NCJ Number
109314
Journal
Journal of Legal Studies Volume: 17 Issue: 1 Dated: (January 1988) Pages: 43-82
Date Published
1988
Length
40 pages
Annotation
This article examines the discretion granted by the American criminal justice system to prosecutors and judges from the perspective offered by economic analysis.
Abstract
Many of those in favor of criminal justice discretion claim that it is efficient and they compare that efficiency with the effective operation of free commercial markets. However, in this article, the author argues that uncontrolled discretion in charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing is not more efficient than alternative methods. He also challenges those who say that criminal justice discretion is analogous to the operation of commercial markets. The analogy is inaccurate, because criminal procedure is a political and not an economic system. Criminal justice discretion results in unequal treatment of offenders, abuse of authority, and other inequities. Even if it were an efficient system, the author argues, these serious inequities must be recognized and dealt with. He concludes that the solution to these inequities will come from political and not economic analysis. 97 footnotes.