NCJ Number
96194
Date Published
1985
Length
21 pages
Annotation
This chapter considers the likely effects of variations in drug enforcement and other official drug abuse control strategies on the nature and extent of the organized drug problem.
Abstract
The discussion examines the effects of enforcement policy on the whole range of crimes by and against drug traffickers. The key unknown in this analysis is the response of drug purchasers to increasing drug prices. If demand is relatively elastic to price, then increasing prices will lead to a decrease in the total amount of money spent on drugs, which means that the total revenues of drug trafficking organizations will decrease. If demand remains relatively insensitive to price, then total drug-dealing revenues will increase as better enforcement drives prices up. Given inelastic demand, a tough law enforcement policy that reduces supply would only generate higher prices, higher revenues, and higher profits for the smaller pool of suppliers. With more money at stake, there would be more to fight about, and violence would probably increase. Successful drug enforcement will thus tend to increase violence by both users and traffickers, especially in the short run. It will serve organized crime's interests by restricting the entry of new criminal groups and increasing the wealth, power, and threat of high-level established dealers. The preferable policy for controlling organized crime would be to reduce demand for drugs through public education aimed at the principal users. Three notes and seven references are listed.