NCJ Number
86839
Journal
Canadian Journal of Criminology Volume: 25 Issue: 1 Dated: (January 1983) Pages: 79-90
Date Published
1983
Length
12 pages
Annotation
Econometric studies of deterrence suffer from questionable theoretical assumptions, unreliable data, and the inability to solve some of the methodological problems common to deterrence research.
Abstract
Economic models of criminal behavior have the underlying theoretical assumptions that (1) criminals are rational decisionmakers, (2) crime is a chosen activity, and (3) crime rates can be reduced by decreasing the benefits of crime. All of these assumptions involve simplistic analyses of human behavior that fail to consider the irrational and expressive nature of human behavior as well as the immediate environmental circumstances that restrict behavioral choices. Another weakness of the economic model of deterrence is its ignoring of the inherently subjective nature of the deterrence process. As long as it is impossible to measure the subjective rewards and costs of criminal activities, there is no way of implementing an economic model of deterrence. Even in cases where the net gain from the crime is strictly a monetary gain, the subjective value of the same amount of money varies from person to person. The matter is complicated further by a person's subjective estimate of the risk of being detected, caught, and punished rather than any objective probability of punishment. Public knowledge of sanctioning conditions also varies. Econometric studies of deterrence have also invariably used official crime data, whose deficiencies and limitations are well known. The statistical techniques used in econometric studies fail to identify the correct causal relationships while eliminating others. The statistical analysis of data yields results consistent with two or more, sometimes conflicting, hypotheses. Nineteen references are listed.