NCJ Number
188789
Journal
Journal of Criminal Justice Volume: 29 Issue: 3 Dated: May/June 2001 Pages: 171-187
Editor(s)
Kent B. Joscelyn
Date Published
May 2001
Length
17 pages
Annotation
This article presents evidence showing that a substantial proportion of law enforcement agencies are dependent on civil asset forfeiture for budget supplementation and necessary income.
Abstract
Civil asset forfeiture allows for the seizure and forfeiture of property derived from or used to facilitate certain crimes. It is designed to weaken the economic foundations of the illicit drug trade and assist law enforcement in reducing drug-related crime. Civil asset forfeiture has become controversial since law enforcement officials share in the proceeds derived from forfeitures. Critics claim that this potential for profit in law enforcement is the driving force behind civil asset forfeiture and that the goals of controlling crime and reducing illicit drug use are not high priorities. The research in this article partially substantiates the critics’ claim and then offers an explanation for this occurrence. Results from a survey of 1400 municipal and county law enforcement executives revealed that a substantial proportion of law enforcement agencies are dependent on civil asset forfeiture as a necessary budgetary supplement. The dependence on civil asset forfeiture is positively associated with revenues generated from past forfeiture activities and inversely related to fiscal expenditures. The dependency on civil asset forfeiture was explained in terms of three primary factors: (1) fiscal expenditures; (2) past experiences with forfeitures; and (3) state regulations governing the disposition and distribution of forfeited assets. The article states that as long as law enforcement agencies remain dependent on civil asset forfeiture a conflict of interest between effective crime control and creative fiscal management will exist. References