Determinants of Sanction Severity in a Regulatory Bureaucracy (From Corporations as Criminals, P 147-165, 1984, Ellen Hochstedler, ed. - See NCJ-94652)

• NCJ Number: 94659
• Author(s): J Lynxwiler; N Shover; D Clelland
• Date Published: 1984
• Length: 19 pages
• Grant Number(s): 80-IJ-CX-0017
• Sponsoring Agency: National Institute of Justice (NIJ); US Dept of Justice NIJ Pub
• Sale Source: Sage Publications, Inc
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This study examines the determinants of the magnitude of civil fines imposed on a group of mining corporations for violations of regulations enforced by the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM).

Abstract

The sample consisted of 83 firms receiving a total of 735 notices of violation (NOV). Company size influences the size of the fine. Smaller companies paid higher fines than large corporations although their violations were no more serious. This indicates the influence of informal corporate mechanisms on agency decisionmaking. Analysis of personal interviews with 43 OSM mine inspectors indicates they are the most likely source of this influence. Because the OSM's sanctioning process is heavily dependent on inspector reports, the fines elicited by the reports will reflect inspector proclivities toward offending corporations. It appears that larger mining companies benefit from the fact that agency-client confrontations are a match between salaried technicians in which large, but not small, industry has the upper hand. Inspectors' judgments of appropriate sanctions seem to be influenced by their perceptions of corporate resources. These corporate resources are not the arrangements that resulted from the regulatory presence, but rather are attributable to the structure of the industry itself. Five notes and 45 references are included. Two tables are also provided.