	Dept.	Survey	Dept.
African American	9% (91)	14% (1,243)	10% (158)	14% (1,343)	11% (169)	14% (1,278)
Asian American	6% (66)	5% (479)	6% (97)	6% (591)	6% (93)	7% (617)
Caucasian	49% (529)	51% (4,626)	43% (677)	49% (4,742)	42% (626)	46% (4,322)
Hispanic	30% (326)	29% (2,571)	34% (523)	31% (3,009)	32% (481)	33% (3,104)
Other	5% (55)		6% (92)		7% (105)	

As Tables 5 and 6 show, at the latest survey about 82 percent was male, 42 percent Caucasian, 32 percent Hispanic, 11 percent African American and 6 percent Asian America.

Analysis of the Data

We entered the numerical data from each year's survey into an electronic database for analysis using SPSS. We performed response bias tests on the numerical dataset to insure that variation on individual items conformed to expected patterns and removed the small number of non-conforming responses. We then inspected the data, using frequencies and cross-tabulations and recoded some variables. Missing data were replaced by using mean imputation methods if the missing data were less than 10 percent. For missing data over 10 percent (none exceeded 20 percent) we compared the mean of respondents' individual backgrounds across years and mean of non-respondents' backgrounds. If the results were different, we used regression imputation for the missing data.

After producing frequencies and cross-tabulations, we performed an exploratory factor analysis (with Varimax rotation) on the data from sworn officers to identify underlying constructs or factors that explain the correlation among the set of variables. Because the questionnaire had already been organized into four somewhat discrete sections (police work, supervision and management, hiring, evaluation and discipline, community policing) there was an existing consistency to each section. To take advantage of the conceptual coherence of the four individual sections, we decided to performed factor analyses within each section for each of the three years.

Factor analysis is a useful technique for reducing responses to a large and complex set of questions to a limited number of factors and to explain patterns that form an intuitively sensible story (Hutcheson and Sofroniou, 1999). By using an exploratory factor analysis to reduce the data, we were also able to reveal multiple facets of issues like officers' values and job satisfaction, and their perceptions of key elements of police work. Each factor measures an underlying construct that taps a single larger issue (like job satisfaction or community policing). Each of the selected factors is shown below in Table 7 with associated reliability scores.

Table 7
Listing of Factors, Factor Scores and Reliability

	Factor Number and Name	Alpha		
		1996-1997	1998	1999-2000
1	Police Work as Helping People (Altruism)	.83	.85	.86
2	Arresting People to Achieve Community Safety	.63	.64	.68
3	Police Work as Career (Security and Pay)	.54	.65	.63
4	Positive Work Environment	.81	.81	.82
5	Inclusive Work Environment	.83	.78	.80
6	Opportunity for Initiative On-the-Job	.78	.76	.82
7	Job Satisfaction and Burnout	1.0	.90	.84
8	Support from the Public, the Media, and Top-Management	.78	.83	.83
9	Chief of Police's Integrity and Leadership		.76	.78
10	Captains' Integrity and Leadership[11]	.87	.92	.92
11	Quality of Supervision	.90	.93	.94
12	Hiring, Personnel Actions and Discipline	.80	.75	.71
13	Discipline and Career Advancement	.51	.68	.66
14	Complaint System, Fear of Punishment and the Role of the Inspector General		.33	.38
15	Community Policing in Concept	.79	.61	.89
16	Benefits of Community Policing	.86	.89	.89
17	Traditional View of Community Policing	.52	.41	.48
18	Progress with Community Policing	.75	.77	.75

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[11] In 1996-1997 two additional components, variables 36 and 38, entered the factor analysis. Because they dealt with issues of supervision they have been omitted from the table for the sake of clarity, but their significance is discussed in the narrative.

Later, each factor is presented in tabular form with loading scores for each variable for each of the three years to compare their relative strength.

We also compare the percent of officer agreement on each item to provide another dimension of change over the three years. Because respondents in each of the three surveys could not be identified for reasons discussed earlier, we had to treat them as independent samples over time.

Next, we wanted to determine which categories of officers held to these beliefs and perceptions most clearly and the pattern appears to change over time. We cross-tabulated each of the factor scores with selected background characteristics and inspected the sub-populations of most importance (ie. gender, ethnicity, age, length of service and so forth).

Next, we triangulated qualitative data drawn from observations, interviews, meetings, and open-ended questions to help provide a more fine-grained understanding of the statistical results as revealed by the officers themselves.

Limitations of the Study

Results of this study are limited by the fact that the survey data were collected in three independent cross-sectional studies rather than a longitudinal study in which the same subjects were followed over time. This

design was necessary because we would have been unable to gain the officers'

cooperation if we were to identify them if only for means of follow-up. The

result is that each of the three samples must be considered independent from

one another. However, it should also be kept in mind that respondents'

characteristics changed only slightly from year to year, and factor loading

scores, and patterns of agreement on individual items are consistent when

triangulated with the qualitative data results. But, despite the overall

coherence in the data, we cannot safely draw conclusions about changes over

time with complete confidence.

V. Findings

We now turn to a detailed discussion of the findings from the three surveys augmented by qualitative data drawn from responses to open-ended questions on the questionnaires, ride-alongs, interviews and observations.

Police Work

<u>Altruism and Service</u>

As early as 1994 when we began the study, members of the research team were struck by the altruistic values exhibited by most Los Angeles Police officers. In the course of ride-alongs and interviews it became clear that most LAPD officers were loyal and dedicated employees. Patrol officers worked together under difficult and dangerous circumstances with degrees of teamwork rarely seen in other organizations. Many officers said they were attracted to the LAPD because of its image as a disciplined, aggressive, and confident organization.

Table 8
Police Work as Helping People (Altruism)
(Factor 1)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)[12]		
	1996–1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999–2000 (n=1,617)
I am in police work because I want to make the community become a safer place	92% (.87)	94% (.85)	93% (.86)
I am in police work because I want to help people	95% (.83)	96% (.84)	95% (.84)
I am in police work because I want to fight crime	95% (.82)	96% (.82)	94% (.82)
I am in police work because it is exciting	95% (.51)	96% (.60)	94% (.59)

Results from each of the three surveys bear out these initial impressions as shown in Table 8. The overwhelming majority of officers (95 to 96 percent) said they are in police work to help people, and to make the community safer (92 to 94 percent) by fighting crime. Many also said they were drawn to police work because it is exciting. The high rates of officer agreement have been remarkably stable over the three surveys changing only one or two percentage points each survey. Interestingly, this altruistic service orientation is most strongly held by officers with longer years of service (16 to 25 years).

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[12] Loadings for these factors are relatively stable across years in a 7-factor solution of 27 items. Note that the factor analysis is exploratory for the specific puprpose of clarifying the basic relationships between items and constructs for each section.

This altruistic, service-oriented profile is supported by officers'
responses to open-ended survey questions. Respondents were asked to
identify the single aspect of their job that gives them the most
satisfaction. In each of the three surveys, a surprising number identified
some version of "service to the community" as what they liked most
about their jobs. For instance, in 1996-1997, thirty-six percent of all
officers who answered the question gave "service to the community" as
the leading source of satisfaction. By 1999-2000 the figure had
increased to 38 percent. Next came "arrests" or "imprisoning criminals"
(17% in 1996-1997, and 20 percent in 1999-2000). Examples of officers'
comments include:

> When someone from the general public looks directly at me
> and I can feel that he 'trusts' me, that really makes my day.

> Knowing that I helped a citizen and made a difference in his
> life, that's the payoff for me. People depend on us, and it
> feels good to know they have confidence and can depend on
> you.

> I went into police work because I wanted to make the streets
> safer. What gives me the greatest satisfaction is by helping
> citizens in the community, by being there when they need
> you, and by fighting crime and putting criminals in jail.

Results from interviews and observations from ride-alongs help
confirm the service-orientation of most LAPD officers. For instance, on a
ride-along in the West Valley Area one night, a seasoned training officer
and a probationer were called to an apartment complex where a woman
had overdosed on drugs and was thought to have killed herself. By the

time we arrived, the woman had already been taken by ambulance to a nearby hospital.

The officers drove to the hospital and went into the emergency ward where the woman was alive, having her stomach pumped. The nurse told the officers that the same woman had been brought in three times earlier over the last few weeks for drug overdoses and that she was obviously trying to kill herself. But, the nurse added, the emergency room doctor (who tried to eject the researcher from the emergency room) kept sending her home. Both officers stayed two hours past the end of their watch to learn the results of the hospital's medical evaluation team.

In the meantime, the young officer called the County Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU) to report the case and to avoid any liability. He explained to the county employee that he lacked confidence in the hospital to properly care for the woman and that the indications were that the doctor would simply discharge her for the fourth time. He said the county employee told him, "Don't worry about it. You're done." Upon hearing the report, the training officer exclaimed angrily, "That's the answer by the book. They don't give a shit about what happens to this woman."

The training officer gave the nurse the area watch commander's name and number. He told her, "If the doctor tries to send her home again, just call him and he'll send somebody out. When we get back to the station, I'll let him know." As we left the hospital and walked to the

car the training officer explained to the rookie, "We can do what's

right—by the book—or we can do the right thing!"

Apprehending Criminals to Achieve Community Safety

There is an additional belief about police work held by a majority of

LAPD officers -- that what is needed are aggressive tactics to arrest

people and "get the bad guys off the streets". Though not as strongly

held as the altruistic service values described above, proactive policing is

important to a significant number of officers.

Table 9
Arresting People to Achieve Community Safety
(Factor 2)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)		
	1996-1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999-2000 (n=1,617)
Arresting people is the best way to do proactive police work	64% (.82)	66% (.84)	60% (.85)
Police work is primarily a way of getting the bad guys off the streets	74% (.77)	76% (.77)	70% (.81)

Table 9 shows that at least 70 percent of the respondents agreed that "Police work is primarily a way of getting the bad guys off the streets", while at least 60 percent said that arresting people is the best way to do "proactive police work."

Observations from a ride-along out of 77th Street shows how these altruistic beliefs overlap with many officers' beliefs that they must help protect citizens from criminal elements. The researcher asked the officer if he thought community policing could change the conception of the police as an "occupying army" in South Central Los Angeles. The officer replied:

> Right now we're pretty much out there all alone. There are a lot of people in this part of the city who need our help. The criminal element preys on them. So, we've got a big job to do and sometimes we have to get physical. But, once community members start to take responsibility with us for their safety, then it will get better. But as long at we have to do it alone – well, we'll be seen as a bunch of kick-ass cops.

Police Work as a Career

There is also a perception held by many officers that police work is a primarily good job, a source of good pay and security that offers valuable career opportunities. Of the three dimensions of police work discovered in this study (altruism and service, arresting people, and career) this factor is the weakest.

Table 10
Police Work as Career (Security and Pay)
(Factor 3)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)		
	1996-1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999-2000 (n=1,617)
I am in police work because it is a good paying job	70% (.80)	77% (.80)	68% (.80)
I am in police work because it provides job security	92% (.70)	84% (.75)	76% (.69)
I am in police work because it provides valuable career opportunities	78% (.42)	84% (.53)	79% (.45)

Nevertheless, as Table 11 shows, more than three-quarters of officers agreed they are in police work because it "provides valuable career opportunities", that it "provides job security", and that it is "a good paying job." Responses to these questions have remained constant over the three surveys except for officers who singled out job security, a topic we discuss later in the report.

Further analyses revealed that officers with the fewest years of service were inclined to think of police work as a career or a job. A Deputy Chief with 30 years of service explained that he thought there was a difference between older officers and those with fewer years of service:

When we were on the streets we could hardly wait to get to work, to be here every day. We think of police work as a calling, but so many younger officers, the "Generation X-ers" think of it as a job.

Honesty and Perceptions of Serious Misconduct

In 1999, after the Rampart scandal had been discovered, some of the captains asked that new questions be added to the survey questionnaire to capture officers' definitions of "serious misconduct." We offered officers four scenarios in the 1999-2000 survey and asked them whether or not they or their fellow officers would construe them as serious misconduct, and whether or not they or their fellow officers would report the incidents to superiors. The scenarios were:

An officer routinely accepts free coffee from local merchants.

A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. As the officer approaches the vehicle, the driver yells, "what the hell are you stopping me for?" The officer replies, "Because I don't like the way you look."

In responding with her male partner to a fight in a bar, a young female officer receives a black eye from one of the male combatants. The male is arrested, handcuffed and he is led into the cells. The male member of the team punches him very hard in the kidney area saying, "Hurts, doesn't it!"

A police officer discovers a burglary of a hardware store. The display cases are smashed and many items have obviously been taken. While searching the store, he takes an expensive pocketknife and slips it into his pocket. He reports that the knife has been stolen during the burglary.

We found that most officers (86 percent) did not consider accepting free coffee from merchants as serious misconduct (though it contradicts Department policy, accepting free coffee is a widespread practice). But,

86 percent agreed that retorting angrily to an accusing citizen was serious misconduct. Also, 93 percent agreed that punching a handcuffed prisoner in retaliation was serious, and 99 percent said that stealing a pocketknife at the scene of a burglary was serious. While only 11 percent agreed they would report a fellow officer for accepting free coffee to a superior, 61 percent said that they would report an officer who spoke angrily to a citizen. Ninety-three percent said they would report punching a handcuffed prisoner, and 99 percent said they would report an officer stealing a pocketknife at the scene of a crime. There were no differences in how officers responded in terms of their assignment, rank, length of service, or their ethnicity, gender or educational backgrounds.

We also asked officers about whether they thought the means of policing justified the ends. Only nine percent agreed with the statement, "It's more important to get the bad guys off the street by any means necessary than to follow Department policies" and they were most likely to be supervisors than rank-and-file officers.

Impact of the Changing External Environment

Next was a set of questions designed to tap officers' perceptions of the larger environment that surrounds them – the public, the media, and top management. Table 11 shows that overall, while officers perceive more support from the community than from any other quarter, agreement had slipped significantly each year (p<.001) from a high of 57 percent in 1996-1997 to a low in 2000 of just over one third (34 percent).

Similarly, perceived support from politicians also dropped from 23 and 24 percent in 1996-1997 and 1998 respectively, to 11 percent in 1999-2000, no doubt due in large part to the Rampart scandal. Interestingly, Table 11 also shows that that in 1996-19967, only 18 percent of all officers perceived growing support from the media. But, in 1998 agreement rose to 27 percent, probably because of the favorable publicity given to the LAPD after the North Hollywood shootout that happened on February 28, 1997, a few months after the first survey had been completed. But, officers' perceptions of support by the media slumped to a new low in 1999-2000 in the aftermath of the Rampart Division scandal.

While Willie Williams was Chief in 1996-1997, a third of all officers said they thought that support from top management had grown over the past year. However, by 1998, after Bernard Parks had taken over as Chief, the percentage was cut by more than half, falling to 15 percent. Each of these changes is statistically significant (p<.001).

Table 11
Support from the Public, the Media, and Top-Management
Factor 8

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)[13]		
	1996–1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999–2000 (n=1,617)
Compared to a year ago, the Department receives more support from the community	57% (.66)	43% (.67)	34% (.50)
Compared to a year ago, the Department receives more support from politicians	23% (.69)	24% (.74)	11% (.71)
Compared to a year ago, the Department receives more support from the media	18% (.68)	27% (.69)	7% (.74)
Compared to a year ago, the Department receives more support from top management (commanders and chiefs)	33% (.66)	15% (.64)	16% (.55)

Officers' length of service was significantly associated (p<.001)these statements. In their first two years of service agreement is low, no doubt because most officers lack experience upon which to make such judgements. However officers who report serving from 3-6 years are most likely to agree with these statements. Agreement then falls off with longer years of service.

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[13] Loadings for these factors are relatively stable across years in a 4-factor solution of 22 items. Note that the factor analysis is exploratory for the specific purpose of clarifying the basic relationships between items and constructs for each section.

