NCJ Number
49332
Journal
NEW YORK LAW FORUM Volume: 18 Issue: 4 Dated: (SPRING 1973) Pages: 997-1006
Date Published
1973
Length
10 pages
Annotation
IN BARKER VERSUS WINGO (1972), THE SUPREME COURT UNANIMOUSLY HELD THAT A 5-YEAR PRETRIAL DELAY DID NOT VIOLATE THE ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.
Abstract
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECISION IS THREEFOLD: (1) IT OVERRULES STATE AND FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS HOLDING THAT WHERE A DEFENDANT DOES NOT ASSERT THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, THAT RIGHT IS DEEMED TO BE WAIVED; (2) IT PROVIDES SOME GUIDELINES ON HOW THE RIGHT SHOULD BE CONSTITUTIONALLY APPROACHED; AND (3) IT MANIFESTS A WILLINGNESS BY THE COURT TO DEFEND A RIGHT WHICH HAD, FOR THE MOST PART, ESCAPED ITS PURVIEW. BARKER AND MANNING, BARKER'S ACCOMPLICE, WERE BOTH INDICATED FOR MURDER. AS THE CASE AGAINST MANNING WAS STRONGER, THE PROSECUTION DECIDED TO TRY MANNING FIRST AND CONVICT BARKER USING MANNING'S TESTIMONY. MANNING WAS TRIED SIX TIMES BEFORE BEING CONVICTED. DURING THIS TIME, THE PROSECUTION WAS GRANTED 16 CONTINUANCES OF BARKER'S TRIAL. BARKER'S COUNSEL MADE NO OBJECTION UNTIL THE 12TH CONTINUANCE. BARKER HAD SPENT THE FIRST 10 MONTHS IN JAIL BEFORE BEING RELEASED ON BAIL. FINALLY AFTER 5 YEARS, HE WAS TRIED, CONVICTED, AND SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT. IN REACHING ITS DECISION, THE SUPREME COURT DIFFERENTIATED THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL FROM OTHER SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN THAT THE SOCIETAL INTEREST INVOLVED IS GREATER, DENIAL OF THE RIGHT MAY WORK TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE ACCUSED, AND THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT ARE EXTRAORDINARILY VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN. THE COURT FLATLY REJECTED APPROACHES WHICH WOULD SPECIFY A TIME PERIOD AND THE APPLICATION OF THE DEMAND WAIVER RULE. INSTEAD THE COURT DECIDED ON A 'BALANCING TEST' TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REASON FOR DELAY, THE DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION OF THE RIGHT, THE LENGTH OF DELAY, AND PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT. IN BARKER, THE COURT FOUND THAT ALTHOUGH THE LENGTH OF DELAY WAS EXTRAORDINARY AND THE REASON NOT VERY STRONG, THERE HAD BEEN MINIMAL PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT AND AN ALMOST COMPLETE ABSENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION OF THE RIGHT. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE SUPREME COURT MUST BE MORE SPECIFIC IN DEFINING THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL; THE CONCEPT REMAINS VAGUE AND AMORPHOUS, AND BY LEAVING THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION OPEN, THE TRIAL JUDGE IS GIVEN ENTIRELY TOO MUCH DISCRETION. EXTENSIVE NOTES ARE PROVIDED. (JAP)