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Cover Page

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Project Title: New Directions in Research on Immigration and Crime

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Summary of the Project

Goals/Objectives/Research Questions/Data and Methods

The main objective of the project is to improve understanding of the immigration-crime relationship by addressing several important areas of inquiry. These areas of inquiry represent key omissions in the literature that merit attention. For example, next to no research has examined the robustness of the immigration-crime relationship across a substantially large and diverse range of neighborhoods across the U.S., which reflect different immigration contexts and histories. At the same time, with few exceptions, research largely lumps all immigrants together and neglects important differences across groups, whether by immigrant status or demographic or socio-economic background. Finally, little is known about how the immigration-crime relationship may be context dependent, and how immigration-related policies and practices may condition the immigration-crime relationship. Using data from a variety of sources over many years (2000-2016), we conduct a series of analyses that refine and advance our understanding of the immigration-crime relationship.

These analyses address a variety of research questions including: How robust is the immigration-crime relationship? What are the appropriate ways to capture varied effects of immigrant groups on neighborhood crime rates? Does citizenship status matter? How do levels of assimilation impact how immigration and crime are associated? Which immigrant groups have crime reducing effects in neighborhoods? Which have crime enhancing effects? Another set of analyses consider the extent to which the broader city-context of reception as well as immigration-related policies and practices condition the immigration-crime relationship. These analyses address research questions including: Which city-level characteristics matter most for

2

impacting the neighborhood immigration-crime relationship? How does immigration enforcement condition the relationship between immigration and crime? Do "sanctuary cities" attract crime-prone immigrants, reducing public safety overall?

To achieve these goals and begin to answer these research questions, we collected, cleaned and merged data from many sources including crime data from police departments, public use Census and American Community Survey data, restricted data from the Census Data Center at UC Irvine, historical business data from Reference USA, and TRACFed data, among others. After considerable effort, we collected data for a sample of 415 cities in 2020 with at least 10,000 population, a sample of 480 cities in 2010, a sample of 168 cities in 2000, a subset of 310 cities with longitudinal data in 2010 and 2018, and a subset of 139 cities with longitudinal data in 2000 and 2010. No comparable neighborhood crime data set that covers such a large and diverse range of contexts currently exists.

For the first set of analyses related to immigrant heterogeneity, we create several new measures reflecting key differences among immigrants (e.g., immigrant diversity measures, legal status measures, assimilation levels, etc) and examine their associations with crime rates across neighborhoods in our data set, which includes a diverse range of neighborhoods in a diverse range of U.S. cities, as just noted. We compare these measures with the typical measure employed in studies—percent foreign born. For the second set of analyses related to better understanding how destination context and immigration-related policies and practices condition the immigration-crime relationship, we extend these baseline models to allow for heterogeneity in this relationship across time and place. We consider how this relationship is conditioned by city-level context, focusing on key characteristics of the destination context including demographic and socio-economic characteristics (e.g., immigrant population, racial and ethnic

composition, and level of disadvantage). To capture the broader policy context, we classify cities/counties in our sample in terms of whether or not they are sanctuary locales.

Expected Applicability of Research

Collectively, the analyses provide "innovative approaches to advance the field's rigor and methodology in understanding the relationship between immigration and crime" as called for in NIJ's RFP. Our data collection efforts and analyses enabled us to rigorously examine some of the most pressing questions on immigration and crime, with an eye toward creating evidence-based policy on this issue.

Participants and Other Collaborating Organizations

Co-PIs:

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Changes in Approach from Original Design and Reason for Change, If Applicable

Timeline and Access to Secure Data

As noted in previous progress reports, our timeline shifted due to the grant starting later than anticipated as well as the COVID19 pandemic and challenges associated with accessing secure data in UCI's Research Data Center (RDC). Specifically, our grant was initially slated to begin January 1, 2020 however it did not officially start until March 24, 2020. Shortly thereafter, the pandemic hit further impeding our progress, particularly with respect to gaining approval and access to the UCI RDC to begin collecting and cleaning the restricted data necessary for many of our analyses. For this reason, during the reporting period we requested two no cost extensions for 12 months. The first request was approved by NIJ in September of 2021. The second request was approved by NIJ in November of 2022. After many obstacles, the research team was finally allowed access to the secure data in September 2022 and we immediately set to work cleaning, creating and merging the various datasets we need to conduct many of the analyses identified in the proposal. While most of the analyses are complete (see discussion below), we will continue to conduct analyses using RDC data for the length of our contract with RDC.

Ability to Get Data on Immigrant Status (Documented vs. Undocumented)

Initially, we anticipated taking advantage of information on immigration status, asked in recent waves of the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). However, during the review process to gain access to the RDC, we learned that the NCVS data fields had been removed from the RDC by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. During our grant period, this information was never released to the RDC environment. As a result of these data access issues, we were unable to conduct an analysis of victimization and crime reporting. While this was unfortunate, it did not

ultimately prevent us from researching key questions related to documented status and crime. As described in detail below, we were able to employ an alternative approach to create estimates of documented statuses using other data—specifically, the household level Census data housed in the RDC.

Outcomes

Activities/Accomplishments

One of the biggest activities and accomplishments associated with this grant involved creating an unparalleled national neighborhood-level crime data set that includes information on crime in over 15,000 neighborhoods across a diverse range of hundreds of U.S. cities. The NICS is an unprecedented data project as it provides crime incident data at various time points for a large number of cities (n = 630) that vary considerably in size, geographic location, and most importantly, immigration context and histories. Although the sampling frame was not random, the data are (relatively) representative of cities across the U.S. We cleaned and geocoded the data, and only include crime data that reasonably match the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data that is reported by the city to the FBI. As far as we are aware, no other data source offers information on neighborhood crime in such a diverse range of (immigration) contexts throughout the U.S. allowing us to examine the immigration-crime nexus beyond a handful of cities and in contexts not typically considered (e.g., non-border cities or major metropolitan areas like Los Angeles or New York). More specifically, the NICS data allow researchers to explore questions of ecological interest simultaneously across a range of cities. These data help researchers move beyond single-city studies, the norm in the field, enabling them to ask whether and how the broader context impacts the spatial location of crime. In our case, these data allowed us to analyze how immigration and crime are associated across communities and cities that have very different immigration histories and contexts and employ a range of immigration-related policies and practices.

We created a comprehensive document [https://tinyurl.com/3vkbydep] to accompany the National Incident Crime Study which explains, in detail, how the NICS data were collected, how

8

the data set was constructed, and how nationally representative the data are. Concerning the latter, the NICS is not a random sample of cities but rather (largely) a convenience sample, which raises a question about the extent to which it is representative of U.S. cities. To determine this, we compared the NICS sample with all tracts in U.S. cities with at least 10,000 population based on U.S. Census socio-demographic data. The NICS tracts are quite similar to all tracts in such cities. In terms of racial and ethnic composition, NICS tracts have somewhat more nonwhite and immigrant residents, with 23 percent immigrants, 26 percent Latino/a and 23 percent African American, compared to all cities which, on average, are 18 percent immigrant, 20 percent Latino/a, and 17 percent African American. NICS tracts have a slightly lower homeownership rate, but older housing and greater population density. The NICS sample tends to include somewhat larger cities and fewer smaller cities, unsurprising given increased data availability in larger cities. Finally, crime rates for NICS cities are relatively similar to crime rates for all cities. The NICS cities match almost perfectly on property crime, although they do have 24 percent more violent crime.

