Discretion in the Sentencing and Parole Processes (From Discretion, Justice, and Democracy, P 62-70, 1985, Carl F Pinkele and William C Louthan, eds. - See NCJ-96653)

• NCJ Number: 96659
• Author(s): D Kalinich
• Date Published: 1985
• Length: 9 pages
• Publication Format: Document
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This paper argues that efforts to limit the discretion exercised by judges and other practitioners in sentencing and in granting parole will change the focus of decisionmaking or drive the application of discretion underground.

Abstract

Several approaches to limiting discretion are considered: for example, some States have moved to a 'flat sentencing' procedure so that sentences are fixed by statute and relate to the crime. The offender's background and personal details are not considered. A variation of the flat sentence allows for some decisionmaking based on the intent of the offender, the seriousness of the offense, and/or the offender's previous criminal record. Limits have also been placed on probation and parole officers and prison personnel who provide information to the judges and paroling authorities involved in the decisionmaking process, but these attempts will not survive the momentum of the criminal justice system. Legal and administrative changes will be resisted when they conflict with the roles that members of the criminal justice system have been socialized to accept. In addition, police officers, prison guards, prosecuting attorneys, and judges can easily circumvent the rules or limits. Judges, for example, may reduce or change charges so they can give sentences that they feel are appropriate. A strictly administrative or legalistic approach to imposing limits on discretion will not work; those who are being controlled must participate in policymaking.