An Argument Against Presenting Interval Quantifications as a Surrogate for the Value of Evidence

• NCJ Number: 255190
• Journal: Science & Justice Volume: 56 Issue: 5 Dated: September 2016 Pages: 383-387
• Author(s): Danica M. Ommen; Christopher P. Saunders; Cedric Neumann
• Date Published: September 2016
• Length: 5 pages
• Grant Number(s): 2014-IJ-CX-K088
• Sponsoring Agency: National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
• Publication Format: Article
• Publication Type: Research (Applied/Empirical); Report (Study/Research); Report (Grant Sponsored); Program/Project Description
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

In this article, the authors argue that interval quantifications for the value of evidence should not be used directly in the Bayesian decision-making process to determine the support of the evidence for one of two competing hypotheses.

Abstract

In the various forensic science disciplines, recent analytical developments paired with modern statistical computational tools have led to the proliferation of ad hoc techniques for quantifying the probative value of forensic evidence. Many legal and scientific scholars agree that the value of evidence should be reported as a likelihood ratio or a Bayes Factor. Quantifying the probative value of forensic evidence is subjected to many sources of variability and uncertainty. There is currently a debate on how to characterize the reliability of the value of evidence. Some authors have proposed associating a confidence/credible interval with the value of evidence assigned to a collection of forensic evidence. (publisher abstract modified)