NCJ Number
100956
Journal
California Law Review Volume: 73 Dated: (1985) Pages: 443-482
Date Published
1985
Length
40 pages
Annotation
This paper explores the enforcement possibilities of corporate fines as companions to individual penalties.
Abstract
The study reformulates the rationale for corporate fines, suggesting that individual and corporate prosecutions are not so much parallel means to a single end as tools having complementary but distinctive functions. The discussion also presents a revised framework for justifying the harm fines cause innocent or impotent shareholders. The performance of the traditional cash fine is assessed in the context of this altered rationale. The remainder of the study explores three variants that, like the traditional fine, impose a financial penalty upon a convicted corporation. These alternatives are the equity fine, a penalty levied in stock; the pass-through fine, a penalty levied on shareholder assets; and superadded liability, an alternation of the rules of limited liability in the criminal context. Although no one of these variants can stand alone as a full alternative to cash fines and individual prosecutions, the paper concludes that, as part of a diversified strategy for preventing corporate misconduct, each is a useful tool in a battery of sanctions. 143 footnotes. (Author summary modified)