We also created datasets in the Census Research Data Center (CRDC). These data use household-level data for the Census in 2000 and the American Community Surveys (ACS) beginning in 2005 to create neighborhood-measures for our ecological models. This required us to make proper measures based on the characteristics of persons living within a particular census tract or egohood (egohoods are an overlapping approach to constructing neighborhoods; whereas census tracts utilize a non-overlapping approach, i.e., neighborhoods do not overlap with one another, egohoods allow for overlap and take an explicitly spatial approach to measuring context). We then aggregated the data to tracts or egohoods for additional analyses we plan to complete once our analyses using census tracts are complete (models using egohoods as the unit

9

of analysis require extraordinary CPU bandwidth and significant amounts of time to run, so they will be completed last). These data allow us to create unique household-level measures not available in the public-use Census data. This dataset must remain in this secure environment, and can only be used in our statistical analyses.

In order to examine the role of documentation on immigration outcomes, we constructed an algorithm to impute immigration status on American Community Survey (ACS) respondents in the restricted version of the ACS. This imputation process, described in detail below, can be executed on any wave of the ACS within the RDC using an R package created by Dr. Derek Christopher.

Results and Findings

Once the crime data were collected, cleaned, aggregated and merged, we began conducting the analyses identified in the proposal. Due to the challenges associated with gaining access to secure data in the RDC, the first sets of analyses conducted and papers published from the grant use publicly available data to answer our research questions related to immigration and crime. Below we highlight key findings to emerge from the analyses undertaken thus far. Importantly, unless the findings are reported in a published paper, they are to be considered preliminary and may change as we refine our modeling approach and/or respond to reviewer comments.

One set of key findings relates to the robustness of the immigration-crime relationships, and in particular, the complexity and nuance of the immigration-crime nexus across a diverse range of contexts, reflecting the most fundamental focus of our project. The ability to examine and document this nuance and complexity is directly attributable to our newly created data set,

the National Incident Crime Study, which reveals significant variation in both patterns of immigration and patterns of crime across neighborhoods in our sample. Our NICS analytic sample contains 15,097 tracts (with at least 500 population) covering 346 cities (with at least 10,000 population), reflecting a wide range of contexts within which to examine the immigration-crime association. Summary statistics reveal significant variability. The average count of violent crimes across census tracts in our sample is 23.7 with a standard deviation of 26, whereas the average count for property crimes is 138 with a standard deviation of 125.6. The average percent immigrant population across our sample of tracts is 23.1, and ranges from 0 to 87 percent, reflecting a *very* wide range of immigrant and non-immigrant neighborhoods alike. For percent nonwhite immigrants, the average is just under 20 with a standard deviation of 16.6. This variability allows us to determine whether extant findings in the literature regarding the immigration-crime relationship still apply when using a national data set that reflects a wide variety of different contexts—something that heretofore has been lacking as most studies examine neighborhoods within one or only a handful of cities.

What we find from our analyses is telling: our findings reveal the nature of the immigration-crime nexus is more complex than originally thought, even as we are able to replicate basic findings in the literature. Stated alternatively, using our unique data set we are able to both replicate and extend existing studies in important ways. Case in point is findings reported in our paper, "Immigration and Crime: Is the Relationship Nonlinear?" just published in *British Journal of Criminology*.

Concerning the former (replication), in this paper we follow practices in extant studies where we first model a *linear* immigration and crime relationship. Findings reveal there is a negative, but not significant, relationship between percent immigrants and violent crime

11

(coefficient is -0.099). Findings also reveal a significant negative relationship between percent immigrants and property crime (a coefficient of -0.408 indicates that a 17.4 percent increase in immigrants in the tract (one standard deviation) is associated with 7 percent less property crime at the neighborhood level, holding other variables constant (exp(-0.408*0.174) = 0.931). Thus, consistent with prior research, in these baseline models we find that immigrant concentration is not associated with violent crime and is associated with lower property crime levels in neighborhoods across the U.S.

Concerning the latter (extension), we argue that omissions in the scholarship raise important—yet unanswered—questions including whether or not the immigration-crime relationship may be nonlinear—something that, as far as we are aware, is rarely assessed in scholarship. Some theories (e.g., immigrant/ethnic enclave theory and immigrant victimization theory) contain implicit nonlinear arguments, although most research has not accounted for this. It is also possible that more than one theory is applicable, and their combination has nonlinear implications for the immigration-crime relationship. More generally, failing to account for nonlinearity can lead to faulty inferences and a conclusion of a null linear relationship when in fact a nonlinear one exists.

In this paper, we address this omission in additional analyses. Again, using our newly created neighborhood-level crime data set, we examine whether or not the immigration-crime association is non-linear. Beyond including a measure of percent immigrants, which is what we did to replicate existing research, we computed the quadratic, cubic, and quartic form of percent immigrants. We estimated models separately for violent and property crime and sequentially included each polynomial for the percent immigrant measure to determine which is most appropriate.

We find that for both crime-types, a *nonlinear* relationship best characterizes reality. In terms of violent crime, simply adding the quadratic term best captures the relationship. The nonlinear relationship between percent immigrants and neighborhood violent crime reveals a negative relationship that slows and reaches an inflection point at just under 40 percent immigrant. Beyond that point, an increasing concentration of immigrants in neighborhoods is associated with increasing violent crime levels. Thus, the violent crime rate is about 11 percent lower in a tract with 40 percent immigrants compared to one with no immigrants, but is 8 percent higher in a tract with 68 percent immigrants compared to one with 40 percent immigrants. These findings, as we discuss in the paper, are not consistent with an immigrant/ethnic enclave argument but given a U-shaped curve, may provide support for an immigrant victimization argument.

In terms of property crime, we also find evidence of a strong nonlinear immigration-crime relationship, although that relationship is best captured by a quartic polynomial. We find that as a neighborhood begins to experience an influx of immigrants, property crime tends to decrease. This sharp decrease slows to a gentler decrease when neighborhoods are at between 10 percent and 30 percent immigrants. However, beyond these percentages property crime again falls sharply as immigrant concentration increases until at the very highest percentages of immigrants we see the relationship flatten. This pattern for property crime is consistent with enclave theory in combination with immigration revitalization theory, as we discuss in the paper.

Collectively, the findings show support for a non-linear immigration-crime relationship, compared to a linear one, but are decidedly mixed in terms of support for the theoretical perspectives which offer competing arguments. Concerning property crime, results reveal greater support for the immigrant/ethnic enclave perspective while for violent crime, the U-shaped curve

13

suggests some support for the victimization argument. In light of this, we conducted additional analysis that further determines whether immigrant victimization theory is relevant.

In another set of analyses, we test the idea that certain types of crime, specifically instrumental crimes, may be higher in neighborhoods with high levels of immigrant concentration because immigrants may be perceived by offenders as easy targets or victims. To determine this, we disaggregated violent crime into two distinct types, one instrumental (robbery) and the other expressive (aggravated assault), and re-ran the analyses. If this argument is correct, we expected to find distinct relationships: an increase in robberies in neighborhoods with a high concentration of immigrants (implying they are more attractive targets) but no such increase in aggravated assaults.

