NCJ Number
163544
Date Published
1996
Length
74 pages
Annotation
This U.S. General Accounting Office study examined the nature of counterfeiting of U.S. currency abroad, the extent of that counterfeiting and of concerns about this issue, and the status of U.S. efforts to deter such counterfeiting.
Abstract
To obtain information on the nature and extent of counterfeiting of U.S. currency abroad, as well as U.S. efforts to combat this activity, the study obtained views and material from U.S. government agencies in the United States and abroad, foreign law enforcement and financial-organization officials in seven European countries, Interpol officials in the United States and abroad, and individuals who are researching the Superdollar case. The review was performed in the United States, England, France, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Switzerland. Due to the criminal nature of counterfeiting, the true extent of the offense abroad cannot be determined. The total level of counterfeit-currency detections -- $208.7 million in fiscal year 1994 -- represented less than one one-thousandth of U.S. currency in circulation. Both Treasury and Secret Service officials agreed that counterfeiting of U.S. currency is a threat to be taken seriously, but that it is not now at a level that poses an economic threat to the U.S. monetary system. Counterfeiters run the gamut from office workers to organized crime and terrorist groups, and the equipment used for counterfeiting U.S. currency ranges from photocopiers to sophisticated offset presses. The quality of counterfeit notes varies significantly, and even those made with the same method vary according to the sophistication of the perpetrator and the type of equipment used. The U.S. Government, primarily through the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, has increased its efforts to deter counterfeiting activities. These efforts include redesigning U.S. currency to incorporate additional security features, using joint Federal agency team visits abroad to obtain more information on counterfeiting and provide counterfeit-detection training, increasing Secret Service staffing abroad, and using additional task forces and increasing diplomatic efforts to combat counterfeiting abroad. None of these efforts have been fully completed, and thus their success cannot be evaluated at this time. 3 figures and appended supplementary information and data