NCJ Number
213875
Journal
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Volume: 29 Issue: 3 Dated: April-May 2006 Pages: 207-239
Date Published
April 2006
Length
33 pages
Annotation
This article explains the sources of unity that connect violent extremists with nonviolent "puritans" in the Salafi movement (often referred to as the Wahhabis), which includes such diverse individuals as Osama bin Laden and the Mufti of Saudi Arabia.
Abstract
All Salafis share a puritanical approach in implementing the model for Islam defined by the Prophet Muhammad. Yet individuals and groups within the Salafi movement have significantly different positions on such topics as jihad, apostasy, and the priorities of activism. The unifying concepts for all Salafis are the concept of tawhid (the oneness of God) and an unwavering rejection of a role for human reason, logic, and desire in following Islamic principles. Divisions among Salafis have emerged due to the subjective nature of applying religion to new issues and problems. Different readings of Islamic law have produced three major factions: the purists, the politicos, and the jihadis. The purists focus on nonviolent methods of propagating and purifying Islam. Politics is viewed as a diversion that encourages deviancy. Politicos, in contrast, emphasize the application of the Salafi creed to the political arena, since this is where social justice and the laws of God are implemented in society. Jihadis take a more militant position on the propagation and protection of Islam. They argue that current threats to Islam warrant a violent and revolutionary response by the faithful. These divisions are caused by the applications of beliefs, not by the beliefs themselves. This analysis suggests that if the United States wants to influence the Salafi community and prevent its radicalization, it should focus on the competing political analyses and interpretations rather than the specific content of jihadi beliefs. Care should be taken not to provide symbolic or actual threats to Salafis' beliefs, since this might increase support for, if not engagement in, the jihadis strategy of violence. 92 notes