Qualitative data also make it overwhelmingly clear that most officers felt support for the Department is eroding from all quarters – the larger community, politicians, the media and their own top managers. One officer from Rampart Area commented in the most recent survey that the single biggest obstacle to doing his job was, "Citizens and politicians, who rely on media sensationalism for their information, then taking that information to pre-judge officers and make false allegations." On a ride-along out of Central Area in 1998 one officer asked another how he thought the department had changed since Rodney King. The first officer replied:

> We can get put in jail for doing our job, so why should I do anything? I hope it never gets that way for everybody in the department. The department is too political. The LAPD gets knocked for everything. Like that thing in Vegas (a shooting), probably nothing will come of it for them. But if that happened here, the media would have a field day. I joined the military in 1979 after Vietnam when everybody hated the military. But after Grenada and Saudi Arabia, now we're popular again. These things swing back and forth. It took an incident like North Hollywood [the bank shootout] for the people to start appreciating the police again. The press usually focuses on the few who hate us. They focus on the negative.

It is not surprising that significant external events should shape officers' perceptions. While the 1997 North Hollywood shootout caused the media to lavish praise on the Department, the recent Rampart scandal (like the Rodney King beating and the O. J. Simpson trial before it) pitted many political leaders and community members against the Department.

Officers described feeling abandoned. Some of these feelings are probably chronic -- the result of being police officers who confront individuals who may be dangers to society as a routine part of their work. When asked about the single biggest obstacle to doing his job, one officer from Southeast responded with comments that are echoed by many others:

> The media! Politicians who are self-righteous--who place political correctness over the value of honest justice. And, a District Attorney who is unwilling to prosecute criminals!

But the LAPD's top management does not escape criticism. When in 2000 officers were asked about the "single biggest obstacle to doing their jobs" 243 wrote in comments about their managers, most of which include top managers. One representative comment came from an officer from Southeast Division:

> [The] command staff and all the unnecessary paper work they generate to try to justify their weak leadership skills. The command staff is in fear of the Chief and they won't suggest solutions to problems that exist because they fear a negative impact on their careers.

Another officer from West Los Angeles Division wrote, "High ranking bureaucrats with no knowledge of police work, or empathy for their officers," while another assigned to West Valley replied, "Management's insistence on officers writing citations. Officers are too concerned with writing citations, and not doing effective police work."

The "1.28" Complaint System

Officers also felt that the complaint system implemented in 1998 to improve officers' accountability to citizens and improve discipline is

46

particularly onerous. This new complaint system, whose impact is described later in detail, is called the "1.28" because of the number of the form on which it is printed. It is the result of recommendations made by the Christopher Commission in 1991. One of the reasons for establishing a new system stemmed from the Department's inability to show exactly how many complaints were filed. The conflicting numbers generated suspicion that the Department's was perhaps unable to uncover misconduct. But a new system was never implemented until Parks became Chief. The 1.28, approved by the Police Commission and implemented by Chief Parks in January 1998, holds officers strictly accountable for their actions. Under the old system, a supervisor or captain could dismiss complaints that, if they were true, would not result in disciplinary action. Under the new system, every complaint must be investigated, removing much of the independent judgement once held by supervisors and captains.

The system is costly in terms of time required to investigate each of these complaints, not to mention time required for administrative processing and review. A conservative estimate is that investigative time alone costs between $16-$17 million each year.[14]

Not surprisingly, the vast majority of officers view it as punitive and unfair and they truly hate the new system. Most officers are

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[14] The estimate assumes at least three sergeants, plus the equivalent of one field sergeant and one half of a lieutenant's time at each of the 18 divisions. In addition 108 investigators are employed by Internal Affairs who are assigned to complaints. The $16-$17 million estimate does not include benefits.

convinced that the public, the Police Commission, and the LAPD Chief and top managers, are out to "burn" them. One officer echoed the sentiments of others when she said, "We work hard for the city. The city should back us as officers doing thankless work instead of trying to burn us at the stake."

What is clear is that escalating public demands for increased accountability and discipline, transmitted through the Police Commission, the Chief of Police, and down the chain of command, have had a profound effect on officer morale that has only worsened. Officers were unequivocal about their desire of wanting to feel valued and supported. In 1996, most said that they felt removed from decisions made at Parker Center and that both recent Chiefs Williams and Parks, paid more attention to politicians than they did to managing the department and supporting their employees. That perception has only grown in recent years. We now turn to police officers' perceptions of how these external pressures, mediated by key actors within the Department and influenced by its powerful culture, play out.

The Chain of Command

The Chief of Police

A significant influence on the day-to-day quality of police officers' work life is the Chief of Police. We have no survey data to measure officer perceptions' of Willie Williams' leadership as we were prevented

from including such items on the 1996-1997 survey questionnaire. However, qualitative data derived from observations and interviews made it abundantly clear that Williams lacked internal support, and that most officers (especially top managers) thought the Department was drifting. Bernard Parks, however, encouraged us to include questions in the 1998 and subsequent surveys about officers' perceptions of his integrity and leadership.

Table 12
The Chief of Police's Integrity and Leadership
(Factor 9)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings) [15]		
	1996-1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999-2000 (n=1,617)
The Chief of Police has a high level of integrity		35% (.72)	43% (.83)
I am confident that the Chief of Police is leading us in the right direction		15% (.75)	18% (.78)

Table 12 shows that in 1998, somewhat more than a third of all officers (35 percent) agreed that Parks had a high level of integrity and substantially fewer (15 percent) agreed that he was leading the Department in the right direction.

When we briefed Parks on the 1998 survey results, he did not seem especially surprised. He described the large number of changes that he and his top staff had enacted in the first year and the impact they had on the Department and officers' appraisal of him:

> We've put together a large package of changes that we decided to let go in one year rather than doing them over a number of years--FASTRAC, a new officer examination procedure, a new complaint process, reorganization. These are things that prior Chiefs didn't do and we've set out to do them in one year. Dave [David Gascon, a Deputy Chief who was also Chief of Staff] and I sat down and knew that this was going to be a big year because experiencing many simultaneous major events is not normal for this organization. It was purposeful. We went in with our eyes wide open. But the thing to remember is that the

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[15] Questions about the were not asked in the 1996-1997 survey.

organization is undergoing a massive change. Next year the numbers will begin to come up.

But Parks was also contemptuous of employees who criticized him as being unfeeling and uncaring. When we first briefed him about the slide in officer morale and job satisfaction Parks retorted, "Well what am I supposed to say to them? Welcome. I'm glad you decided to come to work today!"

Nevertheless, in the 1999-2000 survey, the percent of agreement rose somewhat from levels of the past year. The percent of officers who agreed that the Chief had a high level of integrity rose from 35 percent in 1998 to 43 percent in 1999-2000. The increase probably stemmed from the public way in which Parks supported officers in the aftermath of the Margaret Mitchell shooting and his aggressive investigation into the Rampart scandal. In 1998, only fifteen percent of the officers agreed that the Chief was leading the department in the right direction – at the same time officers were feeling a loss of support from politicians and the media. By 1999-2000, the percent of officers who agreed rose slightly to 18 percent.

Additional analyses show that most support (agreement) for the Chief's integrity and leadership came from supervisors, officers who identified themselves as African-American, and officers with bachelor's degrees and higher. Officers in patrol, especially those with three to 10 years of service, were most likely to disagree.

Discussions with officers and comments to open-ended questions reveal that much of the criticism about Parks emanated from officers' intense dislike of the 1.28 complaint process. Officers' feelings were also no doubt colored by their perception of him as a harsh disciplinarian.

When asked in the most recent survey, "What is the biggest obstacle to doing your job?" nearly two-thirds of the 1,296 responses (61 percent) criticized the complaint process or the Chief, both of which are highly correlated. For instance, one patrol officer from Hollywood said the biggest obstacle to doing his job is:

> …the Chief of Police. His unfair complaint policy, his condoning of over-zealous supervisors to indiscriminately persecute officers, and his lack of concern for the officers.

Another officer from Rampart expressed similar views, attributing the Chief's actions to political motives – an attribution echoed by other officers. She said:

> Chief Parks and the 1.28 system that makes officers afraid to do our job. We need a pro-officer Chief, not one that is only concerned about himself and making it to mayor. Morale could not be lower.

Another officer from Southeast Division explained that he thought the Chief was making officers' life hard out of sheer spite. He elaborated:

> The Chief of Police and all of his new policies! I don't think the Chief even likes police officers! If he did, why would he want to make our jobs so hard for us? We're just honest, hardworking cops trying to make life better for decent people!

A more balanced yet critical view was offered by a veteran detective from Pacific Division who said:

The Chief means well. However, he has opposition in his efforts to bring the department to a new standard. He needs to be mayor or governor. We need a different Chief with more feeling for the underling.

Yet, Parks, said he wished he could align the Department with political realities of which most officers are unaware. He said that he would have like to spend more time in the field. Parks explained:

I can't go to every roll call. I primarily deal with the larger issues like the budget, technology, discipline and so on. And, it's very hard to get the word down to the troops. I have meetings here and I see the captains leaving with tons of stuff. But I wonder by the time they get back to the division if it is just pounds? Is it just dissipating along the way?

Parks was also acutely aware that until very recently, crime was dropping faster in Los Angeles than in most other large cities. For instance, in 2000 Los Angeles ranked 7th among cities with populations of 1 million or more in crime rates. Even though Los Angeles has a far smaller ratio of police per citizens than most other big cities, the crime rate had fallen by 50 percent between 1990 and 2000 – faster than it had in other big cities (Los Angeles Times, August 14, 2000). Parks explained the implications:

We have a new situation here with 2,000 more officers than we've ever had. Crime is down, radio calls are down, so the workload has dropped. Our number one mission over the next few years is to teach people what to do with their available time. The worst thing is for officers to be hanging out with no apparent mission. That used to be New York's problem. So how do you train them to work on available time? We never taught them to work in small bursts of time. FASTRAC helps because it gives them a working plan for 1 minute or for 3 hours.

Nevertheless, most officers regarded Parks with fear and hostility. Probably contributing to officers' trepidation was the fact that Parks disciplined more than 800 officers and fired 113 — more than any Chief in the Department's recent history.

An event in 2000 revealed the ephemeral nature of police morale and its sensitivity to external events. A week following the Democratic National Convention (DNC) we conducted two focus groups with officers assigned to Central Division (a division that had a large role in the DNC).[16] All officers agreed that morale had risen sharply because the LAPD had been successful, judged by the lack of civil disorder that had been predicted. According to these officers, sergeants were given authority to command their squads according to an overall plan, but without having to run every decision up the chain of command, something that one said, "Rarely happens at the LAPD." Officers also said that they liked the fact that Chief Parks was in the field with them. "He stood back and let others lead," one observed. Another officer explained:

> It was great to see the Chief walking in the middle of the street with a helmet on. And then, after it was over, the man said to us, "I want to let you know that you did everything right." The Chief was interviewed and he said it was a textbook case, the officers did everything right, there were no problems. It just made you feel that he wasn't just a tourist. And just having the command officers comes over and pat you on the back once in a while really makes you feel good.

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[16] The focus groups were suggested by Deputy Chief David Gascon as a test of how morale can be affected by external events. They were conducted on August 22, 2000 by UCLA Research Associate, Joel Rabin

One officer said he wasn't surprised, "I knew we were capable of handling it. We're capable of getting the job done, as long as we went and did our job." But, officers agreed that this boost in morale would plummet once they went back to their regular duties and had to cope with 1.28s. One said:

> For a short period of time a lot of the negative things we work with every day were put on hold. You got something else to concentrate on. They said, "Time out, put it on the back burner, let's do it this way for a week." And we constantly were doing something totally different for a week. No one said one thing about anything negative!

One said of the boost in morale:

> It won't last because they [command officers] will go back in the ivory tower, we stay in the gutter, and they forget what we're putting up with. Right now they're all smiles. Management comes down and says "hello" to us now and talk with us because they were out there with us.

Another officer elaborated:

> The high morale will last until they quit supporting us and start back with the "Us" and "Them." Now we've got to go to the back burner for that stuff we put there a week ago. I've got a drawer full of complaints. I'll set them down and think, "We were heroes." However, Mrs. Jones said you had a bad look on your face when you talked to her. And we'll start with the negative crap again.

Captains

Captains who manage each of the 18 divisions are also significant factors in officers' job satisfaction because they influence their work assignments, promotions, discipline, and morale. Table 13 shows how

five variables clustered to form a factor titled "Captains' Integrity and

Leadership."[17]

<div align="center">
Table 13
Captains' Integrity and Leadership[18]
(Factor 10)
</div>

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)		
	1996–1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999–2000 (n=1,617)
My Area/Division captains have high levels of integrity	85% (.76)	75% (.83)	74% (.82)
My Area/Division captains are good leaders	83% (.76)	65% (.91)	58% (.91)
I am confident that my Area/Division captains are leading us in the right direction	64% (.81)	57% (.90)	51% (.89)
My Area/Division captains are open to new ideas and ways of working	58% (.74)	51% (.84)	40% (.83)
The Area/Division captains care about me personally	52% (.76)	41% (.83)	37% (.84)

What is most striking about this factor is the uniformly strong

factor loadings and the high levels of agreement on three of the five

variables (captains' integrity, leadership and leading in the right

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[17] When we began the survey in 1996 each division was commanded by an "area captain" (a Captain III who had responsibility for the overall command including a host of external duties many of which were related to community policing. A "patrol" captain (a Captain I) was the second in command but with exclusive responsibility for supervising patrol. In 1997 when Bernard Parks became chief, he moved responsibility for patrol to the Area Captain, renaming the patrol captain as "operations support captain" whois now in charge of detectives and the special enforcement unit (formerly "CRASH").

[18] In 1996-1997 two additional components, variables 36 and 38, entered the factor analysis. Because they dealt with issues of supervisors they have been omitted from the table for the sake of clarity, but their significance is discussed in the narrative.

direction) that fall off significantly in 1998, and in 1999-2000 (p<.001).

For instance in 1996-1997, eighty five percent of the officers agreed that their captains had high levels of integrity. But by 1998, the figure had fallen to 75 percent, and then to 74 percent in 1999-2000. Similarly in 1996-1997, eighty three percent of all officers agreed that their captains were good leaders, but within a year the figure had fallen to 65 percent and then to 58 percent in 1999-2000. While agreement on the other variables was not as high in 1996-1997, they too fell off in a similar pattern in subsequent years.

Separate analyses showed that patrol officers were most likely to support their captains' integrity, leadership, and openness (p<.001). Also, rank-and-file officers were more likely to agree when compared with supervisors.

What could explain this slide in confidence? Officers said that captains were less accessible because of escalating workloads. And as Parks pressed for productivity and accountability they became overly concerned with producing high numbers of arrests and officer discipline. In 1996-1997, only a handful of officers identified their commanding officers as obstacles to doing their jobs. The few complaints were more like gripes about the boss rather than truly hostile responses. By 1999-2000, the picture had changed. In the most recent survey, a fifth of all officers singled out their commanding officers as obstacles to doing their

jobs.   One officer commented that if he could change one thing about his area it would be:

> Having a captain who is fair and supportive in administering
> discipline, days off, setting realistic goals and not setting
> quotas for enforcement action such as citations.

> Officers said that FASTRAC and other means that top management uses to audit areas' activities have reduced captains' abilities to make decisions because they are, as one officer put it, "always looking over their shoulders to see what the Chief wants."

Parks believed in managing on the basis of data. Although he said the volume of special projects requested from the areas had not increased substantially, the perception of those further down the chain of command is different. The view from the area level is that the number of reports has increased, as has the workload on captains and lieutenants and sergeants to produce them. One captain, who had worked under Parks for years, and who recently retired, said with affection:

> You can always tell when Bernie's in charge. The flow of
> paperwork increases exponentially! Reports, reports and
> more reports!

> Officers were also critical that under Parks their captains had lost power and that they should be given more authority so they can do a better job of managing and backing up their officers. One officer said that the top staff should:

> ...allow commanding officers to manage their own divisions
> without being micro-managed by commanders and chiefs
> and politicians who mandate decisions and policies they
> have no personal involvement in. Commanding officers
> should be the "chiefs" at their stations.

But, according to Parks, captains already had sufficient authority

to command their areas. He explained:

> Captains in this Department don't know what power they
> have. They don't realize it. Probably 98 percent of decisions
> that commanding officers make go unsupervised. If they go
> into new territory or if they do something a little different,
> they'll make the call themselves.

