NCJ Number
130348
Journal
Crime, Law and Social Change Volume: 16 Issue: 1 Dated: special issue (July 1991) Pages: 3-39
Date Published
1991
Length
37 pages
Annotation
Colombia's main drug trafficking coalitions, the Medellin and Cali syndicates, constitute powerful but illegitimate interest groups.
Abstract
Drug traffickers, particularly the Medellin Cartel, expert political influence through violence and intimidation. They also use noncoercive means such as bribery, contributions to political campaigns, and open lobbying in the media to achieve political objectives. Conventional law enforcement strategies have not been effective against the cocaine mafia which is well-entrenched in Colombian society. Wide domestic opposition to the drug war has prompted Colombia to adopt the unconventional strategy of negotiating the voluntary withdrawal of major drug traffickers from the drug trade. Negotiation is viewed as one possible supply side strategy and will be worthwhile if it cripples existing drug businesses and provides the knowledge needed to improve the fight against future cocaine operations. However, Colombia's interests center more on ending mafia-inspired violence than on terminating the drug trade per se. The United States will have to participate at some level in Colombia's dialogue with drug traffickers in order to reduce the annual flood of 400 to 700 tons of Colombian cocaine into U.S. markets. The organization, tactics, and operations of cocaine syndicates are described as well as their coalitions, organizational and financial resources, military and logistic capabilities, and internal structures. The penetration of legitimate economic and political institutions by drug traffickers and ties to guerrilla groups are also discussed. 64 notes (Author abstract modified)