NCJ Number
78918
Date Published
1980
Length
19 pages
Annotation
Federal court decisions regarding corporate criminal liability and procedure are reviewed, with emphasis on the issues of the acts of agents, double jeopardy, criminal liability of dissolved corporations, and corporate rights under the fourth and fifth amendments.
Abstract
Modern doctrines of corporate criminal liability data from the 1909 case of New York Central and Hudson River R.R. v. United States, which showed that a corporation could incur liability when the statute in question did not require demonstration of specific criminal intent. Later it was established that a corporation, through the conduct of its agents and employees, may be guilty of crimes involving knowledge and willfulness if the agents acted in the course of their employment and within the scope of their authority. As long as one employee at any level can be found who might have the requisite criminal intent, the corporation itself is potentially liable for any crime committed. It is not a defense to assert that officers, directors, or high-level managers had no knowledge of what was occurring. The corporation may also be held liable even if the individuals thought to be taking part in the criminal acts are acquitted. Although corporations are protected against double jeopardy, the double jeopardy clause is not violated by the prosecution of both a corporation and its officers or shareholders or of both a partnership and an individual partner. A corporation may also be charged with criminal contempt for violating a court order or consent decree. Declarations of an agent within the scope and course of the agency are admissible in evidence against the principal. Despite the common law rule that a corporation's dissolution has the same effect as the death of a natural person, court decisions have now firmly established that, if State statutes so provide, proceedings can be instituted against corporations, as creatures of statute, even after dissolution. Corporations are protected against unreasonable searches and seizure but are not entitled to the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which is a personal privilege. However, corporate custodians may not be compelled to give oral testimony regarding the location of records. This privilege is unavailable to a partnership. Footnotes with references are provided. For related materials, see NCJ 78913.