NCJ Number
153596
Journal
Harvard Journal on Legislation Volume: 32 Issue: 1 Dated: (Winter 1995) Pages: 3-77
Date Published
1995
Length
75 pages
Annotation
Following a review of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dauber v. Marl Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc. (1993), which established a new test for the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, this article critiques a "plain- meaning" approach to interpreting the Rules, as manifested in the "Dauber" decision.
Abstract
In Dauber v. Marl Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court replaced the Free v. United States test, which required that novel scientific evidence be "generally accepted" before being admissible in court, with a "reliability test" embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence. After Dauber, scientific evidence is admissible if it is "relevant and reliable." The judge must therefore examine the science underlying the testimony and base his admissibility decision on a weighing of factors that the U.S. Supreme Court has, to date, only partly identified. This article focuses on Dauber for the purpose of understanding and critiquing the Court's approach to interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence. Scholars have argued that the Court has adopted a rigid "plain-meaning" approach to Rule interpretation, allowing exceptions only for highly unusual cases. This article argues that the Federal Rules of Evidence are particularly appropriate for a more flexible, as opposed to "plain-meaning" approach, to interpreting the Rules. 403 footnotes