NCJ Number
39428
Journal
Journal of Legal Studies Volume: 5 Issue: 2 Dated: (JUNE 1976) Pages: 311-340
Date Published
1976
Length
30 pages
Annotation
IN HIS 'ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS,' LANDES SHOWED THAT PLEA BARGAINING CAN BE CHARACTERIZED AS A MARKET TRANSACTION IN WHICH THE PROSECUTOR 'BUYS' GUILTY PLEAS IN EXCHANGE FOR PROMISES OF SENTENCE LENIENCY.
Abstract
THIS PAPER DEVELOPS AND EXTENDS LANDES' MODEL TO CLARIFY THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING AND THE OVERALL MECHANICS OF THE CRIMINAL COURTS. A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY IS DEVELOPED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE INFLUENCE THAT THE RELATIVE BARGAINING STRENGTHS OF THE DEFENDANT AND PROSECUTOR HAVE ON: (A) THE NUMBER OF PROSECUTIONS, AND (B) THE USE OF PLEA BARGAINING RATHER THAN TRIALS TO DISPOSE OF CRIMINAL CASES. TO ANALYZE THE BARGAINING BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS AND PROSECUTOR, SOME MATHEMATICAL NOTATION IS INTRODUCED INITIALLY, FOLLOWED BY ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE PROSECUTOR'S BEHAVIOR. AMONG THESE ASSUMPTIONS IS A SPECIFICATION OF THE PROSECUTOR'S OBJECTIVE FUNCTION, WHICH HE MAXIMIZES SUBJECT TO A BUDGET CONSTRAINT AND THE DEFENDANTS' AGGREGATE DEMAND FOR TRIALS. THIS MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM IS SPECIFIED, FIRST ORDER CONDITIONS FOR A CONSTRAINED MAXIMUM ARE DERIVED AND INTERPRETED, AND THE FIRST ORDER CONDITIONS ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENTIATED TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT THAT THE PROSECUTOR'S BUDGET, THE AVAILIBILITY AND QUALITY OF LEGAL AID TO INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, COURT DELAY AND BAIL POLICY HAVE OVER THE DISPOSITION OF CASES IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS. IT IS SHOWN THAT THE DISPOSITION OF CASES IN THE CRIMINAL COURTS DEPENDS ON THE PROSECUTOR'S BUDGET AND THE RELATIVE COST OF TRIALS FOR THE DEFENDANTS. THE EMPIRICAL COUNTERPARTS OF THESE THEORECTICAL CONSTRUCTS ARE SPECIFIED IN TWO HYPOTHESES AND TESTED USING DATA COLLECTED FROM U.S. DISTRICT COURTS AND MINNESOTA COURTS. THE DISPOSITION HYPOTHESIS STATES THAT, GENERALLY, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PROSECUTIONS, AND THE RESULTING NUMBER OF GUILTY PLEAS AND TRIALS, ARE FUNCTIONS OF THE BUDGET CONSTRAINT IMPOSED ON THE PROSECUTOR AND THE COST OF A TRIAL RELATIVE TO A SETTLEMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT. THE SENTENCING HYPOTHESIS STATES THAT, OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, THE DEFENDANTS' DEMAND FOR TRIALS IS INVERSELY RELATED TO THE PLEA BARGAINING CONCESSIONS EXCHANGED FOR NEGOTIATED SETTELMENTS. THEREFORE, THE RATIO OF SETTLEMENTS TO TRIALS VARIES DIRECTLY WITH THE LENIENCY OF THE SENTENCE EXCHANGED FOR GUILTY PLEAS. BOTH HYPOTHESES ARE TESTED USING MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS WHERE DATA MADE THIS METHOD APPROPRIATE, OR A T-TEST TO DETERMINE THE STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF OBSERVED DIFFERENCES IN DISPOSITIONS AND SENTENCING BETWEEN TWO JUDICIAL DISTRICTS. STATISTICAL RESULTS SUPPORTED BOTH HYPOTHESES. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED)...ELW