NCJ Number
209548
Journal
Criminal Justice Ethics Volume: 23 Issue: 2 Dated: Summer/Fall 2004 Pages: 39-50
Date Published
2004
Length
12 pages
Annotation
In this article, a challenge is presented to the defended communicative account of criminal punishment, favoring the rights of victims, and defends not only victims’ rights, but their responsibilities as victims which depend upon the modest type of communitarianism.
Abstract
Criminal punishment is seen as an essentially communicative enterprise. It aims to, not only communicate what an offender has done wrong, but persuade the offender to accept substantive understanding of his crime as a public wrong. However, what if the offender is not persuaded in their wrongfulness and what if the victim dissents from that portrayal? Researcher Christopher Ciocchetti highlights the status of victims, and whether and how the punishment of “their” offenders can do justice to them. Specifically, what are the responsibilities or duties that victims of crime should have; do they have any moral duty, and should they have a legal duty in either reporting the crime, assisting the police, or giving evidence in court. Dissenting victims become problematic for accounts that insist that crimes must be recognized as wrongs against a particular victim(s) and the larger community. This article identifies the problem created in a case of an “atypical” or dissenting victim, who takes a sincere and reasonable view of the crime and that view differs from the authoritative view expressed by the law and the court, and who is not persuaded of the authoritative view. 52 Notes