Despite the fact that many officers complained that their area captains

are spread too thin, and they are unavailable because of a heavy load of

normal duties plus managing patrol, Parks disagreed:

> Patrol is the biggest function of the area but many of them
> [captains] wanted to escape it because it's hard work that
> we've all done. But too many captains want to have
> someone, or me give them the answers. I say, "But, you are
> the answer! We've given you the command and the
> resources. The issue is how you perform and get the job
> done. Its up to you."

Many captains said privately that managing patrol, on top of their

already overloaded schedules, was an excessive burden. One captain

worried that having patrol report to the area captain was an "invitation

for disaster" because of the lack of time for quality supervision. (It

should be noted that the illegal acts committed in the Rampart Area were

committed while patrol captains were still supervising patrol.) A sergeant

complained:

> Captains are never there. They're at Boards of Rights,
> FASTRAC, bureau meetings and so on. It's sad when you
> have to write a note to your captain because he's too busy
> and is always out at meetings. How could they know what's
> going on in the division if they can't be there? Although they
> rely on others to inform them what's going on in the office, it
> is still not the same as being there. A captain needs to make
> his own evaluation by what he observes and what he hears.

Some area captains also said that because of the additional burdens of the 1.28 complaint process they had even less time to spend with patrol. One area captain explained:

> Not only do most divisions have three or four full time supervisors assigned to processing complaints, every supervisor's handling at least 3 or 4. So there's a tremendous drain of personnel at the division level just keeping up. On top of that I have to review every investigation, and advise every officer of his rights. On top of that, I have to manage morale, which is at an all-time low because of this 1.28. I have to spend more time in roll calls and in the hallways selling what we're doing. And, frankly, it doesn't make sense.

Most captains agreed that under Parks they had been given the freedom he described in theory, but in truth there was little time in which to exercise it. They said they were assigned a huge workload of special projects. One captain said, "We're not auditing, we're checking everything!"

The cumulative effect, according to many officers, was to make captains overly responsive to the Chief and to Parker Center managers. One officer echoed the sentiments of others when he said, "Parks has the captains on short leashes." Most agreed that they would like to see their captains have more time to spend managing their divisions and more authority to make decisions. In an interview, we asked a veteran officer at 77th, "If you had a magic wand and could change anything in this area what would you do?" He answered:

> I would empower the managers. We need more power at the division level. By the time an individual rises to the captain

level he should be trusted more.   But some still believe in the "chain of command.

Supervisors

Supervisors, next in the chain of command -- lieutenants and sergeants -- direct the activities of patrol, operations support and the area office. But supervisors too appear have been affected by pressures for greater accountability and stricter discipline in a domino-like effect through the Chief, down through the chain of command.

Table 14
Quality of Supervision
(Factor 11)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)		
	1996-1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999-2000 (n=1,617)
I can go to my immediate supervisor for help whenever needed	85% (.76)	90% (.91)	88% (.91)
My working relationship with my immediate supervisor is positive	93% (.81)	94% (.90)	93% (.89)
My immediate supervisor at my Area/Division will listen to my concerns	85% (.76)	92% (.83)	90% (.82)
Overall, my immediate supervisor is responsive to my needs	85% (.74)	90% (.84)	88% (.83)

As Table 14 shows, most sworn officers reported positive working relationships with their supervisors. These also tap personal dimensions of officers' relationships with their supervisors. What is most interesting about this factor is the uniformly high loading scores (meaning high

intercorrelations of factor components) and uniformly high levels of agreement. If anything, agreement of officers about working relationships with their supervisors increases over time. For instance, responses among officers who agreed with the statements "My immediate supervisor at my Area/Division will listen to my concerns," and "Overall, my immediate supervisor is responsive to my needs" increased significantly across the three separate surveys (p<.001).   Analysis of variance produced no significant relationships between background variables and this factor.

Despite the positive feelings the vast majority of officers reported about their supervisors, a small percent of the officers (less than five percent) volunteered negative comments. Frequently, these comments reflected dissatisfaction with "backup" that supervisors provide officers. Most officers believed this behavior stems from increased pressure from the Chief to file and investigate citizen complaints. For instance, one officer wrote in response to the question, "What is the single biggest obstacle to doing your job," "Confidence on our supervisors backing us up on use of force and citizens' complaints." Another volunteered a similar criticism, "Shaky supervision. Department buckling down to the slightest political pressure." Another officer complained, "Supervisors that are out to catch misconduct when there is none (Burn 'm to learn 'm)."

Our observations leave little doubt that supervisors (sergeants and lieutenants) are caught in the middle as the Department came under increased public scrutiny, the Chief centralized authority in his office, and captains took on a greatly expanded workload. Supervisors know that to be effective they must maintain their officers' confidence, but at the same time they must please command officers to whom they report. One lieutenant at 77th explained:

> The watch commander sets a tone!with his supervisors, which I hope gets communicated to the officers in roll call. That's my time to communicate to officers what I think is important. That's the most important thing I do everyday. I'm frustrated with the organization because too many times, I have to sell a bag of shit to the officers. I have to have credibility with them, so I can't just say, "this is it."

The fastest way a supervisor can lose credibility is by failing to back up an officer on an unwarranted citizen complaint. One officer said:

> Policing is all-political now. !It used to be that when I handled an incident, if I did the right thing, I'd get supervisor support. Now I'm not sure. You figure out which supervisor you can go to or take a report to but our priorities have changed. The priority used to be fighting crime. But now crime's not discussed. It's social issues, quality of life issues.

Some supervisors are tagged as "fast-trackers"—sergeants and lieutenants who are perceived as being more interested in their own careers than supporting their subordinates. One officer described what differentiates the "fast-trackers" from supervisors that can be trusted as he walked into the parking lot to get a car for the AM watch. He pointed to a sergeant and said:

That's " a cop's cop." He's one you can trust. The question you always ask is, "Is he there to help you or to burn you?" A sergeant you can!trust will back you up on personnel complaints. Some are only after promotions and they'll burn an officer just to climb the ladder, to show that they are <u>good</u> supervisors.

Officers joke about how promotions cause managers to avoid getting blemishes on their records and give into pressure from superiors.

One veteran training officer said:

> When you make sergeant, you're surprised you made sergeant. Some guys think they can make lieutenant and, if they do, then they think they can make captain. At this point, you're scared to death to make a decision. I had a lieutenant ask me if I was going to test for lieutenant. I told him no, that I'm afraid of the <u>surgery</u>. He looked at me not understanding. I said: "I heard that when you make lieutenant, you have to have your balls surgically removed?"

A popular sergeant told a story, which in its exaggeration, reveals a truth that officers use to differentiate supervisors they can trust from those they cannot. According to the sergeant, a citizen walked into the station to file a complaint (prior to the 1.28) against his mother for violating a restraining order he had obtained against her. The officer on the desk asked what the restraining order was for and the citizen explained that his mother was not allowed to water the lawn. The sergeant continued:

> The officer rolls his eyes and begins taking the report. The citizen gets very upset and asks to speak to a!supervisor. I come out and ask what the problem is. The guy says my officer was being "rude" when he rolled his eyes and that he wanted to file a complaint against him. I told the guy, "I can't file a complaint!against the officer because I was going to give him a <u>commendation</u> for taking your stupid report! What I should do is throw *you* out of the station.

The point this sergeant was trying to make was that many officers

believed even in 1996, that the Department had become overly

politicized. Pressures from elected politicians, as well as citizens, were

taken far more seriously than they had been in earlier days when the

Department was led (and defended) by Chiefs Daryl Gates and Ed Davis.

One officer said, "We cater, no we <u>encourage</u> people to file complaints.

Many of these people have been to jail—they know the process. They

know how to make phony complaints that stick." Another female officer

said in 1996-1997:

> Sergeants are putting constraints on officers, cautioning us
> against doing things that might bring complaints. It's due to
> the Rodney King incident. Many supervisors are not trusted
> because they turn everything into complaints. Since the
> Inspector General came aboard, captains go overboard on
> reports.

Since 1998, most officers said their captains had become

overloaded with work and they paid more attention to the Chief's

demands for productivity (citations) and processing complaints than they

did to their employees. The effect was to erode officers' relationships

with captains while strengthening their relationships with supervisors.

However, according to many officers, supervisors are often caught in the

same dilemma. One officer said, "Supervisors are so inundated with

1.28 paperwork that they have no time for real police work--responding

to supervisory requests as well as adequate supervision of the field

officers." Another added:

The 1.28 system does not give supervisors time to lead or get to know the officers – there's just too much paperwork. Not every citizen complaint should be a 1.28 - some can be resolved without this paper trail. The 1.28 system does not reflect honestly nor accurately on the officers' character.

In the course of this study it became increasingly clear that the management of the area office, or station, is a critical link in the management of the LAPD. The quality of management and supervision at this level has an enormous impact on the Department's ability to provide effective police service. One P-3 observed, "I'll work here 'till I die because we have good captains and good sergeants, or until we get some bad supervisors. They make a division."

Hiring, Assignment, Promotion and Discipline

The following tables present factors that represent significant dimensions of officers' lives – those things that have a powerful influence on their morale and satisfaction with their jobs and careers.

Personnel and Discipline

Table 15 displays five variables that compose a factor called "Personnel and Discipline". The factor loading scores for the first three variables (hiring qualified people, fair selection and job assignment, and promotions) are fairly even. However, only a slim majority at best agrees with them. For instance, slightly more than a third of officers agreed in 1996-1997 that the Department hires qualified people. The percent rose significantly (p<.001) in 1998 and in 2000 stood at 41 percent. Similarly, less than half of officers agreed that selection and job

assignments were fair (49 percent), a figure that rose to 55 and 53 percent in successive years (p <.01). Finally, 39 percent agreed in 1996-1997 that their divisions promoted the most qualified people, a percent that has remained stable across the three surveys. Beyond the relatively low agreement with statements about hiring, job assignment and promotion, a significant finding from this factor is the comparison of officers' perceptions of the fairness with which discipline is administered. In 1996-1997, 69 percent of all officers agreed that discipline was fairly administered at the area level, compared with 21 percent for the department level. The variable "Generally, the way my captain administers discipline is fair" failed to emerge in successive years. Rather it loaded on Factor 13, "Discipline and Career Advancement", but significantly smaller proportions of officers agreed with it (p <.001) than in the 1996-1997 survey. The final variable that refers to Department discipline failed to load on any factor after the initial survey.

Table 15
Hiring, Personnel Actions and Discipline
(Factor 12)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)		
	1996-1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999-2000 (n=1,617)
The Department hires qualified people	35% (.73)	47% (.75)	41% (.72)
Personnel selection and job assignment systems at my Area/Division are fair for all employees	49% (.75)	55% (.76)	53% (.80)
My Area/Division promotes the most qualified people	39% (.79)	40% (.78)	38% (.75)
Generally, the way my captain administers discipline is fair	69% (.57)		
The Department's disciplinary system is applied equally/fairly to all employees	21% (.68)		

Interestingly, while the open-ended questions drew thousands of comments about officers' perceptions on a wide range of issues, in 1996-1997, only 35 officers actually wrote comments about hiring and promotion standards. In 1999-2000 only 17 officers wrote such comments. For instance, in response to the question, "If you could change one thing about your area/division, what would it be?" one officer wrote, "Get rid of affirmative action and hire/promote on merit." Another advocated changing to an "Improved, streamlined, promotional system, which completely ignores affirmative action and returns to the merit

system." Another officer wrote, "I am concerned that affirmative action is resulting in reverse discrimination against white males."

An analysis of variance showed significant relationships between some background variables and Factor 12. Officers who were assigned to operations support were most likely to hold these views, followed by officers from area, and finally officers from patrol ($p<.003$).

But what is interesting about the responses to the open-ended questions, is that despite an outpouring of opinions and feelings about the Chief and management, the 1.28 and the disciplinary system, and usual gripes about facilities and equipment, is the <u>lack</u> of response about hiring and promotions. Qualitative data from ride-alongs and interviews support the view, that while some officers complain that hiring and promotional standards have been lowered, and that officer quality has slipped, there were actually very few such comments. For instance, one P-2 officer said on a ride-along:

> Promotions should go to the most qualified person for the job, not the one that meets the quota. Affirmative action has destroyed the standards of this department. Females don't even have to jump or scale the 6-foot wall. Special rights rather than equal rights are destroying our goals and our morale.

Some responses like this help explain why perceptions of unfairness and favoritism are sometimes blurred with politics in the minds of officers. Two federal court orders issued in 1980 mandated hiring targets for females, African-Americans, and Hispanics. But, in the

minds of some officers, the impact of the court orders is seen as

favoritism. For instance, one officer said:

> Promotions have traditionally been given to the most
> qualified candidate, but realistically, promotions go to the
> favored people... It is "who you know" and not "what you
> know." Promotions based on gender, favoritism, or race is
> wrong.

While many officers might agree with the comments of this officer,

a large number seem to also to perceive that changes in hiring

(diversifying the Department's workforce) is inevitable. Nevertheless,

there is a feeling among many officers that the rapid hiring and training

of 3,000 new officers in the late 1990s hurt quality because of the speed

with which the buildup took place. A Latina officer at Hollenbeck said in

1998:

> The best thing about working Hollenbeck is that the
> community is very supportive. The officers are a closely-knit
> group. Sure, there are some bad apples - but it doesn't spoil
> the place. I was one of the first women here. I had to prove
> myself, to demonstrate I could take care of myself. I met the
> standards. But now we're getting probationers out of the
> Academy who are not well trained. They are being pushed
> through the Academy. I was supervising a probationer on a
> "shooting in progress" incident. No one knew where the
> shooter was. A man had been shot through the cheek and
> was bleeding badly. The probationer failed in several
> ways—he didn't make a crucial call for the ambulance
> (because he said the line was busy) and he didn't know how
> to break into the frequency to report the emergency.

Two male officers at Central complained in 1998 about how

"politics" had pushed too far into the Department causing some

unqualified people to be promoted because of the need for new sergeants

to supervise the new recruits:

Too many people are making sergeant too soon. These people are too young to supervise. We are promoting inexperienced, unqualified people. I don't feel like I am qualified to be a sergeant. I wouldn't be able to give orders to a 20 year vet. They wouldn't listen to me.

There is another side to perceptions of favoritism that stem from "who you know." One officer wrote, "There appears to be some problems with the perceptions of promotions! It is apparent that who you play cards or golf with, or how much you drink, counts more." Another said, "There is favoritism on promotions and assignments to specialized units. And, there are double standards in regards to discipline too. Special treatment is given to officers who are liked by management who make the choices." Yet another officer said he thought there was a double standard with regard to discipline: "It is a very unfair system," he said. "A captain, or somebody in a management position wouldn't get in any trouble for an action that would get a police officer days off."

Discipline and Career Advancement

The factor shown in Table 16 taps another dimension of officers' perceptions about how their behavior can affect their careers.

Table 16
Discipline and Career Advancement
(Factor 13)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)		
	1996-1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999-2000 (n=1,617)
I am clear on what type of behavior will result in discipline	81% (.80)	69% (.75)	70% (.75)
I know what I need to do to be recognized in my ratings/evaluations	82% (.78)	76% (.76)	75% (.73)
The supervisors within my Area/Division will understand and support me when I make a mistake (not misconduct)	66% (.69	55% (.64)	54% (.60)
Generally, the way my captain administers discipline is fair		57% (.54)	53% (.48)

For instance, in 1996-1997, the majority of officers (81 percent) agreed that they knew what behavior would result in discipline. The following year the percent declined significantly to 69 percent and remained at 70 percent in 1999-2000 (p<.001). Similarly, officers' agreement with a statement that they know what to do to be recognized in their ratings/evaluation also declined significantly from a high of 82 percent in 1996-1997 to 76 percent in 1998 and 75 percent in 1999-2000 (p<.001). At the same time that officers reported decreasing clarity about expected behavior, they reported significant reductions in support from their supervisors for making an honest mistake (p<.001). The same

pattern can be seen in a significant decline of officers who believed that their captains administer discipline fairly (p<.001). This variable loaded on Factor 12 in 1996-1997 with 69 percent agreement, but in 1998 it loaded on Factor 13 and dropped to 57 percent and finally to 53 percent in 1999-2000.

