NCJ Number
116360
Journal
American Journal of Sociology Volume: 94 Issue: 3 Dated: (November 1988) Pages: 535-562
Date Published
1988
Length
27 pages
Annotation
This article analyzes the role of regulatory interests in norm emergence within the context of collective criminal sanctions.
Abstract
Various theories of norm emergence have been proposed by social psychologists, sociologists, and economists that indicate norm emergence depends on actor preferences regarding their own behavior, actor preference regarding others' behavior, and measures for enforcing prisoner norms. In considering the role of regulatory interests in norm emergence, the analysis focuses on collective sanction systems in which an individual violates a rule and that individual as well as other members of the individual's group are collectively punished or rewarded. Collective criminal sanctions thus give individuals an incentive to regulate one another's behavior. When a group is subjected to collective sanctions, various responses may be rational. The ultimate stability of collective sanction system depends on the strength of group member incentives to choose compliance over the best available alternative (revolt or passivity), whichever is preferred. A theoretical model is proposed in which the optimum response to collective criminal sanctions depends on group size, internal cohesion, and related factors. 54 references, 4 figures. (Author abstract modified)