NCJ Number
83818
Date Published
1982
Length
11 pages
Annotation
The use of social science by the courts is discussed, and recent criticisms of judicial decisionmaking that relies on social science data are reviewed, followed by an examination of several proposals to reform the manner in which social facts are determined in law.
Abstract
Social science has become a vehicle with which certain social facts can be contested in court. Widespread criticisms of judicial reliance upon social science data can be reduced to three basic complaints: (1) flawed data, (2) incompatibilities between the two disciplines, and (3) the institutional incompetencies of courts. Despite the fact that social science data is frequently flawed, it still constitutes the best evidence available to courts that grapple with social science issues. While the professional incompatibilities between law and social science may hinder the effective use of data by courts, they do not preclude the use of such data. Some of these incompatibilities could be remedied by a fuller and more informed use of social science data by the courts. There is little evidence that courts are incapable of effectively using social science, and there is even less evidence that they cannot get better at it. Some proposals for improving court use of social science data include (1) using procedural safeguards, (2) placing the burden of proof on any party that would use such data to challenge a statute's constitutionality, (3) increasing the sophistication of court personnel, (4) using court-appointed experts, (5) using a social science institute to synthesize and codify data for use by courts, and (6) creating a separate court for the resolution of legally relevant scientific fact issues. Thirty-one references are listed.