NCJ Number
187502
Journal
American Criminal Law Review Volume: 37 Issue: 4 Dated: Fall 2000 Pages: 1429-1472
Editor(s)
Stacey E. Ostfeld
Date Published
2000
Length
44 pages
Annotation
This note presents a historical overview of the Beck doctrine and a critical analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's 8-1 decision to convict and impose the death sentence on Reeves, a man charged with felony murder in Nebraska.
Abstract
The Beck doctrine was an important cornerstone in the Supreme Court's quest to bring rationality and order to capital sentencing. In an appraisal of the factors that go into a capital jury's decision-making process, the Supreme Court acknowledged that forcing a choice between conviction on capital murder and outright acquittal would inevitably result in bias toward the former. The author believes the decision in the Reeves case represents a de facto abandonment of the Beck doctrine. While the Reeves opinion, on its face, recognizes the dangers of presenting a capital jury with an all-or-nothing choice between death and acquittal, the opinion sanctions a capital sentencing scheme that contemplates that very impermissible dichotomy. Because Reeves does not explicitly over-rule Beck, States are still prohibited from adopting an across-the-board prohibition on the charging of lesser included offenses in all capital cases. Instead of issuing a blanket rule covering all capital offenses, State legislatures may now redefine the elements of individual capital crimes, such as felony murder, as having no lesser included offenses. Protected by the shield of "State autonomy," each of these offenses can then be presented to capital juries as the sort of yes-no proposition condemned in Beck. The author concludes the Beck doctrine has been transformed from an important constitutional protection to little more than a hollow rule of statutory construction. 307 footnotes