NCJ Number
15933
Journal
Oregon Law Review Volume: 53 Issue: 1 Dated: (FALL 1973) Pages: 100-113
Date Published
1973
Length
14 pages
Annotation
THIS ARTICLE ANALYZES OREGON'S DEFINITION OF THE 'SAME OFFENSE' CRITERIA OF THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY BY EXAMINING THE 1972 CASE OF STATE V. BROWN, OTHER CASE LAW, AND THE NEW OREGON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.
Abstract
ON MAY 24, 1972, THE SUPREME COURT OF OREGON HELD, IN STATE V. BROWN, THAT UNDER THE OREGON CONSTITUTION A SECOND PROSECUTION IS FOR THE SAME OFFENSE AND IS PROHIBITED IF (1) THE CHARGES ARISE OUT OF THE SAME ACT OR TRANSACTION, AND (2) THE CHARGES COULD HAVE BEEN TRIED IN THE SAME COURT, AND (3) THE PROSECUTOR KNEW OR REASONABLY SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE SECOND CHARGE AT THE TIME OF THE ORIGINAL PROSECUTION. IN ADDITION, THE GOVERNOR SIGNED INTO LAW A NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE WHICH PROVIDED THAT (N)O PERSON SHALL BE SEPARATELY PROSECUTED FOR TWO OR MORE OFFENSES BASED UPON THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE, IF THE SEVERAL OFFENSES ARE REASONABLY KNOWN TO THE APPROPRIATE PROSECUTOR AT THE TIME OF COMMENCEMENT OF THE FIRST PROSECUTION AND ESTABLISH PROPER VENUE IN A SINGLE COURT. EACH ELEMENT OF THE DEFINITION IS DISCUSSED AND SOME OF THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE CHANGE IN OREGON LAW ARE EXPLORED. THE AUTHOR CONCLUDES THAT OREGON'S NEW DEFINITION OF THE 'SAME OFFENSE' IS BROADER IN SCOPE THAN EITHER THE JUDICIARY OR LEGISLATURE HAD ORIGINALLY PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THE PROCEDURAL MECHANISM FOR IMPLEMENTING THE DEFINITION IS NOT WHOLLY ADEQUATE. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED)