NCJ Number
190311
Date Published
2000
Length
25 pages
Annotation
This paper focused on critical questions that would affect the next administration's decisions regarding missile defenses and the policy implications of pursuring a national missile defense capability.
Abstract
The threat of a ballistic missile threat to the United States is different today because nations are pursuing new strategic capabilities because they perceive their security at risk in ways it was not during the Cold War. Under the right circumstances proliferating states may not be deterred by the United States' advantage in strategic nuclear forces from using their ballistic missiles. There has been a proliferation of ballistic missile design and production know-how. The missile threat from Russia and China is growing, and North Korea and Iran are developing long-range missiles. The United States has a right to defend its homeland. The goal of defensive deployments is to allow the United States to pursue its foreign and defense policies without a risk to the American people. Defensive deployments can deter Russia from backsliding while guarding against accidental launches, dissuade China from pursuing a strategic offensive force, provide assurance to allies, and deny adversaries an utility from ballistic missile capabilities. Rather than viewing the ballistic missile threat narrowly as a proliferation problem with a focus on the supply routes, it needs to be addressed as a strategic problem. The focus should be on determining the intent, plans, and doctrines of the potential proliferator. Activities of second tier suppliers need to be integrated into the analysis. The United States needs to deploy theater defenses that will give forces some inherent strategic capability. Deterrence can be achieved by ensuring there is sufficient retaliatory capability to survive any first-strike scenario. A combined deterrent/defense concept and force structure would seek to make assured retaliatory strategies both feasible and reliable. It is not certain that present funding is enough to deploy a national missile defense (NMD) program by the end of the decade. The United States needs to revitalize its efforts to convince Russia and China that they can cooperate with the United States' plans to deploy NMD. America also needs to engage its allies more. The next administration should consider measures to refine the set of options to an emerging missile threat, including enhancing a NMD program, improving intelligence collecting, and providing sufficient funding. Footnotes