NCJ Number
192157
Date Published
2001
Length
20 pages
Annotation
In challenging the view that private police are not under the scrutiny of accountability to the same degree as public police, this paper argues that such an assertion takes insufficient account of the various mechanisms through which private police may be held accountable in democratic societies.
Abstract
In most jurisdictions in North America and Europe, there is now some formal state regulation of at least some private policing operatives and organizations, although the scope and extent of this regulation varies greatly from one country to another. Some countries (e.g., the United Kingdom) have officially encouraged industry self-regulation as an alternative to formal state regulation of private policing by the state. Industry self-regulation typically seeks to achieve similar objectives to those of formal state regulation and often through similar means. Like their public police counterparts, private policing organizations and operatives are subject to the criminal laws of the jurisdictions in which they operate and may be held accountable for violations of these laws. Further, civil suits against private policing personnel and organizations, although not always easy to sustain, have been plentiful and often successful in many jurisdictions. In addition, mechanisms for collective bargaining, grievance processing, and arbitration in the workplace, along with broader labor legislation concerning such matters as procedures for union certification, strikes, and lockouts, etc., all provide vehicles through which private policing activities can be held accountable to management, workers, and unions. Finally, the marketplace itself provides substantial opportunities through which private policing can be held effectively accountable to the public as consumers. Companies that engage in overly aggressive or inappropriate private policing may often find that their customers will shift their patronage to other companies. 86 references and 8 notes