CRIMINAL LAW - ENTRAPMENT - PREDISPOSITION OF DEFENDANT CRUCIAL FACTOR IN ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE

• NCJ Number: 15824
• Journal: Cornell Law Review Volume: 59 Issue: 3 Dated: (MARCH 1974) Pages: 546-568
• Author(s): B ELA
• Date Published: 1974
• Length: 23 pages
• Corporate Author: Cornell University
• Publication Format: Article
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

DISCUSSION OF A 1973 UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION WHICH DENIED THE AVAILABILITY OF AN OBJECTIVE 'POLICE CONDUCT' STANDARD FOR THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT.

Abstract

ONE METHOD OF CONTROLLING LAW ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES IN WHICH AGENTS INDUCE THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME IS THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT. IN TWO EARLIER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, IT WAS HELD THAT PREDISPOSITION TO CRIMINAL ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED WAS A PRINCIPLE INGREDIENT IN THE TEST FOR ENTRAPMENT. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED THE PROBLEMS WITH DEFINING AN ENTRAPPED DEFENDANT SOLELY BY AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD RELATING ONLY TO POLICE CONDUCT. THIS ISSUE WAS RECONSIDERED IN UNITED STATES V. RUSSELL. THE VALIDITY OF A DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE EXAMINED ONLY THE POLICE CONDUCT IN A GIVEN SITUATION TO DETERMINE WHETHER SUCH CONDUCT WOULD HAVE INDUCED THE AVERAGE PERSON TO COMMIT THE CRIME WAS DECIDED. THE COURT REJECTED THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT BASED ON THE POLICE CONDUCT APPROACH, BUT DID RECOGNISE THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME DAY BEING FACED WITH A PREDISPOSED DEFENDANT WHOSE ARREST RESULTED, NOT IN ENTRAPMENT, BUT IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.