Delayed Memories and Scientific Evidence: Maintaining the Pre-Trial Admissibility of Delayed Memory Evidence (From Sexual Abuse Litigation: A Practical Resource for Attorneys, Clinicians, and Advocates, P 133-145, 2000, Rebecca Rix, ed. -- See NCJ-193287)

• NCJ Number: 193293
• Author(s): Brooks Cooper
• Date Published: 2000
• Length: 13 pages
• Sale Source: Haworth Press, Inc
• Publication Format: Book (Softbound)
• Publication Type: Legislation/Policy Analysis
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This chapter explains how the legal tradition of applying different standards to the admissibility of expert and lay opinions as evidence in litigation complicates delayed-discovery cases of childhood sexual abuse.

Abstract

The current controversy fueled by the efforts of some to question the existence, validity, and reliability of "repressed memory" has a complex relationship to the evolving standards for the admission of expert testimony at trial generally, and to delayed-memory sexual abuse cases in particular. This chapter first examines the jurisprudence regarding expert and scientific evidence preceding the recent U.S. Supreme Court finding in Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993), with attention to Frye v. United States (1923). "Frye" specified a rule for the admissibility of expert testimony that requires it to be based in generally accepted scientific truth in the field represented by the expert witness. In "Daubert," the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated a test that differed substantially from those in use by the circuit courts at the time. After explaining the Court's finding in "Daubert," the chapter explains why the Court's ruling favors the admissibility of expert testimony regarding repressed memory in cases of childhood sexual abuse. The author argues for a rejection of "Frye" and for the proper application of "Daubert," with due regard for the values embodied in the adversarial system. 41 notes