NCJ Number
92192
Journal
University of San Francisco Law Review Volume: 17 Issue: 2 Dated: (Winter 1983) Pages: 277-305
Date Published
1983
Length
29 pages
Annotation
The purposes of the due process exclusionary rule are better served when the courts focus not on the standing of the individual defendant, but on the particular conduct that must be regulated.
Abstract
The justification for an exclusionary rule lies in its deterrent value and in its ability to protect the integrity of the judicial system. The atomistic standing requirement is antithetical to these basic justifications and severely constrains the regulatory objectives of an exclusionary rule. Increasingly, the standing requirement has been invoked to limit access to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to individuals who were victims of an unlawful search. This trend continued in United States v. Payner, where the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to transplant the fourth amendment standing requirement to new fields at the expense of the protections of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Application of a standing requirement to limit invocation of an exclusionary remedy is particularly inappropriate in the fifth amendment area because of the firmly entrenched constitutional protections of due process. In practice, an unwarranted extension of the fourth amendment standing requirement to violations of individual's due process rights will operate as a limitation on the due process exclusionary rule and undermine the rule's regulatory objectives. The objectives will be promoted, however, when the rule is viewed from a regulatory perspective with a focus on the particular conduct the rule was meant to deter. A total of 172 case notes are supplied. (Author summary modified)