NCJ Number
130268
Journal
St. John's Law Review Volume: 64 Issue: 4 Dated: special issue (Fall 1990) Pages: 877-898
Date Published
1990
Length
22 pages
Annotation
Although Congress did not explicitly address the issue of jurisdiction in its hearings on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, there is clear intent on its part to fashion civil RICO's private remedy after Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
Abstract
The Clayton Act mandates exclusive Federal jurisdiction over civil RICO claims. In the 1990 decision of Tafflin v. Levitt, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that State and Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO actions. Petitioners claimed that Congress intended civil RICO claims to be brought solely in Federal district courts, based on the Clayton Act. Petitioners also pointed to RICO's procedural mechanisms which include extended venue and service of process provisions when the action is brought in Federal court. The Supreme Court borrowed procedural provisions from the Clayton Act for use in RICO interpretation involving the statute of limitations period. Nonetheless, it did not find that jurisdiction over claims arising under the Clayton Act is exclusively Federal. There is a need for uniform interpretation of civil RICO provisions, and Federal judges may be the best qualified to make those determinations based on their expertise in adjudicating Federal disputes. By allowing civil RICO actions to be brought in State courts, the Supreme Court may be encouraging forum shopping. Congress should insert a provision in the RICO statute that grants exclusive jurisdiction to Federal courts. 144 footnotes