NCJ Number
93649
Journal
University of Pennsylvania Law Review Volume: 132 Issue: 2 Dated: (January 1984) Pages: 327-353
Date Published
1984
Length
27 pages
Annotation
This analysis of the constitutional dimensions of the right to a trial by jury argues that a jury waiver system is not only less restrictive of sixth amendment rights than plea bargaining, but also accomplishes the State's goals by attaining the efficiency objectives currently achieved through plea negotiations.
Abstract
Several major cities have used criminal bench trials for the same purpose that most cities have used plea negotiations: as an inexpensive alternative to jury trials. Both systems provide powerful incentives for defendants to waive their right to a jury trial. Three lines of Supreme Court cases are relevant to determining whether incentives to waive the right to a trial by jury are constitutional: cases upholding plea bargaining, those considering unconstitutional conditions, and cases involving vindictive sentencing. After examining these decisions and relevant case law, the author concludes that the right to a trial by jury is not an absolute right, but rather one which can be impinged upon by valid State interests. He then develops a three-part test to determine the constitutionality of State infringement on the right to trial by jury: is a constitutional right infringed, is the infringement justified by a compelling State interest, and is the method of promoting the compelling State interest the least restrictive alternative in terms of its impact on constitutional rights. According to these criteria, incentives to waive jury trials are constitutional provided they are implemented by the least restrictive means. Because a jury waiver system is less restrictive than plea bargaining, this analysis mandates that the latter be declared unconstitutional. The paper includes l88 footnotes.