Differential Social Organization, Collective Action, and Crime

• NCJ Number: 217403
• Journal: Crime, Law and Social Change Volume: 46 Issue: 1-2 Dated: 2006 Pages: 3-33
• Author(s): Ross L. Matsueda
• Date Published: 2006
• Length: 31 pages
• Grant Number(s): SES-0004323
• Sponsoring Agency: National Science Foundation
• Publication Format: Article
• Publication Type: Research (Theoretical)
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This article elaborates and extends Sutherland’s (1947) concept of differential social organization by drawing on Mead’s (1934) theories of symbolic interaction and social control in order to conceptualize crime as collective behavior.

Abstract

The main goal of the article is to present an integrated theory of both criminal and noncriminal collective behavior. Sutherland’s differential social organization thesis uses macro-level concepts of social organization to explain variations in crime rates across groups. According to this explanation, crime rates can be both enhanced and decreased depending on the type of social organization. Sutherland, however, failed to enumerate the underlying mechanisms through which social organization impacts crime. The author focused on identifying the underlying theoretical mechanisms through which individuals mobilize others into collective behavior that is either criminal or noncriminal. In identifying these mechanisms, the author drew from Mead’s theories of symbolic interaction and social control, particularly the concepts of social networks, weak ties, collective action frames, and individual collective action thresholds. According to Mead, social organization is constituted through social interaction, which means that communication networks of individuals are critical in defining the social organization and structure of a society as well as in defining individual’s selves and activities. The author analyzes the ways in which social ties among individuals and networks lead to collective action, which may be criminal. Elements of Goffman’s frame analysis are also used to show how individuals compete to have their understandings of reality adopted as the collective group’s understanding, which leads to a consensus with regard to objectives and the implementation of actions to realize objectives. Since not all collective actions are criminal, the author draws on the concept of informal social control to explain how collective action can be organized against crime, rather than for crime. Table, figures, footnotes, references