NCJ Number
138718
Journal
University of Kansas Law Review Volume: 39 Dated: (1991) Pages: 137-149
Date Published
1991
Length
13 pages
Annotation
Following a review of the purpose of the sixth amendment confrontation clause and the evolution of the relevant case law, this article outlines the facts and history of Maryland v. Craig, which involved the use of closed-circuit television for the testimony of children in a child sexual abuse case, and analyzes the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in this case.
Abstract
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment gives a criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has never held that the confrontation clause guarantees defendants an absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with opposing witnesses at trial. Exceptions can be granted when it involves the furtherance of an important public policy. In Maryland v. Craig (1990) the children in a child sexual abuse case were allowed by the court to use closed-circuit television for their testimony pursuant to a Maryland State statute. This statute allows such testimony only after the trial judge has found that the child witness would be unable to "reasonably communicate" at trial if required to testify while facing the accused. The U.S. Supreme Court held in this case that the right to a face-to-face confrontation between a trial witness and the criminal defendant may be supplanted when such confrontation would undermine an important public policy, so long as the reliability of the witness's testimony is otherwise ensured. The parameters for this exception to the confrontation clause are appropriately narrow. Before such an exception can be granted, the trial court must be satisfied that the particular child victim-witness would suffer a level of emotional distress in the defendant's presence sufficiently great to prevent the child from "reasonably communicating." The constitutional safeguards of the confrontation clause are preserved if the statute at issue requires the child witness to testify under oath, allows for a full opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination, and permits the child's demeanor to be observed. This note concludes that the "Craig" decision is a necessary accommodation of a legitimate interest in the criminal trial process. 110 footnotes