NCJ Number
192069
Date Published
2001
Length
26 pages
Annotation
This chapter examines chemical and biological terrorism in light of increased incidents in the United States as well as globally.
Abstract
In order to understand the potential threats, consequences, and vulnerabilities resulting from the intentional releases of chemical and/or biological (CB) agents, a review is needed of environmental and agent components affecting toxicity/infectivity. Bioagents most likely to be used in terrorist attacks are anthrax, botulinum toxin, and ricin. Chemical agents may include cyanide blood agents, mustard gas-type vesicants, and organophosphate nerve agents. Less toxic substances could be used to cause large-scale injuries to the community. One of the principal advantages of chemical and bioterrorism agents is their extreme toxicity in small quantities. These agents must have the ability to form and be delivered in respirable aerosol concentrations to result in mass casualties. An attack using chemical weapons is quite destructive and can cause immediate and severe mass casualties. The most lethal of these chemical agents are the nerve gases, especially the organophosphates. Terrorists could manufacture CB agents, purchase them directly from legitimate businesses, or steal them from agricultural, chemical, and/or research facilities. Biological agents may occur naturally or be obtained from culture collection laboratories in the United States. Recommendations for preventing a CB attack include development of “real-time” biological sensors, and establishment of tighter regulations dealing with the acquisition and use of CB agents, as well as the equipment used for aerosol dissemination. Also recommended is increased public awareness and education as to the threat posed by CB agent assaults, coordination between all intelligence, training, and military communities and increased training of local emergency managers. Vaccine, antibody, and antidote research and development need to be adequately funded. The responder community needs the development of adequate and “user friendly” protective equipment. The creation and maintenance of regional biological/chemical task forces would go a long way in assisting the local responders in mitigating “agents of mass destruction” incidents. 23 endnotes