Our results suggest this is, in fact, the case. When we examined specific violent crimes, we observed distinct relationships for robbery versus aggravated assault, consistent with this alternative explanation. As the percent immigrants increase from 0 to 25 percent in neighborhoods, there is a falling level of robberies. However, beyond this percentage, greater concentrations of immigrants are associated with increasing robberies. In contrast, we see a slowing negative relationship between percent immigrants and aggravated assault that shows no evidence of increases in high immigrant concentration neighborhoods. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that immigrants serve as attractive targets of acquisitive crime in these neighborhoods.

Collectively, while we were able to replicate key findings in the literature regarding the linear immigration-crime association, additional analyses and their findings using our newly created crime data set also reveal a more complex, nuanced relationship than previously documented—something future scholars should consider as they conduct research in this area.

Tables, figures and additional information about these analyses can be found in the paper, which is forthcoming and soon available on BJC's webpage (https://academic.oup.com/bjc).

Another set of key findings from the grant, related to the aim of "unpacking the immigration-crime association," intentionally moves away from using a global measure of immigration (percent foreign born) in order to capture the widespread diversity that exists across immigrant groups and in immigrant neighborhoods. A key distinction is immigrant diversity or heterogeneity, which reflects both the number of immigrant groups in a community and their relative sizes or representation, something social theory has a lot to say about but researchers have essentially ignored. Indeed, with few exceptions, scholars have yet to consider how immigrant diversity, including by race/ethnicity, country of origin, or language use, may matter for the immigration-crime association. Building on a handful of studies, we examined the association between different measures of immigrant heterogeneity and violent and property crime rates across 15,000 tracts in close to 350 U.S. cities using our newly created NICS data. We identified three types of immigrant heterogeneity likely consequential for neighborhood crime rates in light of social theory, which we discuss in detail in the paper but briefly below.

First is immigrant racial/ethnic heterogeneity, the broadest dimension. While the concept of racial/ethnic composition refers to the racial/ethnic makeup of a population, the concept of diversity or heterogeneity refers to the representation and relative size of different racial/ethnic groups within a population. Immigrant racial/ethnic heterogeneity is maximized when all racial/ethnic immigrant groups are represented in a neighborhood and comprise equal shares of the population. As the dimension most closely linked to theories of neighborhood heterogeneity generally, immigrant racial/ethnic heterogeneity is likely salient—although it remains unclear

15

whether such heterogeneity is associated with increases, or decreases, in community crime rates given competing theoretical arguments.

Second is immigrant language heterogeneity. Generally speaking, language is central to nearly all forms of culture, social interaction, and social life, and this is no less true among immigrants or in immigrant neighborhoods. Language diversity, in particular, is critical because it may capture more nuanced variations in the cultures of reference, norms, traditions, beliefs, and values that differentially affect behavior and interaction patterns associated with violence. For example, language heterogeneity may benefit the community, including by lowering crime rates, if it increases the variety and complementarity of goods, skills, abilities and services spurring innovation and creativity, and if it increases levels of intercultural tolerance. In contrast, when residents speak different languages, they may find it challenging to communicate, organize, and achieve common goals like crime control.

Third is immigrant country of origin heterogeneity, reflected in the diversity of regions of the world from which immigrants originate. Immigrants originating from a similar region of the world are more likely to share cultural history, cues and language, which can lead to greater cohesion and neighborhood social control, and less crime. In contrast, heterogeneity in immigrant country of origin may not provide such benefits, and may even undermine social control efforts in communities, resulting in higher crime rates.

To determine how these varying dimensions of immigrant heterogeneity impact neighborhood crime rates, we again use data from our NICS sample. For the analyses, our dependent variables are measures of violent (homicide, robbery, aggravated assault) and property (burglary, motor vehicle theft, larceny) crime counts in the tract. We calculated the number of crime incidents in each tract for each year in 2009, 2010, and 2011, and then computed the three-

16

year average for both crime types. Our focal independent variables capture the degree of heterogeneity among immigrants in neighborhoods along the three different but related dimensions. All are constructed as Herfindahl measures in which a sum of squares of proportions of immigrants in each group is created, and then this total is subtracted from 1. Each measure thus captures the degree of heterogeneity along a specific dimension. The first measure captures *immigrant heterogeneity based on country of origin (COO)*. This measure, based on 133 different countries of origin of immigrants reported by the Census, is computed as the proportion of total immigrants that emigrated from each country. To obtain the heterogeneity of immigrants in a tract based on country of origin, we then squared each of these proportions, summed them, and subtracted this total from 1. The second heterogeneity measure uses information on language spoken in the home. This *language heterogeneity* measure computes the proportion of residents in the tract that: 1) speak only English at home; 2) speak Spanish at home; 3) speak an Asian language at home; 4) speak an Indo-European language at home; 5) speak another language at home. As with the previous measure, we computed the sum of squares of these proportions and subtracted from 1. This measure includes total population of the tract in the denominator (rather than foreign-born population, as the other measures do). The third heterogeneity measure captures *immigrant racial and ethnic heterogeneity*. This measure computes the proportion of immigrants in the tract who are: 1) white; 2) Black; 3) Asian; 4) Latino; 5) other race. Again, a sum of squares of proportions is computed. To test possible nonlinear relationships with crime in light of our prior findings discussed above, we also computed quadratic, cubic, and quartic forms of each heterogeneity measure.

To minimize the possibility of confounding, we included additional measures commonly accounted for in ecological studies of crime. Most notably, we created *percent immigrants*,

computed as the percentage of the tract population that is foreign born; we also computed

quadratic, cubic, and quartic forms of this measure to capture potential nonlinearity. We

constructed a measure of *concentrated disadvantage*, which combines the following variables in

a principal component analysis: average household income; average home value; percent with at

least a bachelor's degree; median income; percent at or below 125 percent of the poverty level;

percent single parent households; and, percent unemployed. Factor loadings range from 0.71 to

0.91 with an eigenvalue of 4.61. We measured *residential stability* as a standardized factor score

from a principal component analysis of three variables: average length of residence, percent of

households that moved into their residence within the last five years (loads negatively), and

percent homeowners. The factor loadings range from 0.8 to 0.84 with an eigenvalue of 1.96.

To account for racial/ethnic mixing above and beyond the racial/ethnic heterogeneity of

immigrants, we created a measure of *racial/ethnic heterogeneity* as a Herfindahl Index of five

racial/ethnic groups (Asian, Black, Latino/a, White, and other race). We also account for specific

racial/ethnic groups by constructing measures of *percent Asian*, *percent Black*, *percent Latino*,

and *percent other race* (with percent White as the reference category). Vacant units can provide

crime opportunities, so we computed the *percent vacant units* in each tract. Given evidence of

the age-crime curve, we included a measure of *percent population aged 16–29*. We account for

crime opportunity effects by including *logged population* and *population density* measures.