An analysis of variance indicated a significant relationship between assignment (officers in patrol, operations support and area were most likely to hold these perceptions in that order) (p<.01).

Two reasons lie behind the decline in officers' confidence of being supported by their supervisors or disciplined fairly by their captains. First, prior to the introduction of the 1.28 complaint system in January, 1998, officers already worried that once complaints went beyond their immediate supervisors and captains, bureau-level command officers would "cave into" pressure from the Chief and the top executives and officers would be the victims. In 1995, to make it easier for citizens to file complaints, Chief Willie Williams made complaint forms easily available in the lobby of every police station, a move that angered many officers. We repeatedly heard how officers avoided making arrests for fear of being charged with using excessive force and receiving "1.81s" (the number of the complaint form then in use). Second, since the 1.28 complaint system was introduced in 1998, officers found that their supervisors' and captains' discretion had been seriously curtailed. We discuss this issue in the following section.

An incident we witnessed on a ride-along out of West Valley Area in 1997 reveals the stressful conditions that officers must endure when they encounter abusive citizens. At about 1:30 p.m. the officers (both the training officer and the probationer were Caucasian) received a call about an altercation between an apartment manager and a tenant. The officers and the researcher walked into a run-down apartment building that was managed by an Hispanic couple. They complained that some tenants' kids were trashing the vacant apartments. The husband elaborated that the kids had gone "pee pee" on the rugs and that the adults "called me bad names and said bad things." He took the officers and researcher to see the damage. The first apartment had been thoroughly trashed—windows broken, feces standing in a toilet that had been jammed with paper, feces smeared on the rugs—the place was a horrible mess. Two women, one African-American woman and the other Caucasian, were sitting on the upstairs steps with two children, above the officers, researcher and manager. The senior officer asked the manager to identify the children who had allegedly done the damage. He pointed up to an African-American boy who appeared to be 8 or 9 years old. As the officer told the boy to come down the stairs, two African American men appeared on the stairs. The officer questioned the boy who started making hand gestures and yelling at the manager, "You're lying, you're a liar!" The officer told him:

> Hey stop. You don't talk to an adult like that. Don't you
> know that? You're supposed to respect your elders. And

don't you ever talk to somebody like that when I'm standing here!

The boy suddenly became cooperative, saying that his brother and his uncle had done the damage. "We didn't mean to break anything, we were just playing wild," he said pointing to rocks they'd used to break things. One of the women who had been on the steps called the boy to come back upstairs. When the officer tried to continue talking to the boy, the woman came down shouting, "Who the fuck do you think you are? You can't do this!" The officer told her that if she kept it up he would arrest her. She retorted, "Yeah, and I'll be out in 24 hours you mother-fucker. I ain't got no record. I know the law. Go fuck yourself."

We began to leave with the boy to go to the uncle's address when the mother ran across the street with another older woman. Both women were screaming at the officers and telling the boy not to get in the car. A crowd of about 15 men and women had gathered. One of the men started coming across the street. One officer told him to stay where he was and the car left for the uncle's address. After locating the apartment it became clear that no one was home. On the way back there was an emergency call at the original address where the manager had reported being threatened. Moments later when the officers and the research arrived, the women and two men had gathered in the entrance yelling at the manager. The melee lasted for a few minutes and after things calmed down, the officers and researcher left.

Moments later there was a radio call to report to the watch commander. The senior officer said to his partner, "That's it. She filed a complaint!" The researcher asked if he could observe the interaction between the officers and the watch commander. The officers said, "Observe? You bet you'll observe. You're our witness!"

With gallows humor, the officer who was driving joked with his partner on the way back to the station, "Twenty years ago we'd have choked her out." What followed was a full reporting to the watch commander and about three hours of report writing for each officer, the watch commander (while the researcher observed). One of the captains stopped in to see what was going on, and said to the researcher, "It's lucky you saw this. We live with this day in and day out." A sergeant commented, "Just wait. If this goes to Internal Affairs it can take 60-70 hours of a single supervisor's time."

Late in the afternoon the officers and research were back on patrol and the senior officer commented:

> Twenty years ago we would have proned everyone out, but today I know it's relatively small crime. Wanna start "The Canoga riot of '99 over this?" Probably not. First and foremost I'm thinking about my partner's and your safety. Yes, in the back of my mind I'm thinking about the politics, but only after our own safety.

When the officers and research returned to the station at the end of the watch, the watch commander informed them that the woman had indeed called back, threatening to "take the case to internal affairs." She

was told that a third party had witnessed the events. She said she didn't

care, but she was not heard from again.

The 1.28 Complaint System and Fear of Punishment

As Table 17 shows, after the 1.28 complaint system was

implemented in 1998, officers' fear of being punished for making "an

honest mistake" rose 13 percentage points in 1998 and another six

percent in 1999-2000. The results are statistically significant (p<.001).

The factor loading scores are not as strong in 1998 and 1999-2000 as

might be expected because loadings were shared with other factors.

Table 17
Complaint System, Fear of Punishment and
Role of the Inspector General
(Factor 14)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)		
	1996-1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999-2000 (n=1,617)
I am afraid I will be punished for making an honest mistake	60% (-.79)	73% (-.24)	79% (-.33)
The 1.28 complaint system makes me more effective as a police officer		2% (.82)	5% (.84)
The 1.28 complaint system makes the Department more accountable to the public		16% (.77)	22% (.82)
The Inspector General (IG) position gives the Department's disciplinary system more integrity		24% (.61)	35% (.43)

At the same time only a tiny proportion of respondents (two

percent in 1998 and five percent in 1999-2000) agreed that the 1.28

system made them more" effective as police officers." A somewhat larger proportion (16 percent in 1998 and 22 percent in 1999-2000) agreed with the more abstract statement that 1.28 complaint system makes the "Department more accountable to the public." Both increases in agreement are statistically significant (p<.001).

Finally, a growing number of officers reported that the new Inspector General position (a position with broad powers that reports to the Los Angeles Police Commission) "gives the Department's disciplinary system more integrity" (up from 24 to 35 percent). The increase in agreement is significant (p<.001).

An analysis of variance revealed an interaction effect (p<.002) between assignment and year of survey (p<.002). In the first year the questions were asked, 1998, officers in operations support were most likely to hold these beliefs, followed by patrol and then area. By 1999-2000 the pattern had shifted with patrol being highest, followed by operations support and then area.

In 1997, the year before the 1.28 system was implemented, 1,114 complaints were filed against officers (about half were filed by citizens and the other half by LAPD employees against each other). By the end of 1998, the total had jumped nearly five-fold to 5,015 complaints with about 60 percent being filed by citizens. Each complaint must undergo a thorough investigation at the division level and then it is investigated further by Internal Affairs before being sent to the Chief for final review.

On average, complaints take from nine to 12 months to resolve. While captains have some discretion over which complaints to accept most officers believe that captains err on the side of accepting complaints, except for truly outlandish ones like a story of a woman who complained that officers had stolen her ovaries.

As noted earlier, the system is costly in terms of time required to investigate each of these complaints, not to mention time required for administrative processing and review. There are also substantial human costs because officers say their supervisors are held so strictly accountable under the new complaint process, that they no longer have any discretion. And, anyone can make a complaint no matter how frivolous. Many officers told us that gang members have discovered how to retaliate against officers who stop or arrest them by filing complaints. One officer added,

> It's a sad day when a third strike hard core criminal with a criminal record of 10-15 pages makes a complaint against an officer and the department believes the thug and not the officer. All officers are not Rafael Perez, the vast majority of us tell the truth and follow the rules. The department needs to revise the complaint system so a supervisor or even captain can determine if the complaint is even credible! They need to consider the source of the complaint.

> Another officer added:

> Aside from what happened at Rampart, the vast majority of cops still want to do their jobs, but everyone is scared. What if you screw up. It can cost you your job. I love my job, I look at a gangster or narco suspect and think twice about stopping them. Do I really want to lose my job? Most of the times no. I usually do my job by the book, but in police work it is not always safe to do it by the book.

While captains have some discretion over which complaints to accept, most officers believe that captains err on the side of accepting complaints, except for truly outlandish ones like a popular story of a woman who complained that officers had stolen her ovaries.

Interestingly, in the 1999-2000 survey, 88 percent of the officers surveyed agreed that complaints made against them are "frivolous and unnecessary." And, ninety percent of the officers believe that the 1.28 could negatively affect their careers.

One officer from 77th explained that there was a contradiction between FASTRAC and the new complaint system: He said, "FASTRAC leads to aggressive police work, but we aren't supported when a complaint is made by a robbery suspect. How do you explain that?"

But the most serious criticisms stem from the system's punitive orientation and the fact that complaints become permanent parts of officers' personnel files. At a feedback session with officers from 77th, one P-3 stood up and said:

> We're not looked at as a whole. Only our disciplinary system gets looked at, but not in the context of our entire work history. They say they don't consider unsustained complaints but that's horseshit. Inevitably they will start looking at the past history of unsustained complaints. Here's an example: A CRASH officer got a slew of non-resolved complaints from gang members. The bureau said "there's a pattern so, 7 days suspension." Our job is to put assholes in jail. Gang members are pieces of shit as far as I'm concerned. They don't belong in this city!

There was a round of applause and laughing. A female officer continued:

The other night some officers brought in a suspect who was uncooperative and they had to use force. And they were apologetic. Their overriding concern was how their action would be reviewed. The Department makes them feel like they shouldn't do their job. It's dangerous if officers start second-guessing. They shouldn't be apologetic for doing their job. If someone is a problem, I don't want them trying to find creative ways to get him down, just take them down. In doing police work, shit is going to happen. Sometimes you'll use force, or do a pursuit, or get in an accident. Some of that stuff happens. We should learn by critiquing and review, but it comes back to us personally.

But, many officers say the impact of the complaint system is to

demean them and reduce their morale. One officer said:

Don't give me a hero's funeral and say heroic things about me in death when in life you chastened me, criticized me, second-guessed me, stressed me out, over-scrutinized me and forgot that I am a human being, not just some 5-digit number!

One of the main criticisms of the complaint system is that

complaints are put in officers' files where they remain part of the

permanent record.

One officer from Central Division claimed:

Supervisors and above are too "scared" to handle complaint issues fairly. They seem to side with the complainant, therefore inhibiting officers from doing their jobs. Officers are too worried to do their jobs. Supervisors say it's not a big deal and that we will eventually be exonerated/cleared. However, we are still put through the undue stress of an investigation. The majority of officers do a very good job and would do a better job if they would be left alone to do it. Now officers are more afraid of the department and supervisors than armed criminals.

One officer from Central Division elaborated:

The new disciplinary system makes it very difficult to do your job because you can do everything right and still receive

a 1.28. It makes you very cautious about jumping into situations.

But what alarms officers most about the 1.28 is despite assurances from higher ups that unresolved complaints will not count against them, most officers believe they will. One officer said:

> I am now named on two 1.28 complaints. This is permanently on my record. Although I know these complaints will come back unfounded, they are still there. I have been told that unfounded complaints will not count against you. But when it comes down to a job I want I am equal in all areas with another applicant except he has no complaints. Who will get the job?

Problems stemming from the 1.28 were attributed directly (and personally) to Chief Parks and his demanding, and to some, uncaring, style of management. For his part, Parks saw advantages to the complaint system. He explained:

> The thing they (officers) don't understand is that when they are sued I get sued to. So I have an interest. They are afraid of not being protected by our lawyers because their reports aren't documented. Now they get it documented by the 1.28. The use of force reports in the 1970's got the same reaction: "It's a serious incident. Now I'm better off with this report." They're not used to it. If someone makes a complaint they'll see these documents as important. Now there's not a second thought on the use of force [report]. The issue is also that officers tell us "We're victimized by frivolous complaints." But how do you track these cases unless you investigate? The very thing you need is a tool. Instead they want an edict. We're looking for ways to refine it, but not at the expense of protecting the Department. We need well documented and retrievable reports. It's not enough to do it on a log, you give a person the ability to make things up without documentation. Now for the first time in history, we'll know what people complain about. We now have a system. The City Attorney used to tell us not to write anything down so that nothing could be used against us. There's a lot of history in this department. We know where our liabilities are.

Quality of Worklife

Teamwork, On-the-Job Initiative, and Job Satisfaction

Despite increased pressures for accountability and the threats of citizen

complaints and what many officers perceive as unfair discipline, most

areas continue to be regarded by officers as positive work environments.

Table 18
Positive Work Environment
(Factor 4)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)		
	1996–1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999–2000 (n=1,617)
There is little or no conflict between me and my peers at my Area/Division	56% (.70)	85% (.61)	85% (.71)
Everyone at my Area/Division treats me with dignity and respect	76% (.69)	76% (.65)	72% (.66)
My Area/Division provides an outstanding working environment	69% (.65)	60% (.49)	50% (.51)
I would recommend my Area/Division to friends as a good place to work	86% (.61)	74% (.46)	66% (.55)
I feel like I am part of a team	78% (.58)	75% (.53)	65% (.50)
If I have a conflict with my immediate supervisor there is an appropriate way to resolve it within my Area/Division	72% (.50)	76% (.35)	70 (.57)%

Table 18 shows that officers reported less conflict with peers in 2000 (85

percent) than they did in 1996-1997 (fifty-six percent). And, nearly

three-quarters (72 percent in the most recent survey) agreed that in their

areas they are treated "with dignity and respect". But, job satisfaction has declined substantially since 1997. In 2000, far fewer officers rated their areas as "outstanding places" to work (just 50 percent compared with 69 percent in 1996-1997) or feeling as much a part of a "team" (65 in 2000 compared with 78 percent in 1996-1997).

Qualitative data from interviews and ride-alongs help explain these patterns. The enjoyment many officers find in their work stems in part from the positive atmosphere of their areas. As the survey results indicate, most LAPD officers feel that a sense of belonging and teamwork is one of the most important parts of the job. In response to the open-ended question in 1996-1997 that asked, "What single aspect of your job gives you the most satisfaction?", more than 100 officers volunteered "teamwork."   One answered, "Working with a good partner who respects you." Another volunteered, "Being a part of the team that makes society a better place." Another officer wrote, "Working with an officer that knows what he is doing." Results from the 1999-2000 survey were substantially the same. One officer from Central Area explained what teamwork meant to him:

> Being able to influence and guide younger officers toward successful and productive careers. Within my sphere of influence I provide direction and positive leadership which enables officers to be productive and have a small amount of fun at work.

During an interview, a veteran officer at Southeast explained how personal recognition by command officers is an important way of reinforcing social bonds that foster teamwork. He said:

> The new captain stops you in the hall and talks to you, calls you by the name and greets you, even if he doesn't know you well. I like the dedication of our people. They work as a team.

Some officers compared working for the LAPD to being part of a family. One officer said, "It's like being part of a huge family, taking my place in the LAPD along my own family members."

While teamwork among officers is based partly in social relationships, it is also an occupational requirement because of the life and death nature of the job and the serious consequences of inadequate teamwork. A captain explained how the LAPD culture has been formed and maintained to produce such teamwork. He said:

> The department still has a cookie cutter approach to making officers. The bakers are using different sprinkles, but they are the same cookies. Most young officers do get immersed because the culture demands it. Peer pressure is strong. You spend a lot of time together, share a lingo, wear the same uniform, and depend on one another.

But at the same time, as Table 19 shows, an increasing number of officers complained about loss of discretion on-the-job because of feelings they were being closely watched and that they are so vulnerable to citizen complaints.

Table 19
Opportunity for Initiative On-the-Job
(Factor 6)

	1996-1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999-2000 (n=1,617)
I am encouraged to try out new ideas in my job	58% (.76)	56% (.76)	49% (.77)
I have ample opportunity to be creative in my work	67% (.72)	64% (.70)	54% (.73)
I often make suggestions for new approaches to doing things	61% (.69)	63% (.57)	62% (.64)
It is easy for me to suggest ways to improve my job	60% (.65)	59% (.71)	50% (.71)
My assignment permits me enough control over how to do my job	74% (.52)	65% (.55)	59% (.58)

In 1996-1997, nearly three-quarters of all officers (74 percent) agreed

with the statement, "My assignment permits me enough control over how

to do my job." But, by 1999-2000, the number had fallen to 59 percent.

