Crimes Against the Environment: Superfund Enforcement at Last

• NCJ Number: 150643
• Journal: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Volume: 525 Dated: (January 1993) Pages: 119-133
• Author(s): H C Barnett
• Date Published: 1993
• Length: 15 pages
• Publication Format: Article
• Publication Type: Legislation/Policy Analysis
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: Earlier version of article presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, 1991, San Francisco

Annotation

The success of the Superfund Program rests substantially on the ability of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to induce major corporations to share in the cost of hazardous waste site cleanup.

Abstract

The Superfund Act of 1980, amended in 1986, was intended to clean up some of the Nation's worst uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. Since 1980, EPA's enforcement strategy has evolved from highly accommodative to much more enforcement oriented. Reports also indicate a substantial increase in the application of the Superfund Program's most powerful enforcement tools. Industrial targets of EPA enforcement are attempting to shift partial liability and transaction costs to third parties. Viewed against the economic and political evolution of EPA's strategy, a continuation of the enforcement approach depends on the willingness of society to accept the costs of sanctioning the powerful. The development of an aggressive Superfund enforcement policy indicates that organized public involvement in environmental issues can counter industry's political influence. Industry's response to aggressive enforcement, however, highlights inherent limitations on the ability of an environmentally conscious public to demand cleanup and to impose cleanup costs on industrial polluters. Congressional and executive branch sensitivity to industrial interests and the need to promote capital accumulation stand in direct opposition to many environmental initiatives. The industrial sector argues that further broadening of the tax base in combination with a greatly restricted enforcement program is the appropriate way to resolve conflicts over Superfund financing. On the other hand, environmentalists contend that industry should not be held blameless for environmental pollution. In contemplating the next Superfund reauthorization, Congress must consider the high social costs of imposing sanctions on polluting corporations versus simply paying for cleanup. 34 footnotes