NCJ Number
58766
Journal
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume: 70 Issue: 2 Dated: (SUMMER 1979) Pages: 214-234
Date Published
1979
Length
21 pages
Annotation
AN APPROACH TO ASSURING THAT TRIAL DELAYS DO NOT CONTINUE AFTER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT IS FULLY IMPLEMENTED (JULY 1, 1979) IS OUTLINED.
Abstract
THE ACT REQUIRES (WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS) THAT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS BE TRIED WITHIN 100 DAYS OF ARREST OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS. 'ENDS-OF-JUSTICE' PROVISIONS SPECIFY PERIODS OF DELAY THAT MAY BE EXCLUDED IN COMPUTING THE TIME FROM ARREST TO TRIAL. THE ACT, WHICH WAS PROMPTED IN PART BY CONGRESS' DESIRE TO REDUCE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY BY PERSONS RELEASED PENDING TRIAL, REFLECTS THE BASIC ASSUMPTION THAT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS CANNOT BE TRUSTED WITH THE TASK OF PROTECTING SOCIETY'S INTERESTS IN THE SWIFT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. SYSTEM PARTICIPANTS, ALL OF WHOM HAVE IDENTIFIABLE INTERESTS IN DELAYS, HAVE NOT LOOKED FAVORABLY UPON THE ACT AND MAY TRY TO UNDERMINE ITS EFFECT. ONE LIKELY APPROACH IS FOR THE DEFENSE TO REQUEST A CONTINUANCE UNDER THE ENDS-OF-JUSTICE PROVISIONS, CLAIMING THAT THE TIME LIMITS OF THE ACT CONFLICT WITH THE DEFENDANT'S ABILITY TO RETAIN COUNSEL OF CHOICE, OR WITH THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED BY ADEQUATELY PREPARED COUNSEL. THE PROSECUTOR, WELCOMING THE DELAY, MAY NOT OPPOSE THE DEFENSE MOTION. IF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT IS NOT TO BE RENDERED USLESS BY STIPULATED CONTINUANCES, THE COURTS MUST REQUIRE THAT ALL REQUESTS FOR DELAYS BE ADEQUATELY DOCUMENTED AND THAT ALL CONTINUANCES GRANTED UNDER THE BROAD ENDS-OF-JUSTICE PROVISIONS BE FACTUALLY SUPPORTED. THE COURTS MUST BE COMMITTED TO REQUIRING SPECIFIC INFORMATION FROM DEFENSE COUNSEL TO BOLSTER RIGHT-TO-COUNSEL CLAIMS FOR DELAYS, RATHER RELYING ON ON STIPULATION OF THE DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION THAT A BASIS FOR DELAY EXISTS. THIS COMMITMENT BY THE COURTS IS IMPORTANT, BECAUSE MOTIVES FOR SEEKING DELAYS CONFLICT WITH SOCIETY'S INTEREST IN PROMPT ACTIONS. (LKM)