Table 20
Job Satisfaction and Burnout
(Factor 7)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)		
	1996–1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999–2000 (n=1,617)
I find my job personally satisfying	81% (.66)	79% (.66)	76% (.66)
I am more satisfied with my job than I was a year ago	65% (.68)	53% (.63)	47% (.64)
I am burned out with my job	19% (−.77)	20% (−.72)	27% (−.73)
I would leave the department if I had the opportunity	42% (−.66)	46% (−.67)	57% (−.67)

There has been a similar, but less steep, erosion in reported job
satisfaction. Table 20 shows that in 1996-1997 eighty-one percent
agreed that they found their jobs "personally satisfying" compared with
only 76 percent in 2000. At the same time there has been a substantial
change in the percent of officers who report being "burned out with my
job" (from 19 percent to 27 percent). Most recently, 57 percent of all
officers said they would leave the Department if they had the
opportunity, compared with 42 percent in 1996-1997.

There is little doubt that many officers feel their discretion has been
curtailed, and their areas have slipped as "outstanding" places to work,

because of increased public demands for accountability and what most saw as a punitive Chief of Police. These stresses created enormous tensions in the organization that caused officer morale to suffer. And, as noted earlier, most officers singled out the Department's disciplinary system (and the "1.28") as the culprit.

In 1996-1997, when asked "What is the single biggest obstacle to doing your job?", there was a barrage of complaints about working conditions. Most criticisms centered on the lack of a compressed work schedule. It was initially an experiment begun by Chief Willie Williams. The experiment was terminated in 1998 by Interim Chief Bayan Lewis and Chief Bernard Parks. However, to win the Police Protective League's political support, Mayor James Hahn promised to reinstate a compressed work schedule if elected, which he did in 2001. Officers also criticized the lack of equipment, favoritism in discipline and promotions, affirmative action, and politicians meddling in police work. By the time the 1999-2000 survey was conducted, officers' criticisms had shifted to a nearly exclusive focus on unfair discipline, the new complaint system, and the Chief of Police.

An Accepting Work Environment

Officers were asked a number of questions to assess their perceptions about the inclusiveness or acceptance of social differences among sworn employees. Table 21 shows that in 1999-2000, ninety-five percent of the officers agreed that "Employees from many different backgrounds are

welcome in my Area/Division", while 91 percent agreed that there was a "good mix" of employees, meaning men and women of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds.

Table 21
Accepting Work Environment
(Factor 5)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)		
	1996–1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999–2000 (n=1,617)
There is a good mix of employees — men and women of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds — in my Area/Division	89% (.85)	90% (.83)	91% (.81)
Employees from many different backgrounds are welcome in my Area/Division	93% (.78)	95% (.82)	95% (.82)
People from my different backgrounds have the opportunity to be promoted in my Area/Division	84% (.78)	82% (.68)	83% (.73)

And, 83 percent agreed that employees from many different backgrounds have opportunities to be promoted. These figures have remained stable in each of the three surveys.

While one might expect these perceptions to be held chiefly among newer officers with fewer years of service, further analyses of variance showed this not to be the case. In fact officers with 7-10 years of service were most likely to agree that their areas were accepting places, while the newest officers (those in their first two years of service) were least likely

to agree -- probably because they are so busy simply learning how to do their jobs (p<.001).   Also noteworthy is the finding that African Americans were also most likely to agree that their areas had a good mix of employees who were welcome and had opportunities for promotion.

Many examples can be found in the qualitative data. For instance, in 1996-1997, of the nearly 1,000 officers who described obstacles to doing their jobs, most pointed to a range of problems--discipline, equipment, management, the media, paperwork, politics, work schedules, and workload. Only three officers identified racism. Of the 798 officers who described what they would change in their areas, again most identified equipment, facilities, management and work schedules. Only 10 officers singled out the need for increased diversity. Of the few who volunteered comments, one wrote, "I would like to get long time department employees to accept minority employees and teach them to see beyond skin color." One officer wrote, "We need to help people see we're all God's children." We found similar patterns in the surveys of 1998 and 1999-2000, with only a tiny number of officers writing comments about racism. What is striking about these responses is their tiny number, especially at a time that the Department has been rapidly diversifying in terms of ethnicity and gender of its employees.

This is not to say that women and people of color are immediately accepted as equals. As one female sergeant from Hollenbeck explained, "It takes a little while because the division was always known as "a guy's

division." Little by little, women are being accepted. As she sees it, "Either you're squared away and it's OK. If not you get picked on." While each of us heard racist and sexist comments, they tended to be impersonal, spoken as part of the normal banter between busy police officers.

Officers frequently tell racial jokes and sometimes try to edit their behavior in front of outsiders. At a roll call at Hollenbeck, the watch commander announced to a roomful of officers from a variety of ethnicities, that there would be three bilingual, Spanish positions opening up if anyone was interested. Someone from the back asked if extra money would be offered for Ebonics. Everyone laughed. As soon as the room quieted, a Caucasian male officer, asked, "Who's our guest?" The watch commander asked the researcher to introduce himself and to explain the study. For a moment the room became still. The officer said, "I just wanted to make sure before we made any comments." Later, as the researcher and officers waited for equipment, another officer walked up and said that officers usually don't clam up like that. He said jokes about race and gender are posted around the station and they are routinely told at roll call. He said, "We know these jokes are not cool, but it is not as bad as it seems."

On another occasion at West Valley on a hot July day, a group of Caucasian officers were sitting around a table in the back drinking cokes. An Asian-American female officer approached the group from the

parking lot on the way into the station when one of the men said, "Open those squinty eyes and you'll see better." For a moment the researcher worried about the comment until the female officer responded with assurance and humor, "God, when I do that all I see is white people. It's so bright here I think I'll go inside," and she continued inside.

In fact, we encountered relatively few conflicts over racism or sexism other than the types discussed above. In some areas that were reputed to be sexist – West Los Angeles and Hollenbeck for example - we actually found the opposite, Females were equally satisfied with their working conditions, if not more, than their male counterparts. One sergeant at West Los Angeles, an area with a public reputation for sexism, told us:

> This division has had a reputation of being sexist and racist, but there's no more of it here than anywhere else in the Department. Now the division is too PC, and there is a reverse tension but it's still a nice place to work.

> A female training officer explained:

> I've never seen sexual harassment. It's not like that. The majority of women don't have problems with male officers. I feel like, "don't whine to supervisors about that kind of stuff." We're adults. Deal with it one on one. The media makes it worse. Don't print what's not happening. It creates more problems. Now you have to be careful about what you say around people you don't know well. You have to be thick-skinned.

Community Policing and the Department's Relationship to Citizens

The tables that follow show four different dimensions of how officers view community policing – community policing as a concept, its

benefits, a traditional view of community policing, and progress being made with its implementation. Table 22 reveals that the vast majority of officers understand and endorse some of the key principles of community policing. And as both the factor loading scores, and percent of agreement show, their support for the concept has been stable (if not strengthened) over the course of the surveys. Ninety-three percent of the officers agreed that "community policing means partnering with the community," while an initial 89 percent that grew to 93 percent in 2000 agreed that community policing "means taking responsibility for a specific division/area." An even higher percent agreed that community policing "means understanding the community's priorities and concerns. Finally, a growing percent (74 percent in 1996-1997 and 82 percent in 2000) agreed that community policing "involves everyone on my watch."

Table 22
Community Policing in Concept
(Factor 15)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)		
	1996-1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999-2000 (n=1,617)
Community policing means partnering with the community	93% (.79)	93% (.84)	93% (.85)
Community policing means taking responsibility for a specific division/area	89% (.68)	91% (.85)	93% (.87)
Community policing means understanding the community's priorities and concerns	96% (.77)	93% (.82)	94% (.86)
Community policing involves everyone on my watch	74% (.48)	79% (.71)	82% (.65)

When we performed an analysis of variance on this factor with background variables, the results indicated a significant relationship with rank. Rank-and-file officers are more likely to hold these beliefs than supervisors ($p<.003$). And, those with lower levels of education tend to hold these beliefs more strongly than do those with higher education ($p<.005$).

Factor 16 shown in the following table, "Benefits of Community Policing", has six dimensions of benefits that officers say they believe accrue to community policing. In the year 2000, two-thirds agreed that community policing is "an effective means of providing police service while more than 70 percent said it is an "improvement in the way we do

police work." Agreement on both variables has increased significantly

(p<.001) since 1996-1997. Over half of all officers agreed that

community policing "will reduce the potential for physical conflict" and

two thirds said it is a "philosophy that the Department should continue

to pursue." Factor loading scores remain strong in the last two variables

that tap the actual benefits officers have experienced ("Community

policing has positively affected the way I approach my job," and

"Community policing has improved the quality of life on my watch")

though percent agreement is relatively low.

Table 23
Benefits of Community Policing
(Factor 16)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)		
	1996-1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999-2000 (n=1,617)
Community policing is an effective means of providing police service	61% (.69)	64% (.74)	66% (.71)
Community policing is an improvement in the way we do police work	64% (.66)	66% (.64)	71% (.55)
Community policing will reduce the potential for physical conflict between the police and residents	55% (.66)	52% (.67)	56% (.50)
Community policing is a philosophy that the Department should continue to pursue	65% (.66)	67% (.70)	67% (.67)
Community policing has positively affected the way I approach my job	43% (.68)	42% (.69)	42% (.74)
Community policing has improved the quality of life in my watch	27% (.65)	28% (.67)	30% (.73)

Analysis of variance showed that "length of service" was significantly associated with Factor 16 (p<.001). Officers with 16-20 years of service were most likely to hold this view while after 20 years the relationship weakens.

Data gathered from ride-alongs and interviews lend evidence that support the survey findings about community policing. One lieutenant from 77th Street told us that community policing means "getting more

involved with the community—responding to radio calls and after responding, going back and letting the person know you care, and knowing the community". He said he often called on small business owners to let them know that he was available to help. We asked if training officers emphasize this way of working with the community.   He replied, "No, not at all. I've had eight to ten training officers assigned, but only about half followed through on community policing while the others were traditional."

Another example shows how some officers interpret community policing. One day of a ride-along out of 77th, a woman flagged the car down. The officer on the right side stuck out his head to listen. The woman said that she wanted to report a burglary. After taking a report the officer said, "The old-timers are a source of information for us here. It's real community policing. They protect this strip from the crack addicts."

But for many officers, there are contradictions in community policing that remain unresolved. One officer explained:

> People have wild misconceptions of what we can and can't do. Community policing is a double-edged sword because if you're proactive and make a lot of arrests!it makes a part of the community upset. Community policing doesn't mean <u>don't</u> make a lot of arrests. The vocal element in the community is the problem...because they are part of the criminal element. It's the silent!majority we need to reach—the people who stay inside because they fear for their life...We could get rid of all the crime if the citizens got together.'

But, not all officers hold these views. Table 24 shows three variables that comprise a more traditional view of community policing. In 2000, most agreed that it was a community relations program (78 percent), and more than half thought it was "soft on crime." On the other hand, only 11 percent of the officers felt that community policing did not apply to them.   Agreement and factor loading scores have remained rather stable over the years the survey has been administered.

Table 24
Traditional View of Community Policing
(Factor 17)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)		
	1996–1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999–2000 (n=1,617)
Community Policing is basically a community relations program	77% (.72)	82% (.65)	78% (.66)
Community Policing is soft on crime	44% (.67)	47% (.68)	41% (.76)
Community Policing does not apply to me	10% (.46)	11% (.48)	11% (.52)

The analysis of variance showed supervisors were significantly more likely to hold these views than non-supervisors (p<.007), and that African Americans were more likely to hold this view than were Caucasians, Hispanics and Asian Americans in that order (p<.003). Also, those with higher levels of education were more likely to subscribe to these beliefs than were those with less education (p<.01).

The qualitative data help shed light on the meaning of these results. One stocky young officer with a crew cut wearing a T-shirt picturing a skeleton in a cowboy hat captioned, "HIRED GUNS" spoke candidly to this traditional view. He said:

> Guys don't care for it, particularly the older guys. They're more comfortable with traditional policing. Maybe they don't understand it so they say, "Why bother", or "We're becoming soft, kinder, gentler." They think you have to be tough on crime to protect the people otherwise criminals are going to get away with everything. You know the rap song "It's a criminal's paradise?" Well, that's the worry.

A middle-age management analyst assigned to a detective unit explained in 1996-1997, that because community policing was seen as a "program" done by the senior lead officers (SLOs) most officers simply didn't know what it was:

> SLOs are the only ones doing it. People joke about community policing. It's like public relations because they know thy have to look good. It was just shoved down our throats. It was never explained.

In some cases, community policing simply had not touched how some officers do their work, even supervisors. When asked about community policing, one sergeant at Central Division wondered aloud:

> What is it? What is it? That question keeps floating through my mind. It's nothing new. Just treating people with respect. They just changed the title but that doesn't change my job at all.

A female P-2 explained that many of her colleagues didn't think community had much to do with their jobs and that it would have to be sold one-by-one to the officers.

Most of the guys shun community based policing. But most of them don't understand it either. They'll come around once they realize how community based policing helps them do their job. I have turned some hard core guys around. The sergeants are the most difficult to get involved because they rotate after one year and they have a "short timer's attitude".

An officer at Hollenbeck told us that community policing isn't widely accepted because it's seen as a fad and amounts to little more than an officer's attitude in interacting with residents. He sees no change at the service level. He added:

Leaders come out and push it but when officers get on the beat, if they don't buy it, they go back to doing what they did before. We are still inundated with radio calls, overburdened, with no time or resources to spend talking to community people.

A young female P-3 echoed the same sentiments as she explained:

It's the same as in the past, talking to citizens, making sure we are doing what they want us to do. At Hollenbeck, we do a good job of policing. The experts just gave a name to it.

An African-American officer at Rampart said that he likes community policing, but that it puts officers in jeopardy because they lose control of the streets. He said:

They are likely to get confronted and even verbally attacked by citizens. You have to be on your toes because community policing has made the community more demanding. Sometimes, before officers can get a word out, they are verbally attacked.

Progress with Community Policing

Despite the lack of a commonly-accepted definition of community policing, and a widespread feeling that community policing is, in part, a public relations ploy, a growing proportion of officers (nearly two thirds

100

in 2000) reported that their role is clear (the trend is significant, p<.001).

Also, two thirds of all officers said that their colleagues are "on board,

and nearly two thirds reported being able to define community policing

as it is being applied. Agreement on both variables has increased

significantly since 1996-1997 (p<.001). However, less than half (45

percent) say that it is being implemented consistently across the

Department.

Table 25
Progress with Community Policing
(Factor 18)

Item	Percent Agreement (Factor Loadings)		
	1996-1997 (n=1,131)	1998 (n=1,691)	1999-2000 (n=1,617)
My role in Community Policing is clear	58% (.68)	61% (.71)	63% (.74)
The majority of employees at my Division are "on-board" with respect to Community Policing	55% (.65)	60% (.72)	66% (.66)
I can clearly define Community Policing as it is being applied in Los Angeles	58% (.59)	61% (.68)	63% (.70)
Community Policing is being applied consistently across the Department	47% (.58)	43% (.52)	45% (.45)

The analysis of variance indicated a gender effect, with male

officers holding this view more strongly than female officers (p<.001).

An Hispanic sergeant explained his viewpoint:

Of course we can define community policing. We do it
everyday, solving problems. Community policing means
knowing what residents want and knowing the needs of the
community from listening to the community. It's just a new
"Buzz Word". The LAPD has always been in the forefront of
community policing and we have always been a leader.
Commitment to Action [the strategic plan developed under
Willie Williams] was just another spin on things the
Department has been doing for years.

Yet, some of the captains acknowledge that the implementation of

community policing had fallen short of their expectations. One captain

said he would like to know from the research whether the officers in his

command believe management is serious about community policing. He

said he worried that officers still feel that community policing is seen as

just another reform, another "flavor of the day". He added, that if

community policing is going to take root,

We have to give it away to everyone in the station, including
detectives. It has to become more than "an occasional wave
and billboard approach." Officers must feel that community
policing is their own.

