NCJ Number
80403
Journal
Stanford Law Review Volume: 33 Issue: 1 Dated: (November 1980) Pages: 75-101
Date Published
1980
Length
27 pages
Annotation
Following an examination of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision on capital punishment in Furman v. Georgia, Florida's post-Furman death penalty statute, and the Supreme Court's approval of that statute in Proffitt v. Florida, the application of the Florida statute is analyzed in 350 murder cases from 1973 to 1976.
Abstract
In Furman and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk of discrimination or arbitrariness. In an effort to conform to the intent of these Court decisions, Florida enacted a death penalty statute designed to control discretion by listing aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be weighed in determining sentence, as well as providing for a review of all death sentences by the State's supreme court. In Proffitt, the Supreme Court held that the Florida sentencing procedure on its face avoids the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman. An examination of the 350 Florida murder cases showed that although all were presented to the grand jury for a first-degree murder indictment, differences in the circumstances of the killing and the quality of evidence led to a variety of dispositions. Because there is a rational basis for distinguishing most cases that did not result in death sentences from the few that did, it cannot be concluded that capital punishment has been imposed with significant arbitrariness; however, there was still no basis for distinguishing some of the cases that did not result in death sentences from those that did, indicating that some arbitrary use of discretion in capital cases may still exist. Tabular data and footnotes are provided. (Author summary modified)