NCJ Number
90577
Journal
University of Cincinnati Law Review Volume: 52 Issue: 2 Dated: (1982) Pages: 431-455
Date Published
1983
Length
25 pages
Annotation
This study examines whether two corporations possess the legal capacity to conspire with one another through a single agent who acts on behalf of both corporate entities and whether acquittal of the corporate agents through whom the corporation is alleged to have conspired requires acquittal of the corporate entity itself.
Abstract
The first issue is considered in the context of the case of United States v. Santa Rita Store Co., and the second issue is examined in the case of United States v. General Motors Corp. From a policy standpoint, whether a corporate defendant should be considered a conspirator depends largely on how the goals of conspiracy law would be served by further anthropomorphizing the corporation in the context of the facts, and conventional respondent superior principles seem sufficiently flexible to permit achievement of those goals in a variety of factual settings. In a case such as Santa Rita Store, for example, it is possible to construct both a workable analytical framework and a policy justification for recognizing that corporations are capable of conspiring through a single agent under general conspiracy law. Doctrinal and policy considerations may also support recognition of corporate liability for conspiracy despite acquittals of all agents through whom the corporation is accused of conspiring, as was suggested by the 'General Motors' court. A total of 80 footnotes are provided.