Interestingly, some of the initiatives taken by captains under

Williams flourished for a time. For instance in 1996, the commanding

officer at the Hollywood Division encouraged her officers to work with

business owners and citizens who were worried about the increasing

incidence of burglaries. The captain said, "Two officers volunteered to

work on it for a month, and with the help of residents, they figured out it

was the 'hypes' where were committing the burglaries." She explained

how they beefed up patrol, got help from the city attorney's office and

began making a large number of arrests. By 1998, Hollywood was

making more arrests than nearly any other division. Robberies declined

by 31 percent and burglaries by 17 percent. And, when officers' job

satisfaction ratings began to plunge in other divisions, Hollywood's rose.

Eighty three percent said they felt they were part of a team. More than

two thirds said they were encouraged to try new ideas and 91 percent

rated their captains as good leaders. But when Parks removed the senior

lead officers, she said, "The impact was devastating. It was a real blow to

community policing."

VI. Summary of Findings

We have framed the findings with a concept called "force field" analysis" that was developed by MIT's Kurt Lewin many years ago (Lewin, 1951). It is a particularly useful way to use these findings to help new LAPD leadership craft a new strategy to improve the organization's performance, Lewin observed how in organizations that were undergoing changes, "driving" forces insured a certain level of performance. He also saw how other "restraining" forces opposed the driving forces preventing further progress. Lewin conceptualized where these forces met as the "force field". When the force of both driving and restraining forces equaled one another, performance stalled and no higher levels could be achieved. Lewin also observed that by simply adding more driving forces could also create greater resistance that would produce more organizational stress. He reasoned that a more productive strategy was to identify and reduce or eliminate key restraining forces. Later, new driving forces could be added.

The "force field" concept illustrates how the LAPD has been under relentless stress from conflict between driving and restraining forces. The stern and inflexible leadership of Bernard Parks produced immense resistance throughout the organization in the form of restraining forces that emerged as a natural product of his demands. Let us explain with an illustration. Figure 2 below shows how findings from the study can

be grouped into "driving" and "restraining" forces that have caused

organizational performance to become deadlocked.

Figure 2
Force Field

Driving Forces

Among the most important driving forces are officers' values and

their dedication to safeguarding the public. Also, the teamwork they

enjoy with one another, and the quality of their work life (though it has

eroded in recent years) help drive the Department's performance upward.

Also, officers' unwavering support for the principles of community

policing can be considered an important driving force. These forces represent assets that can be harnessed to improve the Department's capacity to reduce crime, raise employee morale, and institutionalize community policing.

Police Officers' Altruism and Mission

Since the beginning of this study, members of the research team have been struck by the altruistic values expressed by most Los Angeles Police officers. During ride-alongs and interviews it became clear that most LAPD officers are loyal and dedicated employees. Many officers also say they were attracted to the LAPD because of its image as a disciplined, aggressive, and confident organization.

Results from each of the three surveys bear out these initial impressions as the overwhelming majority of officers – more than 90 percent – say they are in police work to make the community safer and to help people by fighting crime.

These survey findings are consistent with observations we made of officers' actual behavior during hundreds of hours of observations and ride-alongs throughout the City. Interestingly, many officers (two-thirds or more) also subscribe to the belief that proactive police work (arresting people and putting criminals in jail) is a viable means to their more altruistic ends. Until recently, officers also tend to view police work as a good career – one that pays relatively well and provides opportunities. Fewer are inclined today to think of police work today as a secure job

than in the past, because so many have left the Department since 1998 – some involuntarily because of disciplinary action and others by their own choice.

Quality of Worklife - Teamwork and Job Satisfaction

Despite stresses and strains within the Department, the quality of work life reported by officers at their areas continues to be a strong driving force even though it has declined in the last five years. When we began these surveys in 1996, eighty-three percent of the officers gave high marks to their captains' leadership. And relationships between officers and their immediate supervisors – lieutenants and sergeants – remained favorable and stable across all three surveys. The vast majority of officers (93 percent) reported that they enjoy positive working relationships with their supervisors. Most officers reported high levels of teamwork with partners (81 percent) and supervisors (66 percent).

Most also reported they feel they are treated with dignity and respect (72 percent) in their areas – a critical ingredient of a positive work environment. Also, in 1996-1997, nearly two-thirds said their divisions were outstanding places to work and that they felt they were part of a team (as reported earlier, these figures have slipped substantially in the last five years).

Inclusiveness

A strong sense of inclusiveness represents another driving force. What is truly noteworthy, is that most LAPD officers described their areas as

inclusive places to work where people from many different backgrounds are welcome (95 percent). Most agreed (91 percent) that their areas have a good mix of employees, referring to men and women of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds.

Despite a public perception of the LAPD being racist and sexist, we found very little evidence to support it. It is important to note that today's Department is almost the reverse of the LAPD of the late 1960s. Then 85 percent of its officers were white males. Today, more than 18 percent are women, and more than half (53 percent) are non white males. While a substantial number of officers reported that diversifying the Department had produced a lower quality workforce, it does not seem to be a "hot button" item for most. Rather, there appears to be an acceptance of the fact that steps to bring more women and officers of color into the Department are sure to continue.

Support for Community Policing

Another potentially important driving force is the readiness of LAPD officers to embrace the principles of community policing. Data from this study indicate that most officers are ready to do so. The overwhelming majority (more than 90 percent) appeared to understand and agree with the concept – that it means partnering with the community and understanding citizens' priorities and concerns, and taking responsibility for a specific territory. And from half to two-thirds agreed that community policing offers distinct benefits – effective police

service and reducing the potential for violence. More than two thirds
agreed that community policing is an improvement over current methods
and that the Department should continue to pursue it.

At the same time, some cynicism is evident in the data that no
doubt tempers its positive force. More than three-quarters of all officers
regard community policing as a "community relations program." And, a
sizeable minority thinks it is "soft on crime," though few agree that it
does not apply to them. But, what can also be seen in the data is that
officer support for the concept has been high since 1996. It is also clear
that, despite some confusion over what "community policing" really
means and the public battle over deploying senior lead officers as
community policing specialists, support remains strong. Since 1996-
1997, the percent of officers who said that the majority of officers in their
divisions supported community policing increased 11 percentage points.
There were also significant increases in officers' clarity about community
policing and the way it is being applied in Los Angeles.

These are the driving forces that play a large role in keeping the
LAPD operating at the level of performance that it does: Officers'
altruistic values that include helping people and making the community
a safer place, positive ratings of the quality of work life, high levels of
teamwork, a sense of personal inclusiveness with other employees, and
consistent support for the principles of community policing, each serve to
drive the organization toward higher levels of performance.

Restraining Forces

But just as the driving forces serve to boost performance, five key restraining forces work in opposition, restricting the LAPD's performance. First is a perception of among most officers that they are losing support from politicians, the media, and the larger community. Second, they also report that command officers are failing to provide necessary leadership and support. Third is the dampening effect of the complaint system (the "1.28") and a perception of the disciplinary system as unfair. Fourth is the growing number of officers who fear being punished for making an honest mistake. Finally is the recognition among a growing number of officers that they have lost decision-making power and that the quality of their work life has eroded. Let us examine these forces in more detail.

Feelings of Abandonment

Most officers report that while they want support from politicians, the media, and members of the community, it is weak and is declining. These perceptions are shaped by external events (e.g. the Rodney King beating, the O.J. Simpson trial that cast the Department in a poor light, the Margaret Mitchell shooting in which an unarmed, mentally deranged woman was shot by police, and the more recent Rampart scandal) has each contributed to officers feeling abandoned. Officers complain bitterly how radio, TV and the newspapers sensationalize and distort high profile cases and how elected officials are overly concerned with being "politically correct" to protect their own careers. They also complain

about the unwillingness of the district attorney to prosecute and a judiciary that fails to keep criminals off the street. The media gets lowest marks of all except for a brief moment in 1997 when officers' ratings went up when the media lavished praise on the Department for heroism in the North Hollywood shootout.

The 1998 survey showed how these external pressures affected the Department. By early 1998, Parks had launched a blizzard of new initiatives and administrative orders. Among them was a Department-wide reorganization that gave him more direct control over the areas. He removed the rank of Assistant Chief and elevated responsibility for patrol from Captains I to the already over-burdened Area Captains. He also introduced FASTRAC that was modeled on New York's computerized crime tracking system, and the 1.28 complaint system that was immediately opposed by the rank-and-file. The overall effect of these new initiatives was to centralize greater power in the office of the Chief of Police.

Leadership

A year into his first term, Bernard Parks received extremely low ratings on both integrity and leadership. Though he was unperturbed by the results it was a harbinger of things to come. As the impact of his orders rippled down through the ranks, the organization stiffened in resisting the changes.

Though Parks claimed that captains had a great deal of autonomy, most officers believed that by demanding so much time and attention from the captains, the Chief had undermined their authority. One officer observed, "We had a great captain. But there was a perception that he had to go to the Chief for everything. It's like asking your mother if you can go out and play." Officers reported that most of the contact they had with their captains had become focused on matters of discipline.

The survey data bear this out. Relationships between officers and captains have seriously eroded since the first survey was conducted in 1996-1997. Then officers' ratings of their captains' leadership stood at 83 percent agreement. But by 1999-2000 the ratings had fallen 25 percentage points.

Relationships between officers and their immediate supervisors – lieutenants and sergeants – have remained favorable and stable across all three surveys. The vast majority of officers (93 percent) report that they enjoy positive working relationships with their supervisors. But the increased workload imposed by Parks, and the fact that supervisors' discretion in handling complaints had been removed by the new complaint system began to erode these productive working relationships. Fewer and fewer officers (54 percent) said in the latest survey they could depend on their supervisors to support them when they make an honest mistake – down from two-thirds in 1996-1997).

**Discipline and the 1.28 Complaint System**

A second force that has greatly restrained the organization from achieving higher levels of performance is officers' fear of unfair or capricious discipline. The introduction of the 1.28 complaint system in early 1998 only added to officers' lack of confidence in fair treatment.

Bernard Parks made it clear that one of his highest priorities was improving officer accountability and by disciplining those who committed misconduct. It is little wonder that his administration met with such resistance. Most officers regarded Parks, who had been with the Department for 35 years, as a harsh disciplinarian. Unlike Willie Williams, who as an outsider had little knowledge of the Department's inner workings, Parks came up through the ranks and knew the Department in minute detail. One of his first initiatives was to implement a new complaint system that was recommended by the Christopher Commission in 1991 but was never implemented. The system requires a thorough investigation of every complaint lodged against officers. It removes much of the independent judgement once used by supervisors and captains to make decisions on the disposition of complaints at a lower level. According to Parks, the 1.28 would document allegations made against police officers (those that were judged to be without foundation would be dismissed and those that were sustained would lead to discipline). Parks was convinced that officers would embrace the

system once they saw how the detailed documentation could actually protect them in cases that went to court.

But the 1.28 is hated by most officers. In 1999-2000, a scant five percent agreed that it makes them more effective as police officers. In every feedback session whenever statistics showing lack of support for the 1.28 were projected onto a screen, hundreds of officers would rise to their feet whistling and cheering. The lack of acceptance of the 1.28 also spilled over to officers' negative perceptions of the Chief and top management. Officers were vocal, criticizing Parks for an uncaring attitude toward the rank-and-file and that ruling with an "iron fist".

The vast majority of officers agreed that the 1.28 system is inherently unfair. They believe that it gives undue power to citizens who can make unfounded complaints without penalty. Officers also complain that citizens' credibility is not checked as part of the process. Most officers were convinced that unfounded complaints cannot be stopped once they are in the system and that unresolved complaints will damage their careers.

Most officers hold this view and they are certain that nothing will change until the 1.28 is redesigned (a process that has just begun). The complaint system is also perceived as arbitrary--a fact that only intensifies officers' mistrust in a system of discipline that was regarded warily even before the 1.28 system was introduced. There is also an

apparent lack of understanding about the grounds for a 1.28 being sustained.

It is financially costly as well. Moreover, because of the human resources required to investigate complaints (at least 54 sergeants at the divisional level and more than 100 officers in Internal Affairs are assigned to complaint detail) fewer officers are available for police work.

What is striking in the survey findings and the qualitative data is how little legitimacy the Department's overall disciplinary system has among rank-and-file officers. In the latest survey, only 15 percent of officers agreed that the Department's disciplinary system is "applied equally/fairly to all employees." Though the Inspector General position is regarded skeptically by many officers, support for it grew in the 1999-2000 survey probably because of the Inspector General's potential to protect officers against unfair discipline.

Fear of Punishment

The cumulative impact of officers feeling a lack of support from citizens, politicians and the media, a lack of leadership from the Chief to their captains, and an unfair disciplinary system all but paralyze the Department in making needed changes. Nowhere can this be seen more clearly that in the high percentage of officers who say they fear being punished for making an honest mistake. In 1996-1997, sixty percent agreed that they feared being punished, but the figure grew alarmingly to 79 percent in the most recent survey -- since Bernard Parks became

Chief and the 1.28 was implemented. Most officers say that the 1.28 discourages pro-active policing because officers mistrust the system and fear the consequences. Many officers spoke of the dangers of officers "second-guessing" what might happen to them if they took aggressive action when it was needed. Many said the over riding concern was how their actions would be reviewed. Clearly, the impact was to undercut the potential value in Park's investment in FASTRAC. One sergeant commented on the conflict, "Here we have FASTRAC to help us focus resources on crime, but the 1.28 causes us to avoid encounters that might result in a complaint."

Eroding Morale and Job Satisfaction

In 1996-1997, high levels of officer morale and job satisfaction served as a driving force. But by 1998, under the pressures of waning external support and internal leadership, coupled with fears of unfair punishment, what were once driving forces began to constrain the Department's ability to change.

For instance, job satisfaction, which in 1996-1997 was high, has since declined. In the latest survey, fewer officers rated their divisions as outstanding places to work (50 percent) compared with 69 percent in 1996-1997. Those who reported feeling part of a team declined from 78 percent to 65 percent in the same period of time. Officers feel their initiative on-the-job has been reduced. For instance, in 1996-1997, nearly three quarters of all officers agreed that they had "enough control

over how to do my job" but in 1999-2000 less than 60 percent agreed. A

growing percent of officers reported being burned out with their jobs (up

from 19 percent in 1996-1997 to 27 percent in the latest survey). And,

an alarming proportion of officers reported they would leave the

Department if they had the chance (57 percent).

We now turn to our conclusions based on seven years of research. It

shows how these external pressures combine with a resistant culture to

create immense organizational stress. The conclusions lead to steps the

Los Angeles Police Commission and the new Chief can take to relieve

some of the key restraints and build on opportunities represented by the

driving forces.

VII. Conclusions

## 1. *The LAPD as an open system*

Data we have collected in the course of this study leave little doubt that the Los Angeles Police Department is an organization under enormous stress. A series of events following the Rodney King beating and the subsequent report of the Christopher Commission only intensified public demands for greater accountability and reform. The Margaret Mitchell shooting of 1998, the Rampart scandal, and more recently, the federal government's demand for reform through a new consent decree, have each underscored the difficulty in altering the course of this significant public institution.

Though many think of the LAPD as being autonomous, it is not. It is much more of an "open system" than one might realize. The LAPD exists in a constant exchange with its environment and it depends on many other agencies for resources and policies necessary to provide police services. Describing the LAPD as part of an open system helps debunk the popular idea that it is independent. More important - it helps illustrate the paths of cause and effect – revealing for policy makers how changes in the environment affect the Department's internal operations, and how in turn, its decisions affect the environment.

Considering the LAPD as part of an open system also reminds us that it is a dynamic system that is always undergoing change.

Let us use a simplified example to illustrate the point. Figure 3 below shows how a cycle of activity begins with some kind of stress in the larger environment – an increase in homicides that creates fear among citizens for example. The LAPD receives this information as feedback from the larger environment. It may come from any number of places -- Community Police Advisory Boards, City Council Members, the Police Commission, the media or a number of other sources to which the Department is attuned. The feedback signals to the Department that the rise in homicides is important to a significant segment of citizens. It may come from the environment and enter the Department directly when it may influence internal processes, or it may become a new input -- an increase in the budget with directives as to how it is to be spent.

