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Could the Secret Service Predict Violent Behavior?

NCJ Number
80583
Journal
News Report Volume: 32 Issue: 1 Dated: (January 1982) Pages: 14-19
Author(s)
E M Leeper
Date Published
1982
Length
6 pages
Annotation
This report discusses the Secret Service's ability to predict and prevent assassination of the president or other national public officials. The text is based on the opinions of a group of behavioral scientists.
Abstract
The Secret Service has investigated 26,000 persons and carries an active caseload of about 300 persons whom it deems capable of assassination or 'dangerous.' However, the Secret Service has never investigated or classified as dangerous any of the presidential assailants who actually did attack. Although the Service may appear to have been unsuccessful in predicting violent behavior, the figures may also imply that Service intervention may have thwarted uncounted would-be assassins. Conflicts between agents and the mental health profession may stymie efforts to thwart attackers in that therapists are reluctant to alert the Service to threats a patient may voice during medical consultations out of respect for patient confidentiality. Cooperation between the two professions is possible, however, if both sides understand their own roles and keep the demarcation clear. The quandary of deciding when the Service is justified in violating an individual's civil liberties could be lessened somewhat if predictions of dangerousness become more reliable. A definition of dangerousness is offered, along with suggestions about the items of information that should be collected to make a determination of dangerousness and the priorities that should be assigned to the various items. More intensive mental health training for agents, greater use of men-women interview teams, development of agent interview and evaluation specialists and greater standardization of data collection and interview procedures are suggested to improve assessment of dangerous persons. The service can also advise officials not to take unreasonable risks. One reference is cited.