NCJ Number
155476
Journal
International Review of Law and Economics Volume: 14 Issue: 3 Dated: (September 1994) Pages: 341-350
Date Published
1994
Length
10 pages
Annotation
This paper uses a mathematical model designed to determine the fine structure that is most effective in deterring a repeat of offenses.
Abstract
The model assumes that offending is a rational decision that compares the possible consequences and benefits of an illegal act before deciding whether or not to commit the act. It also assumes that the decisionmaker (DM) decides on the number of crimes to commit at the outset before any crime has been committed. The crimes are identical in the sense that if they prove successful, they all yield the same monetary reward, and the probability of being caught is always the same. The net monetary fine the DM has to pay if caught depends on the number of times the DM has been caught in the past. The model further assumes that the sum of the total amount of fines for all the offenses is fixed. The issue to be determined is the comparative deterrence effectiveness of various fine amounts apportioned to each offense. The model found that the most effective fine structure attaches the greatest fines to the earliest rather than the latest offenses. 2 figures and 8 references