Finally, we account for opportunities provided by local businesses with two measures. Using

Reference USA data, we created a measure of the number of employees of *consumer-facing*

businesses (log transformed) (North American Industry Classification System codes 44-45 and

72). Other businesses may provide crime opportunities, yet may also reduce crime as they

provide jobs for local residents. We therefore constructed a measure of the number of employees of *non-consumer businesses* (those not consumer-facing), log transformed.

Given the novelty of our immigrant heterogeneity measures, we explored the correlations among them—and with the percent immigrants—across neighborhoods with different immigrant concentrations. Specifically, we computed correlations among these measures for neighborhoods with: 1) less than 10% immigrants; 2) 10-50% immigrants; and 3) more than 50% immigrants. For neighborhoods with less than 10% immigrants, the correlation is above .50, but is negative for neighborhoods between 10 and 50% immigrants, and only modestly positive above 50% immigrants. In contrast, the correlation between immigrant language heterogeneity and percent immigrants shows a monotonic decline based on immigrant concentration: the correlation is .72 for neighborhoods with less than 10% immigrants, but it declines and becomes effectively zero when neighborhoods reach 50% immigrants. Likewise, immigrant racial heterogeneity is correlated at .46 with percent immigrants in neighborhoods with less than 10% immigrants, but is modestly negative beyond that point. The highest correlation between immigrant language heterogeneity and immigrant COO heterogeneity, .67, occurs in neighborhoods with more than 50% immigrants. The same pattern generally occurs for the correlation between immigrant language heterogeneity and immigrant racial heterogeneity. Finally, the correlation between immigrant racial heterogeneity and immigrant COO heterogeneity (.70) is highest in neighborhoods with few immigrants, but drops to .50 and .40 in neighborhoods with larger immigrant concentrations.

As a final descriptive observation, we note that our immigrant COO heterogeneity measure has relatively high average values across neighborhoods, perhaps higher than what one might presume given the extensive literature on immigrant enclaves, which are presumed to be

relatively homogeneous based on immigrant country of origin. To illustrate, consider the top 20 countries of origin in the ten neighborhoods with the highest values on this measure in the Southern California region. In the first neighborhood, although 27% of the residents are immigrants, there is considerable heterogeneity based upon from where these immigrants originate. Among the immigrants in this neighborhood, 2.4% are from Canada, 2% are from Saudi Arabia, 1.6% are from Russia, 1.6% are from China, and 1.5% are from Germany. Even the 20th largest group—immigrants from Mexico—constitutes a considerable proportion of immigrants, as they constitute 0.6% of immigrants in the neighborhood. In the second neighborhood, the largest group of immigrants originate from Armenia, though they constitute only 2% of immigrants in the neighborhood. In the third neighborhood, the largest group originate from Ukraine (2.2%) while in the fourth neighborhood the largest group originate from El Salvador (3%) and in the fifth neighborhood the largest group originate from Ecuador (1.5%). In short, these neighborhoods have considerable heterogeneity, not homogeneity as is often presumed, in the country of origin of their immigrant residents.

Moving beyond descriptive statistics, we estimated models for violent and property crime that first include a measure of immigrant concentration but do not include any immigrant heterogeneity measures. Subsequent models introduced each immigrant heterogeneity measure one at a time to determine their individual impact. Our final model includes all measures for relative comparison. In these models we tested for nonlinear effects, which we identified, and thus below we present results for the optimal model based on this nonlinearity.

Skipping straight to the focus of the paper, our results show quite strong negative relationships between immigrant heterogeneity based on country of origin and crime; this negative relationship is particularly pronounced at higher levels of heterogeneity. Recall that we

20

control for the level of neighborhood disadvantage, so this effect is above and beyond the more economically-advantaged nature of these neighborhoods. The results for violent crime are similar, revealing an accelerating negative effect as immigrant heterogeneity increases to very high levels. In contrast, property crime decreases most sharply in the mid ranges of this measure, flattening out at very high levels.

Results are more modest for immigrant language heterogeneity. For violent crime, there is an inverted-U relationship in which violence is lowest at either very low, or very high, levels of language heterogeneity. In contrast, there is a generally positive relationship between language heterogeneity and property crime that flattens out at high or low values. In contrast to some earlier research, we thus find little evidence that immigrant language heterogeneity is protective for crime in neighborhoods.

Finally, we see very modest negative linear relationships between immigrant racial heterogeneity and crime. This was the only measure that consistently exhibited linear, rather than nonlinear, relationships.

We next estimated models that simultaneously include all three immigrant heterogeneity measures. We again tested for nonlinearity and chose the model with the optimal BIC value. There remain negative relationships between percent immigrants and violent crime, and a u-shaped relationship with property crime, but the magnitude of these effects is smaller now that we account for the level of immigrant heterogeneity.

We find strong negative nonlinear relationships between immigrant heterogeneity based on country of origin and violent and property crime. The magnitude and shape of these relationships are similar in this model accounting for the other two types of immigrant heterogeneity as they were in the earlier models that did not include these measures. We again

21

see, then, that this measure is consistently negatively related to crime levels, and that the relationship for violent crime is particularly strong at very high levels of heterogeneity. We also see that the pattern for immigrant language heterogeneity remains similar when accounting for the other immigrant heterogeneity measures. The only difference is the size of the effects is reduced somewhat. We see some evidence that violent crime is lower in neighborhoods with very high language heterogeneity, whereas property crime is notably higher as the level of language heterogeneity increases. Nonetheless, the size of the effect is much smaller than that of the immigrant COO heterogeneity measure. The effect of immigrant racial heterogeneity becomes modestly positive when accounting for the other immigrant heterogeneity measures. Collectively, these findings reveal the importance of immigrant diversity—both in terms of immigrant populations and neighborhoods—for understanding the immigration-crime relationships.

The collective findings from these analyses, and their implications, are written up and the paper is about to be submitted to a peer-reviewed journal.

Yet another set of findings from the grant related to the aim of "unpacking the immigration-crime association" focus on the role of assimilation in the immigration-crime nexus. Concerning levels of assimilation, findings from research conducted at the individual level reveal 2nd and later generation immigrants, and more assimilated immigrants, offend at higher rates than their unassimilated counterparts. These findings are puzzling because as traditionally theorized, the process of assimilation is hypothesized to involve acquisition by immigrants and their descendants of English-language proficiency, higher education levels, valuable new job skills, and other attributes that ease their entry into U.S. society and improve their chances of economic success, thereby reducing—not increasing—criminal behavior. So how can we explain these

counter-intuitive findings? One explanation focuses on the idea that assimilation presents a specific set of challenges, which increase the propensity to engage in crime: "Born or raised in the United States, they [the children of immigrants] inherit their immigrant parents' customs and circumstances but come of age with a distinctively American outlook and frame of reference and face the often-daunting task of fitting into the American mainstream while meeting their parents' expectations, learning the new language, doing well in school, and finding decent jobs" (Rumbaut et al. 2006:65).

