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Between Demand and Supply: Bribery in International Trade

NCJ Number
215228
Journal
Crime, Law and Social Change Volume: 44 Issue: 1 Dated: 2005 Pages: 111-131
Author(s)
Hung-En Sung
Date Published
2005
Length
21 pages
Annotation
This study developed and tested two hypotheses on the dynamics of transnational bribery in international trade.
Abstract
The analysis of cross-national data found no support for the demand-pull hypothesis, which views multinational corporations as victims of corruption in host countries and predicts a positive relationship between corruption in host countries and bribery by guest businesses. On the other hand, the findings provide strong support for the supply-push hypothesis, which views multinational corporations as proactive parties and proposes a positive relationship between pro-bribery conditions in exporting countries and the inclination of their multinational corporations to engage in foreign bribery. The countermeasures being promoted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) hold promise. The OECD's strategy relies on collaboration among states that have advanced economies, the media, and the global civil society to change the legal environment of international trade and instill new corporate habits. The sample for this study consisted of the 19 leading exporting countries included in the Bribe Payers Survey conducted by Transparency International (TI) in 1999. Corporations headquartered in these 19 countries are involved in the overwhelming bulk of foreign investment and large-scale international contracting. Data were collected from 779 interviews with senior business executives working or living in 14 emerging market economies that account for over 60 percent of imports to all emerging market economies. Questions were asked about respondents' knowledge and experiences of bribery that involved multinational firms in public contract and tenders and the granting of licenses by government officials. To determine the demand for bribes in importing countries, a weighted index of perceived corruption and the weighted average tariff rate of all imported products among the top four export trading partners of each exporting country were computed based on the TI Corruption perceptions Index and the World Bank database, respectively. 5 tables, 2 figures, and 50 references

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