Figure 3

The Los Angeles Police Department as Part of an Open System

The LAPD leadership decides how to use these resources to fight

rising homicides and the output (initiatives to reduce homicides) enters

the environment. This new output is evaluated by constituents who

reflect their pleasure or displeasure through policy leaders and the media. In some cases feedback comes directly from the environment to the LAPD where it may alter its processes. For instance Community Police Advisory Boards may complain (or praise) their area captains to LAPD officials or the media.

LAPD officials can choose whether or not to act on this feedback. The same feedback about the Department's initiatives to fight homicide may also enter the Department as new inputs. For instance, members of the City Council may provide or withhold resources to reduce homicides setting off another round of action and reaction, and the cycle goes on (See Easton, 1967 and Scott, 1998 for an extended discussion of open systems.)

At the heart of this system is a continuing struggle among a wide variety of stakeholders over budgetary and policy control. Authority for budgetary and Department policy is widely dispersed among a wide variety of actors – the Mayor, 15 City Council members, and members of the Police Commission. In addition, special interest groups like the Police Protective League, the American Civil Liberties Union, and lawyers who specialize in representing clients with lawsuits against LAPD, each influence policies that affect the Department. And, each actor and interest group naturally tries to manipulate the media to promote its viewpoint to influence decision-makers.

As pressures to make the Department more accountable have mounted, politics have reached into decisions formerly reserved for the Chief, who until Willie Williams, was insulated by Civil Service. In 1991, Los Angeles voters passed Proposition F that stripped the Chief of this protection, making the office directly accountable to the Police Commission whose members serve at the pleasure of the Mayor. Predictably, some decisions usually reserved for management are now being made in the public arena. For instance, in late 2000, Mayor Richard Riordan demanded that the 168 senior lead officers be restored to their community policing duties, despite the fact that Chief Parks was bitterly opposed. More recently the Police Protective League extracted a campaign promise from James Hahn to implement a compressed work schedule over the Chief's objections.

Complicating matters further, a powerful Department culture that has developed over the past half century has produced a set of beliefs and values that restrain change. Most officers have a strong sense of duty to the community and the desire to be regarded and valued as professionals. But they also resist external political pressures on the Department out of the conviction that politics and policing do not mix.

2. The Use of Control to Manage

As the environment has become more turbulent, it has become extremely difficult for any single executive to manage this large bureaucracy alone. Most recently, Bernard Parks believed that he could

manage the Department largely through the use of control or coercive authority exercised through the chain of command and through discipline. (By "coercive authority" we mean a type of authority that can be imposed on people against their wills by the threat of punishment. For this discussion we use "control" and "coercive authority" interchangeably. See Peter Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life, 1964, for a complete discussion.) Employees are commanded to do things that if they refuse they can lose their jobs. Outside the Department, officers command citizens to do things that if they refuse they can lose their rights or their lives. But as we have seen, using control to manage a department that must interact with the outside world (except for keeping civil order) has serious drawbacks.

Managing police agencies through coercive authority or control has a long history in American policing. Kelling and Bratton (1993) describe how it was a conscious strategy used by reform-minded police chiefs since the middle of the last century to rid big city departments like New York, Chicago and Los Angeles of political intrusion and corruption.

The use of control was deeply embedded in the Los Angeles Police Department's culture a half century ago in 1950 when William Parker became Chief. Parker centralized power to establish order and he took stringent measures to rid the Department of the corruption for which it had become notorious. Parker was also a disciplinarian who blocked

promotions for officers who displayed conduct "hinting of dishonesty" (Cannon, 1997).

Parker also knew that he could never get the number of officers needed to police the entire area of Los Angeles. The City Council had rejected his requests for more officers and instead provided more cars and a helicopter. Out of the conditions that confronted the LAPD – a huge geographic area to patrol with a limited number of officers who relied on cars and aircraft, and a powerful chief's demand for professionalism – "efficiency" emerged as a guiding measure of police work. And, Parker was firm in his conviction that the LAPD had to be run in a military style. He believed that police were the "living, physical symbol of authority", warriors who battled to save an indifferent world." (Cannon, 1997, p. 72).

The use of coercive authority or control is trained into LAPD officers because citizens want police officers to know how to use reasonable force to maintain civic order. Its use is reinforced daily on-the-job and it pervades the Department. Top-down management control is the norm for the organization. Except for a brief and unsuccessful moment in time, when Willie Williams was Chief, every chief in recent memory has managed the Department with varying degrees of coercive authority. Orders are given from above and carried out below, and meetings are generally run by authority of rank. Willie Williams

explained how he tried to establish a more horizontal relationship with his top managers without success:

> I'd open staff meetings with "Well, what do you think about…." I'd try to get the deputy chiefs and commanders to express their views, but no one would say anything until they knew where I stood (Williams, 1995).

Control is also exercised through the Department's disciplinary system. Chiefs guard the prerogative for exclusive control over discipline aggressively. For instance, recent attempts by the Los Angeles Police Commission to step up civilian oversight, and the Police Protective League's support for legislation that would send disciplinary cases to binding arbitration, were vigorously opposed by Chief Parks.

But as this study shows, relying exclusively on control to manage employees reduces their opportunities to exercise initiative and to participate in decision making. Worse, it can turn employees against their managers. It is easy to see that when Bernard Parks imposed this kind of authority on the Department, it produced restraining forces (antagonism toward the Chief of Police and management, fear of being punished, loss of on-the-job initiative, and low moral). The effect was to make it even more difficult to make the Department responsive to the citizens it serves.

3. How Control Shapes Interaction with Citizens

Because control is so deeply embedded in police behavior, officers instinctively interact with citizens in a manner that may seem imperious

or dictatorial. The effect is to fuel stereotypes on both sides and missing the opportunity to establish mutual understanding and trust.

Parker's ideas became embedded in the daily routines of police work. Efficiency became the yardstick and officers were judged on their volume of arrests and response time. A popular television program portrayed the model LAPD officer Joe Friday as an unsentimental professional who was only interested in "the facts" and rarely tried to understand or sympathize with the citizens he encountered. (Some officers still view Joe Friday as their model.)

This impersonal and uncompromising "professional" attitude resulted in many arrests for even minor infractions, the frequent use of physical force, and few cooperative relationships between police and citizens.

Evaluating officers on arrests and response time assured that many arrests would be for minor infractions, physical force would be used frequently, and few productive relationships would be formed between the police and the community. It also insured that little would be done about preventing crime and that citizens would become increasingly alienated from, and skeptical of, the police. Such aggressive police work produced beliefs that supported it (see Jermier and Berkes, 1979 for an extended discussion of the problem). In time, these beliefs became the underpinnings of a "new" LAPD culture, which is still visible today. The Christopher Commission noted:

LAPD officers are trained to command and to confront, not to communicate. Regardless of their training, officers who are expected to produce high citation and arrest statistics and low response times do not also have time to explain their actions, to apologize when they make a mistake, or even to ask about problems in a neighborhood (Independent Panel, 1991).

Los Angeles' changing racial composition only exacerbated problems that stemmed from an aggressive style of policing. Between 1940 and 1950 the city's African American population doubled, and it doubled again by 1960. By 1990, in the county of Los Angeles "minorities" had become a "majority." Since then, the Hispanic population has grown 23.6 percent and now stands at 4.1 million, while the Asian population, smaller at 1.2 million, has also grown 26.1 percent in the same period of time (Los Angeles Times, August 30, 2000). When one considers the long history of violent encounters between police and citizens, especially those with racial overtones (e.g. the 1951 "Bloody Christmas" when Mexican Americans were beaten by police, the 1979 Eula Love shooting, the 1991 Rodney King beating, the 1999 Margaret Mitchell shooting and the Rampart scandal), it is easy to see how mistrust and tension between the police and the community have developed.

The effect has been for the Department to try to behave more as a "closed" than an "open" system. This is not to debate whether the LAPD is more closed than open, but rather to show how historic and pervasive forces bring the Department into conflict with its environment. And, once conflict breaks out between the Department and external agencies

like the Mayor, City Council, or special interests like the American Civil Liberties Union or community groups, these differences quickly lead to polarization and more conflict. The natural behavior for the Department, like any other organism that is threatened, is to turn inward and close off communication. Finding ways to keep the Department open to its environment will be a key challenge for a new Chief of Police.

4. The Search for Leadership

Our research makes clear that the vast majority of LAPD officers have chosen police work for altruistic reasons and they support the principles of community policing. They, like the citizens of Los Angeles, are waiting for new leadership.

This finding is especially salient at a time when LAPD officers have come under intense public scrutiny. We are struck by finding such a widespread altruistic value orientation held by the vast majority of LAPD officers. When asked about their own values, most reflect the Department motto, "To Protect and Serve". Findings from each of the three surveys and observations from hundreds of ride-alongs and interviews make it clear that most officers take their greatest pleasure from helping people and serving communities by fighting crime. And, according to the most recent survey, the overwhelming majority of officers would report serious misconduct of fellow officers, and that when apprehending criminals Department policy needs to be followed.

Despite a massive build-up in hiring (5,000 new officers over seven years) and federal court orders that mandated racial and gender goals, these changes in the Department are supported by most officers. Our results indicate that, while some officers complain about hiring and promotional preferences that have been given to officers of color and women, most embrace the diversified direction in which the Department is headed. Especially at a time when the Department is becoming so diversified, we were surprised at the degree to which officers of all backgrounds appear to accept one another. (While we found evidence that officers make comments and jokes to each other about race and gender, they are usually made in the spirit of workplace banter among people who trust one another.) We were especially surprised at the lack of apparent gender bias in two area stations that had been publicly labeled as "sexist" by some journalists. As noted in the report, of the thousands of comments provided by officers about problems they experience on-the-job, only a very small number of them discussed race or gender discrimination.

VIII. Recommendations

Each of the following recommendations aims to reduce forces that restrain the Department from higher levels of performance and in their place create new driving forces that build on the LAPD's strengths.

1. Lead changes from the top, middle and bottom of the organization

Leadership to set the vision and the organization's goals must come from the top of the Los Angeles Police Department – the Police Commission, the Chief of Police, and the command staff. Demands of Los Angeles political leaders are also focused at the apex of the Department where they must be sorted out and interpreted if the organization is to function effectively. At the same time, the captains who command the 18 geographic areas must feel part of, and share in, the organization's vision and its goals. Being close to the day-to-day problems presented by crime, they have much to contribute to the Department's goals. And, to the extent that their knowledge is valued, they will become committed to the Department's goals. The captains are a critical link in the chain of command because they, and lieutenants and sergeants, deploy most of the Department's resources to achieve its goals. And, rank-and-file officers must also feel part of the organization's vision and embrace its goals so that resources are aligned up and down the chain of command.

Finally, the union can be an important ally and a constructive force for change if it is brought into the decision making process. But the union has never been considered a potential ally by the LAPD. To the extent that the union is considered at all, or included in decisions, it is included only after the fact. For instance, when this study began in 1994 we recommended to Chief Willie Williams that the union be represented on the advisory committee. Williams, on the advice of veteran LAPD officials, decided to exclude the union though he included a representative of Employee Relations, the management side of labor relations. In 2000 we urged Chief Parks to include the union in the press conference that had been planned to release findings from our preliminary report. But Parks, like Williams before him, decided to ignore the union.

Excluding the union from issues about employees misses an opportunity to make use of union leaders' knowledge and to build commitment within the organization for necessary changes. Ignoring the union can also be a strategic error because it prevents the union from cooperating with management and often leads to needless conflict.

We now turn to a closer examination of three important levels within the Department, showing how "discconects" between them distort communication and impede necessary changes.

Although Willie Williams quickly became one of Los Angeles's most popular public officials, he failed to win internal support. By 1995, most of Williams' command staff told us they felt the Department was drifting. They seemed paralyzed by the changes that were taking place around them--stepped-up public demands for accountability, humiliation of the Department over the riots and the Christopher Commission report, the Department's high and negative profile in the first OJ Simpson trial, a new Chief drawn from outside the LAPD who soon developed his own personal problems, demands for increased hiring and aggressive affirmative action goals – taken together seemed almost too much for some of these veteran officers to endure. As the environment became increasingly politicized, the Mayor, City Council, and Police Commission each sought to influence the direction of the Department. The fragmented and charged environment, coupled with the lack of support from within, made it impossible for Williams to communicate effectively with those at lower levels in the organization. Initiatives that emanated from his office were often misinterpreted in the media, making it even more difficult to articulate a coherent vision.

Bernard Parks became disconnected from the rank-and-file officers for a different set of reasons that we have already discussed. Most of the area captains were overburdened meeting the demands from the Chief's office and they had less time to spend managing their own officers. The

vast majority of police officers disliked Parks' authoritarian management style, withdrew their active support and, as was the case with Willie Williams, bided their time until Parks left.

Lasting change, as events have made clear over the past decade, have been impossible to effect with such disconnects within the chain of command.

Area Captains

The captains who command the LAPD's 18 geographic areas are vital links between the Chief and command staff and officers who police the streets. Though the literature on policing often singles out middle level managers as obstacles to change, our findings are more consonant with those of Kelling and Bratton (1993) who studied change efforts in a number of large cities and concluded:

> …when mid-managers are involved in the process of planning innovations, they are capable of providing instrumental leadership… Alternatively, whenever mid-managers are kept out of planning or perceived as a source of resistance, they *are* a potentially strong source of resistance. Mid-managers must be included in the planning process. (p. 10)

We were able to see how in the LAPD, when captains were given sufficient freedom, many found innovative solutions to problems within their areas. Under Williams, many of the captains took advantage of the leadership vacuum to do what they knew to be best for the organization. One commander (who had then been a captain) said, "He was asleep at the switch but it allowed us to get some important things done." For

133

instance, Williams published the Department's first strategic plan (Commitment to Action, 1995). Instead of focusing effort, the plan diffused it further with its 37 unranked goals. Despite the malaise at the top of the LAPD, many of the captains (some of whom had been recently promoted) had interpreted the very same changes in the environment as an opportunity to implement community policing. Some developed strategic plans at the area level that could be easily wrapped in the language of the unfocused *Commitment to Action*. For instance, one area captain decided to implement community policing throughout the division. She explained, "The first thing we did was to get our officers working with citizens who were bothered about crime. The officers quickly learned that they had a supportive community and the residents saw that the police didn't fit their stereotypes." For the first time, in 1995, many of them told us they felt that community policing had a chance of succeeding.

It was at this time that we began working closely with a group of captains who commanded half of the LAPD's geographic areas. Their enthusiasm for using data to help manage their areas and the spirited discussions between them about progress they were making with community policing left little doubt about their commitment.

But in mid-1997, when Bernard Parks was appointed as Chief, he quickly recentralized whatever authority may have been inadvertently decentralized under Williams. And, as noted earlier, Parks reorganized

the Department, putting patrol under the already overburdened area captains, revamping the complaint system and unleashing a blizzard of new directives down the chain of command. Data we have collected since 1997 clearly show the impact of his authoritarian style on officers' diminished confidence in captains' leadership, fear of being unfairly punished, loss of on-the-job initiative, job satisfaction and morale.

Police Officers

Most studies of police culture support the conclusion that change must be embraced by line workers themselves. When officers take initiative in their jobs, and when they feel that decisions affecting them are legitimate, their satisfaction increases.

For instance, more than 20 years ago management experts observed that organizations of all kinds were going through a transformation from industrial to a post-industrial model (Lippitt, 1978). The trend was away from autocratic toward democratic decision making. The disadvantages of the traditional autocratic model of decision making are well known though they are difficult to change.

But the industrial model continues to have a tenacious hold over police agencies as well as many other public organizations. Task specialization, a hallmark of industrial-age organizations that rationalizes the use of centralized authority and decision making may serve to pit officers against their own organizations. As we can see from

results of this study, when officers feel a loss of initiative in their jobs, their satisfaction suffers. Criminologist Jack Greene points out:

> Alienation of line-level police officers has also occurred over years of neglect in the traditional model of policing. Here, it is argued that police organizations over the years have produced a class of alienated workers, who frustrate change efforts, and how, more importantly may take out these frustrations on the public at large (Greene, 2000, p. 330).