Next to no research considers immigrant assimilation at the neighborhood level—the focus of our analysis. To determine whether the degree of assimilation of immigrants is related to neighborhood crime, we constructed two measures capturing the neighborhood-level of immigration. First, given the importance of language acquisition, we constructed three measures of quality of speaking English, based on age groups. Of respondents who report speaking a language other than English in the household, the Census asks whether the respondent and their family members speak English: 1) very well, 2) well, 3) not well, 4) not at all. If the respondent reported speaking well or very well, we noted this as speaking English well. The Census reports this information by age group: 1) 17 years and under, 2) 18 to 64 years, 3) 65 years and older. We created the percentage of those speaking English well within each age group, as a measure of assimilation. Our second measure of assimilation captures the percentage of immigrants who came to the U.S. in the last 10 years. Given that time in the U.S. allows for greater assimilation, this measure captures the degree of immigrants in a neighborhood with minimal opportunity for assimilation. We estimated multilevel models for violent and property crime testing these new measures. The models include the same control variables as used in the models discussed earlier.

Turning to the results, we first focus on the measures capturing speaking English well. We included the percentage immigrants in the neighborhood in these models, and the results for this measure continued to show the consistent negative relationship with crime. However, in addition to this measure, we found that the measures capturing the percentage of these immigrants who speak English well is consistently associated with lower rates of both violent and property crime. Furthermore, while the negative relationship for these language variables for those less than 18 and those aged 65 and older were generally statistically significant, the negative relationship for adults (aged 18 to 64) had by far the strongest negative relationship with both violent and property crime. Thus, rather than an assimilation effect in which such a concentration would be expected to result in more crime, this negative effect may speak to the ability of these residents to collaborate with others in the neighborhood to provide more informal social control and collective efficacy. This mechanism is speculative, and needs further exploration.

We also tested whether this language effect is moderated by the degree of immigrant concentration in the neighborhood or city. First, in models including interactions between these language measures and the percent immigrants in the neighborhood, we still found the same negative coefficients for the main effects of these measures. Furthermore, the negative coefficient was particularly large for the percent aged 18-64 speaking English well. However, we found some moderating effects for property crime. On the one hand, there is a stronger negative relationship between percent aged 0-17 speaking English well and property crime as the percentage of immigrants in the neighborhood increases. On the other hand, the negative relationship between adults speaking English well and property crime actually weakens as the percentage of immigrants in the neighborhood increases. One implication is that in

neighborhoods with high immigrant concentration, property crime is even lower if there is a greater concentration of immigrants who speak English poorly. Another implication is that in neighborhoods with smaller immigrant concentration, it is more beneficial to have more immigrants who speak English well, which is consistent with the idea they are better able to communicate with others in the neighborhood, and therefore enhance collective efficacy.

When we tested the moderating effect of city immigrant concentration and the language ability measures (addressing key questions related to broader context as outlined in our proposal), we found a similar pattern as for the neighborhood immigrant concentration interactions. Again, there is a stronger negative relationship between percent aged 0-17 speaking English well and property crime as the percentage of immigrants in the city increases. There was also less violent crime in such neighborhoods in 2010. Nonetheless, the negative relationship between adults speaking English well and property crime actually weakens as the percentage of immigrants in the city increases. This may be consistent with the idea of immigrant enclaves, even with poor English speakers, benefiting from lower property crime.

We performed similar tests with our measure of the percentage of immigrants who came to the U.S. in the last 10 years. Notably, this measure was nonsignificant in the initial models. Thus, there was no evidence that the recency of immigration as a measure of assimilation makes a difference in neighborhood crime rates. This is notable, as some existing research only measures recent immigrants, under the presumption that they are most impactful for neighborhood crime levels. Our results suggest that this presumption is not supported by the data, and that it is better to measure the concentration of all immigrants, regardless of the recency of entry. When we tested whether this measure was moderated by the percentage of immigrants in the neighborhood, we found no effects in 2010, and no effect for violent crime in 2018. It was

only for property crime in 2018 that we found a significant positive interaction, but even this was a quite modest effect when plotted, and not substantively important. When we tested for a moderating effect of city immigrant concentration, we found no effects in 2010, and only significant effects in 2018. Thus, we found in 2018 that as the concentration of immigrants in a neighborhood increases, violent and property crime declines. Furthermore, this decline in property crime is even sharper as the percentage of those immigrants who have come to the U.S. in the last ten years increases. However, while this effect is strongest in cities with a smaller immigrant concentration, it is weaker in a city with a greater immigrant concentration. We are currently in the process of writing up these findings for a paper we will soon submit to a peer-reviewed journal.

Yet another set of findings from the grant related to the aim of "unpacking the immigration-crime association" focus on documented status—a key distinction in the public sphere that is relevant for public policy but one that has not been sufficiently examined in the literature, especially using data from a diverse range of neighborhoods with varying levels of immigration and immigrant histories.

A key challenge is creating a measure that reflects the number of undocumented immigrants in neighborhoods in our sample, which is why there exist only a handful of studies on this important issue. As noted above, initially, we anticipated taking advantage of information on immigration status, asked in recent waves of the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). However, during the review process to gain access to the RDC, we learned that the NCVS data fields had been removed from the RDC by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. During our grant period, this information was never released to the RDC environment. As a result, we were unable to conduct an analysis of victimization and crime reporting. While this was

unfortunate, it did not ultimately prevent us from researching key questions related to documented status and crime as we were able to employ an alternative approach to create estimates of documented statuses using other data—the household level Census data housed in the RDC.

Undocumented status was imputed using a procedure identical to that which Derek Christopher, one of our graduate student researchers, has applies to publicly available ACS data and similar to that which Borjas and Cassidy (2019) apply to public CPS data. The process begins by restricting the sample to noncitizens and assigning "legal resident" status to any individual who satisfies a condition that an undocumented immigrant could not satisfy (e.g., if an individual is covered by Medicaid or employed in an occupation that requires licensing, they are coded as legal residents). The procedure also relies on a few conditions that are not exclusive to legal residents but are overwhelmingly true of legal residents relative to undocumented immigrants. For instance, immigrants who arrived in the U.S. as an adult and are currently enrolled in postsecondary education are overwhelmingly likely to be student visa holders who would not satisfy other conditions of the procedure. Thus, the imputation procedure assigns legal resident status if this specific condition is met. The remainder of noncitizens are coded as undocumented, resulting in small overestimates of the undocumented population as not all legal residents can be identified as such based on the information in the ACS alone (i.e., some legal residents may not be covered by Medicaid, possess an occupational license, or satisfy any of the other conditions while still truly having legal status). In summary, the procedure categorizes all individuals in the data as either "citizens," "legal residents," or "undocumented immigrants." When weights are applied, counts of the undocumented population can be generated (by location, time period, nationality, etc.), which we did for our sample.

While we have run the models and have findings, we are unable to share them, per RDC requirements, until they have been approved by the Census for distribution. We are currently in the process of getting that permission.

A final set of key findings from the grant, related to the aim of "unpacking the immigration-crime association," considers the mechanisms by which immigrant communities experience, on average, lower crime levels—something that remains relatively unknown in the literature. In our paper, "Immigrant Organizations and Neighborhood Crime," published in *Crime & Delinquency*, we focused specifically on the role of immigrant organizations in neighborhoods—as the title suggests. In the paper, we posited the importance of immigrant-serving voluntary organizations and empirically examined their impact on neighborhood crime, while accounting for other community correlates of crime as well as potential endogeneity. Given it took a substantial amount of time and effort to collect, clean and merge neighborhood crime data for *all* of the neighborhoods/cities in our sample, but that we wanted to begin conducting some analyses, for this paper we investigated whether immigrant-serving organizations mediate or moderate the relationship between immigrants and crime in neighborhoods using longitudinal data from one locale that we had already collected data from at that point—the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area.

