NCJ Number
191286
Journal
Journal of American Medical Association Volume: 278 Issue: 5 Dated: August 6, 1997 Pages: 351-356
Date Published
August 1997
Length
6 pages
Annotation
This document addresses the prospects and implications for the future of biological weapons control.
Abstract
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the acquisition of biological materials for hostile purposes and armed conflict. Entered into force in 1975, it now has the participation of 140 nations. However, there is no monitoring mechanism. Diplomatic efforts to create a supplemental, legally binding protocol to strengthen the convention are now under way. Efforts to improve domestic and global surveillance of infectious diseases represent part of an initiative that can strengthen the BWC. When the convention was signed only a handful of countries were known or suspected of having an offensive biological weapons program. Now that number has doubled. The Soviet Union pursued an offensive program in spite of established international legal and moral prohibitions. Concerns still persist about the veracity and completeness of Russian assurances and statements. Intelligence agencies underestimated the size and scope of the Iraqi biological weapons program. Iraq could reconstitute its biological weapons program in a matter of weeks once sanctions are removed. Primary prevention of biological weapons rests on creating a strong global norm that rejects biological weapons development or use. Secondary prevention implies early detection and prompt treatment of disease. A future protocol that ensures an effective mechanism to permit investigation of occurrences such as suspicious outbreaks of disease or alleged use can simultaneously enhance global security and public health. 27 references