This report on the 2007 National Summit on Intelligence Sharing: Gathering, Sharing, Analysis and Use After 9-11: Measuring Success and Setting Goals for the Future constitutes a followup to the initial 2002 intelligence summit, as it focused on both the progress made since the terrorist attacks of 2001 and the work remaining to be done.
Participants in the followup 2007 summit concluded that many of the Nation's law enforcement agencies do not participate in the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan that resulted from the 2002 summit. Too many State, local, and tribal agencies apparently underestimate the importance of their participation in the criminal intelligence sharing process, overestimate the burdens of full participation, and/or remain unaware of how to contribute to the goals and objectives of the Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. In explaining criminal intelligence sharing, this report indicates that criminal intelligence sharing is the exchange of an analytical product designed to help police prevent, respond to, investigate, and solve crimes. The analytical product is the result of the intelligence process, which includes the following steps: planning/direction, information collection, analysis, production, and feedback. Recent cases, such as the Lackawanna Six in New York, illustrate how local law enforcement, through the effective use of criminal intelligence, plays a key role in detecting terrorist threats and protecting national security. The 2007 summit produced eight recommendations. One recommendation is that every State, local, and tribal law enforcement agency in the Nation develop and maintain a criminal intelligence capability that, at a minimum, involves formal criminal intelligence awareness training for at least one sworn officer; training for all sworn personnel in recognizing behavior that may be associated with terrorist criminal activity; and prescribed procedures and mechanisms for communication with the nearest fusion center and/or a regional information sharing network.