In the study, we posit that voluntary organizations, particularly, immigrant-serving organizations that act on behalf of immigrants and provide services to immigrants, may be an important factor to help explain lower crime rates in immigrant neighborhoods. The theoretical notion of the beneficial effects of voluntary organizations is derived from social disorganization theory, which posits that neighborhood structural characteristics such as socioeconomic disadvantage, residential instability, and racial/ethnic heterogeneity can impede the formation of

self-regulatory capability to solve community problems including crime and disorder. Socially disorganized neighborhoods may have relatively fewer voluntary organizations (and organizational participation) that can facilitate the provision of services and goods for the formulation of social ties and informal social control.

The theoretical insights regarding the importance of voluntary organizations, we argue, are directly applicable to the context of immigrant communities. In particular, voluntary organizations may mediate the impact of immigrant concentration on neighborhood crime rates. That is, voluntary organizations may account for the crime-reducing effect of immigrant concentration in neighborhoods by engendering social interaction, and facilitating mutual trust and informal social control among immigrants. Hinting at this possibility, some studies find that immigrant-serving organizations do, in fact, enhance the density of social networks and increase solidarity among immigrants by providing necessary social and economic assistances.

An alternative possibility is that immigrant voluntary organizations may serve as a moderator of this relationship. In this view, immigrant neighborhoods do not necessarily give rise to more immigrant voluntary organizations as a mediator, but rather the ability of immigrant concentration to foster informal social control through informal social networks is enhanced in neighborhoods with more immigrant voluntary organizations providing formal social connections. The consequence is a multiplicative relationship. Our analyses empirically investigated immigrant voluntary organizations as both a potential mediator and moderator in the immigration concentration-neighborhood crime relationship.

As we describe in the paper, a challenge with measuring the effects of voluntary organizations is the possibility of endogeneity. Voluntary organizations may be more likely to locate in more socially disorganized neighborhoods with higher crime rates given the likely

29

greater presence of potential patrons for the services these voluntary organizations provide. At the same time, it is possible that immigrants are more likely to settle in relatively safer neighborhoods. As a consequence, a negative association between immigrant concentration and crime could be temporally endogenous. These considerations suggest the need to utilize longitudinal data to more accurately capture the associations among immigrant concentration, voluntary organizations, and neighborhood crime, which we do in the analyses.

In the analyses, we examine neighborhoods in the LA metro area, an ideal setting for the study because it is racially and ethnically heterogeneous and is one of the largest destinations among diverse groups of immigrants from around the world. Our measure of the number of immigrant-serving organizations comes from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) data, which provide information on voluntary organizations including addresses and the types of activities/operations. We geocoded all organizations from 2000 to 2010 using ArcGIS 10.2 and aggregated to egohoods. We used NCCS information on an organization's activities/operations to create a category directly related to social services for immigrants: Immigrant-serving organizations. We also constructed three organizational measures that may indirectly serve immigrants in neighborhoods: 1) Human Services, 2) International and Foreign Affairs, and 3) Civil Rights, Social Action, Advocacy.

In negative binomial regression models that test for the main, mediating, and moderating effects of immigrant-serving organizations, we find that immigrant-serving organizations generally have crime-reducing effects for all types of crime (aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft). More specifically, we first assessed how much smaller the coefficients of percent foreign-born are compared to those without immigration organization measures as an assessment of a mediation effect. We find that the coefficients are

30

substantially similar, suggesting little evidence of a mediation effect of the organizational measures in the models. At the same time, we observe that immigrant-serving organizations generally appear crime reducing for all types of crime, even if they do not operate as a mediator of the immigrant concentration measure. For example, one more immigrant-serving organization is associated with 3 to 6 percent lower crime rates one year later for the five crime types. In conclusion, we show that high immigrant concentration is associated with lower levels of crime in general, and this effect is moderated by the number of organizations, which underlines the importance of accounting for these organizations when studying the nexus of immigrant concentration and neighborhood crime. Details regarding the methods and findings from this paper can be found here (https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00111287221084289).

Moving to the secondary aim of the proposal, we have conducted a series of analyses that begin to address questions of how the broader context, specifically the city-level context, condition the neighborhood immigration-crime relationship. These analyses are in response to a limitation in the literature—that we have little understanding of how the broader context, including where immigrants settle as well as immigration-related policies and practices, condition the immigration-crime relationship. Stated alternatively, the immigration-crime relationship not varies only across immigrant groups but also across cities with different socio-economic and demographic profiles and where the local government has taken positions that signal cooperation (or lack thereof) with immigration officials. There is scant empirical evidence on how, for example, how a city's demographic and socio-economic profile matter for the neighborhood immigration-crime relationship and on how "sanctuary cities" (or their counterparts, cities with 287-g agreements) impact crime and may condition the immigration-crime nexus.

To address this research lacuna, we estimated multilevel negative binomial regression models using our 2010 and 2018 NICS data. Given that only a subset of cities have crime data at both timepoints, we estimated separate models on these two samples. This allowed us to assess the stability of the results across these different samples at two different timepoints.

In these models, we included our standard set of neighborhood-level control variables. These included concentrated disadvantage, residential stability, racial composition (percent Black, Latino, Asian, and other race), racial/ethnic heterogeneity (the Herfindahl Index), percent vacant units, percent aged 16 to 29, population (logged), population density, the number of consumer-facing employees (logged), and the number of nonconsumer-facing employees (logged). We also included percent immigrants in the neighborhood, and tested for nonlinear effects by including various polynomial versions of this measure given previous results described above. We also included city-level control variables to minimize the possibility of obtaining spurious results: these include percent immigrants; average household income; racial composition (percent Black, percent Latino, percent Asian); racial/ethnic heterogeneity; racial/ethnic segregation; income inequality; income segregation; and population density (logged).

We estimated four models: one each for property and violent crime in 2010, and one each for property and violent crime in 2018. The crime rates are averaged over three years: 2009-2011 for 2010, and 2017-2019 for 2018. Many of the results are quite consistent over both time periods. The relationship between immigrant concentration in neighborhoods and crime was consistent: at both timepoints we observed a U-shaped relationship between percent immigrants and violent crime. And a quartic function well-fit the relationship between percent immigrants and property crime at both timepoints.

The control variables also showed consistency. Neighborhoods with more concentrated disadvantage had much higher violent crime at both time points, and somewhat more property crime. Neighborhoods with more residential instability, racial/ethnic heterogeneity and vacant units had more violent and property crime at both timepoints. Neighborhoods with a higher percentage of Black or Latino residents had higher violent and property crime rates at both timepoints. Neighborhoods with greater population density had higher violent crime rates at both timepoints, whereas those with more employees had higher violent and property crime rates— and this effect was particularly strong for consumer-facing employees.

