NCJ Number
191808
Date Published
1998
Length
4 pages
Annotation
This report is an assessment of the initial response to an attempted bombing of a courthouse in Lafayette, Indiana from a responder safety and effectiveness perspective.
Abstract
On Sunday, August 2, 1998, a stolen pickup truck was driven through the Fourth Street entrance to the Tippecanoe County Courthouse in Lafayette, Indiana. The truck contained both incendiary and improvised explosive devices; while smoke and water caused damage to the first floor of the courthouse, the explosive device failed to detonate. No claims of responsibility were asserted and no arrests have been made as of this writing. Conflicting information has been gathered regarding the initial approach to the scene by the fire department. Dispatchers initially thought that there might have been two separate incidents, one fire and the other a vehicle crash. Communication between dispatchers and response personnel quickly established the fact that the vehicle crash was the only incident and that it was the origin of the fire alarm. Several conclusions were drawn from this study of the Lafayette courthouse attack. First, in many instances, responders cannot know the full extent of any situation when they arrive on scene. For the first several minutes, this incident was thought to be a case of drunk driving. Second, one responder indicated that crime scene issues were not foremost in his mind during the initial attack, even after the devices were discovered; rather the sole objective remained life safety, incident stabilization, and property conservation. The criticality of evidence preservation to ensuring a successful prosecution cannot be understated, and the case could be made that the objectives of incident stabilization and property conservation at least indirectly support the consideration of these issues from the initial attack on. These principles contribute to the protection of the crime scene from degradation by smoke, fire, and responder actions, and must be given consideration when implementing an emergency response. Third, interagency communication was enhanced by the use of common radio channels. However, if it is in fact the case that two-way radios were used in close proximity to the courthouse, the risk of detonation of the explosive device may have been substantially increased due to the hazard presented by RF transmissions in proximity to some kinds of explosive device triggering system. Response agencies should have procedures in place for ensuring safe and effective communications when explosive devices may be present. Fourth, it appeared that there was initially some uncertainty as to how far back the perimeter should be established and how close to the courthouse the command post could safely be located. While safe distances were eventually determined, it appears that many responders may have been too close. Fifth, management of the media is critical in incidents of this nature, and the smoothness of public information operations is testament to the value of good public information planning both before the incident as well as on the scene. A final lesson learned is that no community can ever say, “It can’t happen here.” No community is exempt from mass violence anymore, and responders of all sectors must learn to be vigilant to all the potential hazards emerging today.