NCJ Number
78846
Date Published
1980
Length
30 pages
Annotation
The nature and extent of arson-for-profit, current problems in detection and prosecution, and suggestions for an improved deterrence strategy, notably through the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), are discussed.
Abstract
The principal reason for the staggering increase in arson is the perpetrators' large return from a small investment within a short time, coupled with the minimal chances of detection and successful prosecution. An old building is purchased at a relatively cheap price, overinsured through a series of sham transactions among several 'straw' parties over a short time (whether the policy value is greatly inflated after each transaction) and then burned to receive the profit from the insurance company. The scheme is successful because insurance companies often do not inspect either the buildings they insure, the records of property value assessments, or property tax payments. Also, insurance companies generally insure buildings at replacement cost rather than fair market value. These enticing insurance practices, along with other favorable circumstances, have induced organized crime to pursue arson-for-profit. A primary deterrent for such schemes could be the application of RICO's civil triple damages for victims of crimes. Civil proceedings also offer a greater likelihood of gaining a favorable court judgment because of a lesser burden of proof than in criminal trials and other broader discovery opportunities. Other deterrent steps should include the enactment of appropriate State 'immunity' legislation that would permit the free exchange of insurance policyholder information with criminal justice agencies and the reform of insurance practices that would undermine the existing possibilities for profit. A total of 77 footnotes are listed.