Among the city-level measures there was also general consistency. Cities with a greater immigrant concentration had lower violent crime rates at both timepoints, although they did have more property crime in 2010 (but not 2018). Cities with more inequality had higher violent crime rates at both timepoints, and more property crime in 2018. Cities with greater population density have higher violent crime rates at both timepoints. Cities with a greater Latino population had higher violent crime rates at both timepoint. There were some differences for racial and income segregation. Whereas cities with more racial segregation have higher crime rates in 2010, they have lower crime rates in 2018. However, income segregation had the opposite effect as cities with more income segregation had higher crime rates in 2018.

Moving to the research questions of greatest interest, while it is possible to test interactions between the percent immigrants in neighborhoods and several key city-level measures, we focus here on the relationship between neighborhood immigrant concentration and city-level immigrant concentration. At both time points we found consistent statistically significant interactions, reflecting the larger point that city context matters. For violent crime, we found the neighborhood immigrant concentration has by far the strongest negative relationship in

33

cities with higher concentrations of immigrants. Thus, immigrant concentration neighborhoods exhibited a slowing negative relationship with violent crime in these cities, with no evidence that the relationship turned positive at higher immigrant concentrations (which would otherwise be the case with the polynomial estimation). Instead, it was only in cities with smaller immigrant concentrations where we found that the relationship with violent crime turned positive at higher concentrations of immigrants in neighborhoods. This is consistent with the findings of our published article with these data for 2010 in *British Journal of Criminology*. This pattern was robust across both timepoints.

We also saw a consistent pattern for this cross-level interaction for property crime. Whereas there was a negative relationship between neighborhood immigrant concentration and property crime in cities with a smaller immigrant concentration, this negative relationship was enhanced in cities with a larger immigrant concentration. Again, this pattern was robust across both timepoints. We are currently in the process of writing up these findings for a paper we will soon submit to a peer-reviewed journal.

Beyond city-level demographic and socio-economic characteristics, a focus of our project was on the broader policy context in which immigrant neighborhoods are situated. In particular, we were interested in determining the impact of sanctuary city status on the level of crime in our sample of immigrant neighborhoods.

Focusing on sanctuary status allows us to examine how cooperation between the local and federal government affects the immigration-crime relationship. While immigration is federal policy, the extent to which local governments actively cooperate with immigration enforcement can affect the ability of both institutions to operate as intended. If local governments actively cooperate with ICE agents, this can increase the ability of federal agents to detect and remove

non-citizens who commit crime. This may enhance public safety through incapacitation (as criminals are deported after conviction or sentencing) and through deterrence, as the penalties for criminal behavior will be higher. Alternately, it may be the case that perceived cooperation of local and federal agents leads to system avoidance by people who are, or who may be perceived to be, non-citizens. To the extent that system avoidance by victims or witnesses reduces crimes known to police, or the ability of police to clear offences they know about, cooperation could reduce public safety.

To examine these issues and address these questions, we ran a series of models. For these analyses, we created a measure of whether the city, or the county, was classified as a sanctuary city. In general, "sanctuary city" is a term applied to jurisdictions that limit cooperation with ICE. While there is no formal, federally recognized definition of a sanctuary city, until early 2017, ICE periodically released a report that included a "Table of Jurisdictions that have Enacted Policies which Restrict Cooperation with ICE." This table includes all localities ICE was able to identify as "non-cooperative jurisdictions" as of the final report in February 2017. It offers a brief description of each policy and includes the month and year that each policy was enacted. For the purposes of this study, we define any jurisdiction that appears on this list as a "sanctuary city." (Note: we make one exception for the statewide policy enacted by California. This policy appears to only give permission to localities within the state to decline detainers issued by ICE. It does not mandate that localities decline detainers from ICE, and several California localities enacted their own, individual policies around the same time. For this reason, we only consider localities in California to be sanctuary cities if they separately enact their own local policy"). The policies are largely comprised of sheriff statements of noncooperation with ICE, changes in jail policy, and updates to municipal codes. They may do as little as placing limits on how long the

jurisdiction will cooperate with ICE in certain circumstances or as much as prohibiting the honoring of detainers issued by ICE altogether. The full report has been removed from ICE's website but can be accessed via Wayback Machine (http://web.archive.org/web/20210104222956/https://www.ice.gov/declined-detainer-report). The table of non-cooperative jurisdictions can be found in Section III of the last report. We have digitized this table and used it to assign sanctuary status to localities in our data based on the month, year, and jurisdiction of policy enactment. In the rare event that a locality has multiple overlapping policies (e.g., Cook County enacts a policy in 2011, and Chicago enacts a municipal policy in 2012), sanctuary status is determined by the earliest recorded policy. While there's no "official" way to define a sanctuary city, we believe ICE's list is the best option. Arguably, the policies recognized by ICE are the most consequential, and lists provided by non-government organizations are subject to the organization's discretion about what constitutes a sanctuary city policy.

After classifying sanctuary status, we estimated multilevel negative binomial regression models using the crime data from 2018. By this time point, all of the cities or counties were already classified as either sanctuary status, or non-sanctuary status. We estimated models for aggregated violent crime and property crime (averaged over the three years of 2017-2019). We included our standard set of tract-level control variables in these models, as reviewed above. We also included city-level control variables to minimize the possibility of obtaining spurious results for the sanctuary city measures: percent immigrants; average household income; racial composition (percent Black, percent Latino, percent Asian); racial/ethnic heterogeneity; racial/ethnic segregation; income inequality; income segregation; and population density (logged).

In the initial, baseline multilevel models, we find in both models that tracts with a higher percentage of immigrants have lower violent and property crime rates. We also find that cities with a higher percentage of immigrants have lower violent and property crime rates, on average. The control variables are generally in line with expectations. Neighborhoods with more residential stability or a higher percent aged 16-29 have less violent and property crime. Neighborhoods with a higher percent Black, Latino, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, vacant units, population and population density, and consumer and non-consumer businesses have more violent and property crime. Neighborhoods with more concentrated disadvantage and percent Asian have more violent crime. Neighborhoods in cities with a higher percent immigrants and more racial segregation have less violent and property crime. Neighborhoods in cities with more income inequality and income segregation have more violent and property crime. Neighborhoods in cities with higher average household income have less property crime, whereas those in cities with more population density have more violent crime.

Moving to the central focus of the analysis, we next asked whether sanctuary status of cities impacts the immigration-crime relationship observed. Again, we measured sanctuary status based on whether the city itself has declared sanctuary status, or whether the city is in a county that declared sanctuary status. We estimated both the main effect of sanctuary status: that is, do neighborhoods in sanctuary status cities have more crime, on average. We also tested whether there are moderating effects in which the relationship with crime for cities with more immigrants, or neighborhoods with more immigrants, is different in sanctuary cities.

In the violent crime models, the initial model tests for the main effect of sanctuary status, and we find no evidence that violent crime is higher, or lower, in sanctuary status cities. In the second model we tested whether there is an interaction effect between the percent immigrants in

37

the city and whether it has sanctuary status, and the result is statistically nonsignificant. In the third model we also tested the interaction between the percent immigrants in the tract and sanctuary status and again found no statistical significance. Thus, we find no evidence that sanctuary status impacts the level of violent crime in neighborhoods of these cities, nor that it changes the level of violence in neighborhoods with high immigrant concentration.

