NCJ Number
229302
Date Published
December 2009
Length
47 pages
Annotation
This report presents findings on the U.S. Department of Justice's use and oversight of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements (DPAs and NPAs) as they relate to cases of corporate crime.
Abstract
The report found the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) lacked performance measures to assess how deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements (DPAs and NPAs) contribute its efforts to combat corporate crime. DOJ agreed with the recommendation to develop performance measures to evaluate the contribution of DPAs and NPAs toward achieving its strategic objective of combating public and corporate corruption, and recognizes the value of appropriate performance measures in this area. Two possible measures of DPA and NPA effectiveness could be 1) whether the company repeats the criminal behavior either during or after its agreement; or 2) whether the company successfully implements the terms of the agreement. In DOJ's need to appropriately punish and deter corporate crime, DOJ has made more use of DPAs and NPAs, in which prosecutors may require company reform, as well as other things in exchange for deferring prosecution. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined the extent to which DOJ has used DPAs and NPAs to address corporate misconduct, tracking the use of these agreements, the extent to which DOJ measures the effectiveness of NPAs and DPAs, and the role of the court in the DPA and NPA process. GAO examined 152 DPAs and NPAs negotiated from 1993 through September 2009 and analyzed DOJ data on corporate prosecutions in fiscal years 2004 through 2009. They also interviewed DOJ officials, prosecutors, company representatives, monitors who oversee company compliance, and Federal judges. Figures and tables