In a study of suburban police agencies, Fanz and Jones (1987) found that in departments where decision making was placed at the top and execution at the bottom, officers perceived a "punishment orientation," they mistrusted management and experienced impaired performance. Research has also found that police officers who work in agencies with centralized authority and decision making often report high levels of stress and low levels of job satisfaction. For instance, researchers Speilberger and Westberry (1981) found that administrative and organizational factors were equally important in contributing to high levels of officer stress as were the actual dangers of the job. Though we did not directly measure officers' stress in this study, their comments make it abundantly clear that they wished for greater control over their work environments. In another study, police researchers found that elements of officers' work lives that produced the greatest stress were "organizational and management practices, notably lack of participation and expression in job decision making (Hurrell, Kliesmet and Pate, 1984).

On the other hand, Wycoff and Skogan (1994) found in their study of the Madison, Wisconsin Police Department, that including police officers in decision making as part of a conscious effort to introduce participatory management improved performance on a number of job related measures. Their findings are consonant with those of a study by Bruns and Shulman (1988) who found that sergeants and lieutenants reported that they would prefer working in environments characterized by group participation, shared decision making and widespread responsibility.

The Union

The League can be a positive force for change if it too is brought into the decision making process. But, the tradition of LAPD management has been to ignore the union and fight it out when necessary. Nowhere could this be seen more clearly than in 1998 when Chief Parks tried to separate the union's male leadership from the Department's diverse employees by publicly branding it as "nine tired old men." The union was incensed and waged a campaign against Parks and the conflict escalated. The League had extracted a campaign promise from the mayor to implement a compressed work schedule over Parks' objections. The League, a significant contributor to the Mayor's election, used its influence to focus public attention on the deteriorating working conditions in the LAPD and on the Chief's shortcomings that ultimately led to his departure.

Though labor and management will naturally find themselves in opposition on some issues, adversarial management-labor relationships are counterproductive and unnecessary. Some industrial organizations (like Saturn and New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.) have begun to slowly alter a century of adversarial labor relations and the underlying culture that supports it. The key has been to include the union in redesigning the organization's work systems, an issue we take up in the next recommendation. Giving the union a serious role in redesigning the organization taps its members' knowledge. It also commits its members to helping to reduce the resistance that predictably arises as changes are implemented (Wilms, 1996; Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1994; Dunlop, 1994).

But this is not simply a matter of arranging more chairs at the table. It requires a new concept of labor and management in which each side recognizes its mutual responsibilities and obligations to the larger organization. Under such a concept, traditional areas of conflict (wages and working conditions) are separated from issues on which both sides can work cooperatively and productively. But, it can succeed only with an unflagging commitment to the principle of cooperation around issues of mutual interests.

2. Redesign the LAPD's work systems to include community policing activities as the means of producing cultural changes.

Much has been written about changing the LAPD's "command and control" culture, one that has proven remarkably resistant to change. As the Christopher Commission observed more than a decade ago:

> The [LAPD] remains committed to its traditional style of law enforcement with an emphasis on crime control and arrests. The values underlying community policing, most fundamentally restraint and mutual respect, are most difficult to incorporate into the behavior of officers operating within the LAPD's current professional system (Independent Commission, p. 104).

But to change an organization's culture, its underlying work systems that govern employees' daily routines must first be changed. An organization's daily work routines exert enormous power in shaping and maintaining its culture. The work routines, and the work systems beneath them, must first be changed if a new culture is going to emerge and endure.

Recall the case of Douglas Aircraft (now Boeing) in Long Beach, California. In 1989, Douglas was on the verge of bankruptcy. The company was paralyzed by a culture – a set of beliefs left over from the days when it was an industry leader – that it was immune to the need for change. Also, an antiquated mass production system caused employees to work in isolation from one another. And, a top-down system of management that was necessary to coordinate and direct the complex job of assembling aircraft produced endless conflict between labor and management. Chairman John McDonnell was convinced that training

employees in Total Quality Management (TQM) would create a "new culture" by infusing them with principles of cooperation, teamwork, mutual respect and trust (Wilms 1996). But, as events would show, McDonnell's effort to transform Douglas by retraining the workforce failed. While the 7,000 employees who were trained in the "new culture" valued the training, it proved to be of little use to them once they were back on the job. Why? Because the complex production system remained unchanged. Aircraft continued to be built the same way they had been in the 1950s causing employees to maintain their dysfunctional beliefs and behaviors.

A successful example of cultural change can be found at NUMMI (New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.) a joint venture between General Motors and Toyota in Fremont, California. Once a failed GM plant, NUMMI emerged as a model of cultural change. Toyota taught General Motors that to produce high quality automobiles a new and supportive culture had to be developed, Toyota's first step was to redesign its old mass production system, that like Douglas's produced employee indifference, mistrust of management, and adversarial labor relations. But, Toyota's "lean production" system required the opposite – employees and managers had to learn to work interdependently and cooperatively and they had to treat each other with respect. Over time, with training to support the new production systems' requirements, a new and

supportive culture began to emerge (Wilms, Hardcastle and Zell, 1994; Wilms 1996).

Though some readers may wonder about the applicability of industrial examples to a police agency, we have discovered the same dynamics in a wide range of public institutions (Wilms and Zell, 2002; Wilms, 2003). Our research leaves little doubt that daily work routines and underlying work processes have a powerful shaping influence on an organization's culture. To change an organization's culture, the systems of work must first be changed.

Implications for the Los Angeles Police Department

LAPD officers follow a range of predictable work routines that reflect underlying work processes designed to reduce crime. And, the Department's culture into which they are socialized supports these processes. For instance, on every ride-along we could see the routines that officers followed. They were guided by radio calls to one location or another being aware of their response time. On other occasions at roll calls we saw officers being told about the importance of making routine traffic stops and importance of issuing citations while being reminded that citations were counted. We also saw how officers consciously avoided situations that would likely produce citizen complaints and discipline, especially after the introduction of the 1.28.

Each of these simplified examples of officers' routines and the underlying processes of police work -- deploying officers quickly, issuing

citations, and holding officers accountable through discipline -- are part of a larger system of work designed to reduce crime. And products of these processes are measured and used to evaluate performance – response time, volume of citations, complaints and instances of discipline, and reductions in citizens' fear of crime (Greene, 2000). Because work processes determine how employees spend their time and influence how they think and feel about each other and their organization they are extremely powerful.

The elements of community policing had been established in the 1970s under Chief Ed Davis – the Basic Car plan, senior lead officers and team policing. But there had been no unifying philosophy to build these elements into a coherent philosophy of community policing. With renewed pressure from the Christopher Commission, Willie Williams was hired in 1992 with the mandate to develop such a program with an organizational culture to support it. Williams succeeded in establishing 18 community police advisory boards throughout the city, he reinvigorated the Basic Car plan, and established senior lead officers as the front line of a community policing effort. Under the leadership of some innovative captains, nascent community policing began to flourish in some of the LAPD's divisions. But Williams left before his initiatives could take root. As described earlier, Bernard Parks had his own vision of policing that depended more on crime analysis and command from the top of the organization than from building cooperative relationship with

residents. When Parks announced his decision in 1998 to reassign the 168 senior lead officers to patrol duties, there was an outcry among community leaders who had developed working relationships with their senior lead officers. As the conflict escalated, it was clear that the fundamental cultural change envisioned by the Christopher Commission had been reduced to a handful of embattled senior lead officers who had become only a symbol of community policing.

Develop community policing as a core work process

The elements of community policing still exist in the LAPD's organization – the Basic Car plan, the senior lead officers, and the 18 Community Police Advisory Boards. What is clear is that if community policing is to be developed and sustained, it must be systematically built into the core work processes of the Department and reflected in the day-to-day routines of police officers. Evidence of processes that engage citizens and police in productive crime reduction exchanges (leads about criminal activity emanating from citizens, incidents of problem-solving) must be identified, measured and reported, along with tradition measures like arrests and use of force.

When we began the study in 1994, most officers were downright skeptical about the concept. They joked about community policing as "drive and wave." Their perceptions ranged from, "It's something we've always done," to, "It's social work, not police work." While many of the captains, lieutenants, sergeants and senior lead officers who were

responsible for implementing community policing and who worked directly with community leaders spoke enthusiastically about the idea, most patrol officers felt that it was a vague and undefined concept. Most told us that nothing in their lives had changed since Williams had announced community policing as his priority. To most, community policing was regarded a "politically correct" fad that had little to do with the reality of police work -- fighting crime and defending honest citizens from criminals. !Some officers even argued that community policing gave the public the false impression that the LAPD could solve society's problems

Influenced by the growing national and local debate about benefits of community policing, coupled with successful initiatives taken by some LAPD captains, there is evidence that the concept is more widely accepted than it was in 1994. By 2000, more than 90 percent of all officers agreed with the importance of building partnerships with the community and taking responsibility for specific neighborhoods. An equally large percent agreed that it is important for them to understand community priorities and concerns. Significantly, an increasing number of officers reported each year that community policing must become more widespread within the Department (not limited to senior lead officers). In the last survey, two thirds of all officers agreed that community policing is an effective means of providing police service and

that it is an improvement over the old ways. They also endorse the concept as one that the Department should pursue.

While implementing community policing has been far more difficult than imagined, it holds great promise for the future of the city and legitimizing the use of the LAPD's coercive police power. Embracing the concept may enable the Department to break down generations of hostility among the poorer parts of the city by rebuilding relationships horizontally with citizens.

There is growing evidence that community policing provides benefits for both communities and police agencies and officers. In a number of notable cases where the concept has been tried, Greene reports improvements in police attitudes toward citizens and job satisfaction (Greene 2000). Police researcher Wesley Skogan discovered that as officers worked with the public in solving crime problems, their attitudes toward citizens improved (Skogan, 1998). And, as noted earlier, in their study of Madison, Wisconsin, Wycoff and Skogan (1994) implementing community policing through participative decision making increased job satisfaction among officers.

And, according to Lurigio and Skogan (1994), the success of community policing rests on officers' receptivity to the concept. Findings from this study make clear that Los Angeles has a major hidden asset as its police officers already embrace the concept and are awaiting direction.

In all likelihood pressing forward to finally implement the idea may provide the Department with the very community support it needs.

But, without first changing the way in which police work is conducted, achieving a cultural change of the kind envisioned by the Christopher Commission will in all likelihood be fruitless (Wilms, 1996).

3. Rebuild confidence in disciplinary system by improving the citizen complaint process

Even before the introduction of the new "1.28" complaint system, the vast majority of officers mistrusted the Department's disciplinary system, especially when cases went beyond the divisional level. When we began surveying officers in 1996, most said they trusted that their supervisors would support them if they made an honest mistake. And most regarded their captains as good leaders with integrity.

But the current complaint system, recommended by the Christopher Commission, and implemented by order of the Police Commission by Chief Bernard Parks, is despised by most officers. It requires that every complaint (save the blatantly frivolous) must be investigated, resolved, and reviewed by the Chief of Police. Officers know that the system has stripped supervisors and captains of authority to resolve complaints at the divisional level, leaving them vulnerable to what they perceive as arbitrary and capricious decisions by the bureaus, Internal Affairs, and the top command staff. Officers criticize the new complaint system also because of its punitive nature. Anyone – even

gang members anxious for revenge - can file one or more complaints against an officer. And, while complaints are under investigation (a process that takes from 9-12 months) officers with complaints against them cannot transfer or be promoted. Another point of contention is the fact that, although officers have been told that unsubstantiated complaints will not count against them, they are filed in permanent personnel records.

In some cases patterns shown by complaints will lead to necessary discipline. In others, detailed documentation will defend officers when cases go to court. But for now, all indications are that the system's negative consequences outweigh the positive. Officers report increasing levels of fear of punishment – and many have alleged that they are less prone to be aggressive in policing when it is needed. Worse, the system's lack of legitimacy will undoubtedly induce officers to subvert it however they can. Wilson reminds us:

> Police patrol officers are members of coping organizations: their discretion is not easily limited by imposing rules. An excessive reliance on rules can lead to shirking or to subversion. To solve the problem of arbitrariness one must rely on effective management, especially on the part of first-line supervisors – sergeants and lieutenants (Wilson, 1989, p. 329)

Experience with the complaint system over the past four years has shown it to be a step in the right direction, but one that needs to be modified to insure that officers feel it is fair and that they will not be singled out for punishment. Sworn officers at all levels of the

Department have had sufficient experience with the system to witness its shortcomings and to recommend improvements.

Among the more obvious improvements is to decentralize decision making so that area captains can exercise discretion over less-serious complaints that can be resolved, and more serious complaints that require investigation at the Department's higher levels. Resolving minor complaints quickly at the area level would go a long way to streamline the system.

One promising method to resolve minor complaints is through mediation. Using mediation at the front end of the process for complaints judged to be of minor misconduct could help the department improve discipline and at the same time improve relationships with the community.

Under such an arrangement, both officers and citizens would have to agree to mediation. Citizens would be able to choose mediators from trained LAPD officers or supervisors, or civilian mediators chosen from an approved list and the location of the mediation.

A growing number of police departments that use mediation to resolve minor misconduct report a number of distinct advantages over traditional complaint processes. Mediation is found to improve officer discipline and improve morale, while building healthier relationships between police agencies and communities, at lower costs. Mediation could help reduce the accumulating human costs and convert them into

assets by treating officers and citizens in ways that they perceive are fair. Especially with the current adversarial relationships between the LAPD and segments of the Los Angeles community, if citizens felt the complaint process was fair, the change would be beneficial.

Recently Chief William Bratton announced that he had reached agreement with the union to begin to overhaul the complaint process in much the spirit of this recommendation, a move that it likely to provide significant benefits (Los Angeles Times, November 7, 2002).

IX. A concluding note

We have spent nearly a decade learning about the Los Angeles Police Department, developing information for decision-makers so they can "take the temperature" of the organization and take corrective action when needed. We have enjoyed remarkable support from three Chiefs of Police and a large number of command officers who saw the potential value of the research. But has that potential been realized?

The answer is mixed. We have spoken with many officers and civilians with whom we have worked to get answers. On balance the opinion is that this kind of information is useful. But its value cannot be fully realized without the firm commitment of a Chief of Police who has the authority to make changes.

As an outsider to Los Angeles, Willie Williams was immediately interested in the value of this research for himself and for the Department. He was also genuinely interested in developing productive

relationships with Los Angeles' two premier universities. However, the results of the first survey had only become ready for use when Williams was dismissed. By 1996, his support within the department had all but completely eroded creating an environment that did not lend itself to self-reflection.

When Bernard Parks became Chief in 1997 he agreed to expand the scope of the study from six to nine divisions, and he urged us to work with the area captains to use the survey findings in a new annual work planning process. At first this was very encouraging. But it soon became clear that the Department was becoming paralyzed in the grip of resistance to his authoritarian style. While the captains with whom we had developed the study remained committed to the idea of using the feedback, they had less and less time for it. We briefed Chief Parks thoroughly on at least three occasions, trying to help him see how the Department was straining under the load he had placed upon it But, even in the face of his own low leadership ratings and plummeting employee morale, he refused to make even the most obvious changes.

In the fall of 2000 Chief Parks agreed to call a press conference with us to release the preliminary findings. He knew that the findings were not altogether favorable, but he seemed to support taking responsibility for them in a " the buck stops here" strategy. But before the report was released Chief Parks had a change of mind and declined to participate, offering only faint praise after the study's release. He

formed an internal committee to examine the study's findings and recommend action that should be taken, though the initiative quickly died and dropped from sight.

What we have discovered is that it is truly difficult to provide objective feedback to an organization that is either in disarray or under siege as the LAPD has been for the past decade. We remain optimistic that this kind of action oriented research can be of substantial use to large public agencies like the LAPD. There is no doubt that the environment surrounding the LAPD will continue to be fractious and the need to align the organization with the external environment down through the chain of command will only intensify. And, it will need a continuing stream of reliable and valid information on the impact of its initiatives both inside and outside the Department.

To succeed, the Department will have to develop a greater capacity to learn from its environment and its employees and to translate this feedback into action. Developing greater external support and internal flexibility can come from a serious engagement with Los Angeles citizens as partners as outlined in these recommendations.

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