NCJ Number
158527
Date Published
1995
Length
7 pages
Annotation
This paper examines U.S. policy related to the use of the military in training foreign domestic police in the context of a U.S. intervention other than war.
Abstract
During the four most recent U.S. operations other than war (OOTW) -- Haiti, Somalia, Panama, and Grenada -- the U.S. government has grappled with emergency law enforcement issues. In the course of each of these operations, civilian law and order broke down, and the Department of Defense (DoD), the State Department, and other agencies argued over who should be responsible for restoring it and how. During the past 10 years, DoD has resisted law-enforcement missions, arguing that the armed forces exist largely, if not exclusively, to fight and win the Nation's wars; nevertheless, in a number of significant OOTW, U.S. military forces found themselves conducting civilian police training. Given that civilian agencies of the U.S. government are ill-equipped and ill-suited to perform many aspects of these training missions, the formal assignment of responsibilities would allow the military to plan and train for this mission. Given the Army's significant military police capabilities, it is appropriate to assign to it primary constabulary training responsibilities. Military police could conduct joint patrols and other operations with host-nation forces to ensure they are properly trained and that they have developed adequate respect for fundamental human rights. A strict limit would be placed on the amount of time DoD personnel could be engaged in these activities. Military-run training would be limited to a maximum of 6 months, beginning with the end of formal hostilities. There is an urgent need to strengthen the ability of civilian organizations to plan for and conduct law-enforcement training in the aftermath of an OOTW. 15 notes