NCJ Number
62561
Date Published
1975
Length
14 pages
Annotation
DISCUSSION OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND OF THE RISK OF WEAPONS PROLIFERATION PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS ON WORLDWIDE CONTROL OF ATOMIC MATERIALS AND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES.
Abstract
GIVEN THE REQUIRED NUCLEAR MATERIALS, ANY COUNTRY COULD DESIGN AND BUILD NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. CONCEIVABLY, EVEN INDIVIDUALS COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND EQUIPMENT AND CONSTRUCT A CRUDE ATOMIC BOMB. ALTHOUGH THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL IS MORE DIFFICULT THAN THE PRODUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVES, TERRORISTS COULD STEAL THE NECESSARY 'WEAPONS GRADE' URANIUM OR PLUTONIUM. OPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES WISHING TO ACQUIRE ATOMIC EXPLOSIVES INCLUDE THE THEFT OF COMPLETE WEAPONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, THE PURCHASING OF ATOMIC REACTORS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING NUCLEAR MATERIAL, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF HIGH ENERGY PHYSICS LABORATORIES. THE LATTER FACILITIES WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO THE SAFEGUARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, BUT SUCH LABORATORIES COULD PRODUCE FISSIONABLE MATERIALS. A VERY HIGH LEVEL OF SECURITY COULD BE PROVIDED FOR ALL SUCH MATERIALS IN THE UNITED STATES AT REASONABLE COST. HOWEVER, THE MATERIALS USED BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES MAY BE DIVERTED MORE EASILY OR STOLEN BY NONNATIONAL GROUPS. BY 1982, OVER 35 DIFFERENT COUNTRIES COULD HAVE NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS AND A CAPACITY FOR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT. ALTHOUGH SEVERE RESTRICTIONS COULD BE IMPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES IN AGREEMENTS WITH COUNTRIES THAT PURCHASE AMERICAN NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT, NO GUARANTEE ASSURES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENTS. DIVERSION OF REACTOR FUEL COULD BE PREVENTED BY THE PRESENCE OF INSPECTORS AT FOREIGN RECIPIENTS' NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS, WITH EFFECTIVE USE OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES TO PREVENT THEFT ATTEMPTS. (TWK)