NCJ Number
72082
Date Published
1977
Length
426 pages
Annotation
The policies and practices of economic crime bureaus in four local prosecutors' offices were studied to analyze different approaches to service delivery and their relationships to political processes.
Abstract
Initially, issues concerning the development and impact of public policy were discussed, particularly in regard to the scope, delivery, and beneficiaries of public services. To explore these questions further, local economic crime bureaus concerned with white-collar crime and consumer fraud were selected for study. These special units usually have a major prosecutorial orientation or an individual complaint handling approach. Choosing between these two strategies presents a dilemma because a major criminal prosecution will delay or even eliminate restitution for the victim, whereas a settlement outside of court may help the victim but allows the criminal to escape legal action. A discussion of the development of economic crime bureaus covers the consumer protection movement and Federal programs. It concludes that these units were not created in response to a manifest local demand but in the expectation that such suppport would be forthcoming after they were in operation. Case studies presented for four economic crime units describe the programs' activities, organizational structure, the political role of the prosecuting attorney, and the character of the resulting bureau performances. These units were selected from a group of 15 bureaus which had constituted the Economic Crime Project initiated by the National District Attorney's Association in 1973. Data were collected from interviews, documents and records, and materials from the Economic Crime Project. The bureaus selected represented a range of approaches; one was oriented to major criminal prosecutions, another focused on serving individual complaints, and others offered both types of services but with different organizational methods. The degree of discretion afforded the chief of the bureau affected the allocation of services in that these officials tended to favor intense criminal action on selected cases which best served investors, businessmen, and the careers of assistant prosecutors rather than consumers. Factors which enabled bureaus to favor certain beneficiaries included control of caseloads by staff attorneys, the diffuseness of popular support for economic crime policies, and the differences in district attorneys' concepts of economic crime. Ironically, the one bureau which focused on consumer conplaints was dependent on the support and presence of the district attorney which limited its potential for future development. Footnotes follow each chapter. The research methodology is described in the appendix.