We estimated similar models for property crime. In the first model, we found that neighborhoods in cities with sanctuary status have higher property crime rates, on average. However, in the second model, we find this is unrelated to the percent of immigrants in the city, as the interaction effect was close to zero. In fact, we find in the third model that the negative relationship between percent immigrants in a neighborhood and property crime becomes even stronger in a sanctuary city. While there is a negative relationship between neighborhood percent immigrants and property crime in non-sanctuary cities, this negative coefficient is about 60% larger in sanctuary cities. We are currently in the process of writing up these findings for a paper we will soon submit to a peer-reviewed journal.

Finally, we have additional analyses that we hope to complete moving forward. The following are specific papers we are or soon will be working on:

- Immigrant compositions and crime: models using novel measures of immigrant composition, including education level, income level, and neighborhood clustering.
- Immigrant compositions, city context and crime: Extending the prior models by assessing how these relationships are moderate by key city contexts, including inequality, and racial and income segregation.

- Documented and undocumented immigration and crime: extending baseline models by assessing how these relationships are moderated by key city contexts, including the immigrant receiving context of the city.

- Broader city context and the immigration-crime relationship: Longitudinal models assessing how the immigration-crime relationship is moderated by the immigrant receiving context of the city.

- Broader city context and the immigration-crime relationship: Longitudinal models assessing how change in city context moderates the relationship between immigration and crime.

<u>Artifacts</u>

List of products (e.g., publications, conference papers, technologies, websites, databases),

including locations of these products on the Internet or in other archives or databases

<u>Publications/Papers:</u>

Kubrin, Charis E., Xiaoshuang Iris Luo, and John Hipp. 2024 "Immigration and Crime: Is the

Relationship Nonlinear?" *British Journal of Criminology*. Forthcoming.

Kubrin, Charis E. and John R. Hipp. "Immigration and Crime: The Role of Immigrant

Heterogeneity." Paper drafted, about to be submitted to peer-reviewed journal.

Hipp, John, Charis E. Kubrin, Christopher Bates, Christopher Contreras, Xiaoshuang Iris Luo,

and Cheyenne Hodgen. 2023. *Technical Report Series: TR-2023-01, Documentation: National*

Incident Crime Study (NICS). Irvine Laboratory for the Study of Space and Crime.

[https://tinyurl.com/3vkbydep]

Kim, Young-An, John Hipp, and Charis E. Kubrin. 2022. "Immigrant Organizations and

Neighborhood Crime." *Crime & Delinquency* 68:1948-1976.

(https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00111287221084289?icid=int.sj-abstract.citing-articles.17)

<u>Data Sets Generated</u>

40

1) National Incident Crime Study Data: We created an unparalleled national neighborhood-level crime data set that includes information on crime in over 15,000 neighborhoods across a diverse range of hundreds of U.S. cities. The NICS is an unprecedented data project as it provides crime incident data at various time points for a large number of cities (n = 630) that vary considerably in size and geographic location. Although the sampling frame was not random, the data are relatively representative of cities across the U.S. We cleaned and geocoded the data, and only include crime data that reasonably match the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data that is reported by the city to the FBI. As far as we are aware, no other data source offers information on neighborhood crime in such a diverse range of contexts throughout the U.S.

2) We have created datasets in the Census Research Data Center (CRDC). These data use household-level data for the Census in 2000 and the American Community Surveys beginning in 2005 to create neighborhood-measures for our ecological models. This required us to make proper measures based on the characteristics of persons living within a particular census tract or egohood, and also to create proper measures based on the households living within those geographic units. We then aggregated the data to tracts or egohoods for the final analyses. These data allow us to create unique measures not available in the public-use Census data. This dataset must remain in this secure environment, and can only be used for our statistical analyses.

3) We created city-level data sets to capture the broader context in which immigrant neighborhoods are situated. Demographic (e.g., immigrant population, racial/ethnic

composition) and socio-economic (e.g., level of economic disadvantage and inequality) measures along with measures reflecting immigration policy and practice (e.g., Sanctuary status) reflect key aspects of the broader context.

4) We produced nationality-specific data from TRACFed data on immigration removal cases filed and adjudicated from 2010 to 2018, aggregated to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) field office level, linked to individual counties. While the data and data products are restricted by a data sharing agreement, the code used to aggregate the raw data provided by TRACFed will be made publicly available.

Dissemination Activities

Invited Academic Talks:

2024   SUNY Buffalo, Department of Sociology. "New Directions in Research on Immigration and Crime." March 29.

2023   University of California, Irvine, Center for Population, Inequality, and Policy, School of Social Sciences, "Immigration and Crime: Is the Relationship Non-Linear?" June 1.

2023   University of Miami, Department of Sociology and Criminology, "New Directions in Research on Immigration and Crime." March 22.

2022   San Diego State University, Department of Sociology, "New Directions in

                Research on Immigration and Crime." May 3.

2021   Tulane University, Department of Sociology, "New Directions in Research on

                Immigration and Crime." November 12. (virtual due to COVID19)

2021   University of Pennsylvania, Department of Criminology, "New Directions in

                Research on Immigration and Crime." September 22. (virtual due to COVID19)

2021   Penn State University, Department of Sociology and Criminology, "New

                Directions in Research on Immigration and Crime." May 13. (virtual due to

                COVID19)

2021   University of Maryland, Spatial Multiscale Analytics, Applied Research and

                Technology (SMAART) Seminar Series, "Accounting for Spatial Mobility:

                Consequences for Ecological Studies of Crime." August. (virtual due to

                COVID19)

Invited Public Talks:

2024   Council on Criminal Justice, "Immigration and Crime: Taking Stock." April 23.

2022   Division on People of Color and Crime, American Society of Criminology and
                Jane Addams College of Social Work, University of Illinois Chicago, "Advancing
                Public Scholarship that is 'Controversial'." April 12.

2021   National Press Foundation, "Rethinking Crime and Immigration." November 16.

Papers Delivered at Professional Meetings:

Kubrin, Charis E., John Hipp, and Emily Owens. "Immigration and Crime in Context: An

> Examination Across Neighborhoods in a Large Sample of U.S. Cities." *American Society*

> *of Criminology*, Atlanta, 2022. (This panel was NIJ sponsored)

> Following the conference, PI Kubrin was contacted by Paul Haskins, Senior

> Writer/Editor NCJRS Communications, who wanted to incorporate some of the key

> findings we discussed in a short web piece he wrote on the subject for the NIJ website.

Kubrin, Charis E. Invited panelist on panel, Engaging with the Public in Communities, Place,

> and Crime Research (Organized by the Division of Communities, Place, and Crime).

> *American Society of Criminology*, Chicago, 2021.

Media Engagement:

12/7/20   <u>Scientific American</u>, research profiled and quoted in "Undocumented Immigrants

> Are Half as Likely to Be Arrested for Violent Crimes as U.S.-Born Citizens"

10/27/20   <u>The Conversation</u>, research profiled in "Undocumented immigrants may actually

> make American communities safer – not more dangerous – new study finds"

8/17/20   <u>Christian Science Monitor</u>, Perception Gaps podcast, interviewed for segment,

> "Why do Americans think more immigration means more crime?"