Adjudication of Guilt or Innocence by Trial (From Criminal Justice Administration Cases and Materials, Fourth Edition, P 997-1096, 1991, Frank W Miller, Robert O Dawson, et al. -- See NCJ-129355)

• NCJ Number: 129378
• Author(s): F W Miller; R O Dawson; G E Dix; R I Parnas
• Date Published: 1991
• Length: 100 pages
• Sale Source: Foundation Press
• Publication Type: Legislation/Policy Description
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This chapter on the criminal trial as a method of adjudicating guilt or innocence considers the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the right to trial by jury; the rights to confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process; and the privilege against self-incrimination.

Abstract

In discussing proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the chapter presents the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) which holds that the due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case. In considering the right to trial by jury, the chapter addresses prosecutions to which the right applies (Duncan v. Illinois); jury composition (Holland v. Illinois); and the jury size and agreement required (Apodaca v. Oregon). Also addressed are witness confrontation (Maryland v. Craig) and cross-examination and compulsory process to obtain witnesses (Chambers v. Mississippi). Issues pertaining to the exercise at trial of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination focus on comment upon and inferences from the failure to testify (Carter v. Kentucky) and waiver of the right against self-incrimination (United States v. Hearst). Case notes are provided.