NCJ Number
61016
Date Published
1978
Length
30 pages
Annotation
RECENT THEORETICAL ECONOMIC MODELS DEALING WITH PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CRIME ARE EXAMINED AND ARGUMENTS ARE PRESENTED FOR THE MODELS' INAPPLICABILITY TO POLICY DECISIONS.
Abstract
CENTRAL TO THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR PROPOSED BY BECKER IS A DETERRENCE FUNCTION WHICH RELATES NUMBER OF OFFENSES COMMITTED TO THE PROBABILITY AND SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT THROUGH THE THEORY OF INDIVIDUAL CHOICE IN THE PRESENCE OF UNCERTAINTY. THIS MODEL CONCLUDED THAT CRIME, AT THE OPTIMUM, SHOULD NOT PAY, BECAUSE OF THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF PUNISHMENT AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF GETTING CAUGHT. THIS MODEL, HOWEVER, IMPLIES THE POLICY DECISION, WHICH IS NOT FOUND IN ACTUAL PRACTICE, THAT PUNISHMENTS SHOULD BE INCREASED TO THE LEVEL WHERE NO FURTHER DETERRENCE IS POSSIBLE. MORE RECENT MODIFICATIONS TO THE BECKER MODEL HAVE FAILED TO OVERCOME ITS INADEQUACIES, ALTHOUGH APPLYING THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES TO CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR DOES PRODUCE USEFUL RESULTS. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IS THEREFORE A PARTIAL BUT NOT A COMPLETE MODEL FOR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR. THE MAIN CONCEPT MISSING FROM ECONOMIC MODELS IS THE IDEA OF RETRIBUTION, WHICH SETS A LIMIT TO PUNISHMENT BY RELATING FINES TO THE DAMAGE DONE BY THE OFFENSE AS WELL AS TO THE INDIVIDUAL'S CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS CONCEPT IS NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN OBSERVED PUNISHMENT LEVELS. FOOTNOTES AND A BIBLIOGRAPHY ARE INCLUDED. FOR THE COMPLETE VOLUME OF WHICH THIS STUDY IS A PART, SEE NCJ61013. (CFW)